KANT-STUDIENPub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1515/kant-2023-2023
{"title":"<b>Prämierung von Dissertationen durch die Immanuel Kant-Stiftung</b>","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/kant-2023-2023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2023-2023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135702874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KANT-STUDIENPub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1515/kant-2023-2014
J. Mcquillan
{"title":"Learnedness, Learned Cognition, and the Science of Logic: From Thomasius and Meier to Kant","authors":"J. Mcquillan","doi":"10.1515/kant-2023-2014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2023-2014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is well-known that Immanuel Kant used Meier’s Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason as a textbook in his logic lectures for almost forty years. Kant himself, and most later scholars, regard Meier as a follower of Wolff and Baumgarten; however, when we compare Meier’s Excerpt with Thomasius’ Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason, we find that Meier’s conception of “learned cognition” is derived from Thomasius’ conception of “learnedness.” Kant seems to have developed the pre-critical distinction between “the logic of the common and healthy reason” and “the logic of the learned reason” from Meier’s distinction between “common” and “learned” cognition, which means that Meier’s appropriation of Thomasius also influenced Kant’s conception of logic. Connecting Kant’s views on logic to Thomasius through Meier in this way reveals that Kant’s pre-critical conception of logic was more eclectic than scholars have previously recognized.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":"114 1","pages":"295 - 328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45826122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KANT-STUDIENPub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1515/kant-2023-2026
{"title":"Mitgliederversammlung der Kant-Gesellschaft","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/kant-2023-2026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2023-2026","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135703247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KANT-STUDIENPub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1515/kant-2023-2018
M. Walter, Jörg Hüttner
{"title":"Zum Nachweis von Kants Fontenelle-Zitat: „Vor einem Vornehmen bücke ich mich […]“","authors":"M. Walter, Jörg Hüttner","doi":"10.1515/kant-2023-2018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2023-2018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is shown that the famous quote from Fontenelle in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, “I bow before an eminent man, but my spirit does not bow,” comes from the book On Principles of Morality, written by Abbé Mably. The Fontenelle quote is found in a review of this very book in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung (No. 21, 1785). This review should further be considered Kant’s source.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":"114 1","pages":"383 - 384"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41920590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KANT-STUDIENPub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1515/kant-2023-2016
Markus D. Herrmann
{"title":"Kants Asymmetrie von Raum und Zeit: Sind reine rein zeitliche Objekte möglich?","authors":"Markus D. Herrmann","doi":"10.1515/kant-2023-2016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2023-2016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In multiple parts of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes how time is dependent on space – which is the fundament of his distinction between inner and outer sense. However, he does not provide us with an argument for this dependency. In this article, two reasons for this dependency thesis are introduced. The first one aims at providing a conceptual link between time and space but runs into conflict with the Transcendental Aesthetic. The second one shifts our focus from the conceptual level to a priori possible objects of experience: Time cannot provide such objects, which are different from our subjective states due to its one-dimensionality. Only space makes such objects possible.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":"114 1","pages":"185 - 206"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47847138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KANT-STUDIENPub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1515/kant-2023-2020
Ekin Erkan
{"title":"Katharina T. Kraus: Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation: The Nature of Inner Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Xiii, 306 pp. ISBN: 978-1-108-87430-4","authors":"Ekin Erkan","doi":"10.1515/kant-2023-2020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2023-2020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":"114 1","pages":"388 - 395"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49578786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KANT-STUDIENPub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1515/kant-2023-2021
Stefan Klingner
{"title":"Kategoriendeduktion in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie. Hrsg. von Nicolas Bickmann, Lars Heckenroth und Rainer Schäfer. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2020. 163 Seiten. [Philosophische Schriften 100.] ISBN: 978-3-428-15925-3.","authors":"Stefan Klingner","doi":"10.1515/kant-2023-2021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2023-2021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":"114 1","pages":"396 - 399"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49519490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KANT-STUDIENPub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1515/kant-2023-2019
H. Puls, Dieter Schönecker
{"title":"Diskussion zum dritten Abschnitt der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten","authors":"H. Puls, Dieter Schönecker","doi":"10.1515/kant-2023-2019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2023-2019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Two issues are at the core of a seemingly never-ending debate about Groundwork III: First, does Kant in GMS III still think he has to deduce the moral law partly from non-moral presuppositions by making a transition from theoretical to practical freedom, as Schönecker argues? Or does Kant already regard the categorical imperative as grounded in a fact of reason, as Puls argues? It is, secondly, no less unclear what exactly is meant by the “deduction” Kant mentions in three places in GMS III. While Puls claims that Kant is referring to the deduction of the idea of freedom from the unquestionable consciousness of pure practical reason, Schönecker contends that GMS III is ultimately about the deduction of the categorical imperative. Schönecker takes issue with Puls’s position as developed, and Puls replies.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":"114 1","pages":"329 - 353"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47221116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KANT-STUDIENPub Date : 2023-03-29DOI: 10.1515/kant-2023-2013
D. Smith
{"title":"How is an Illusion of Reason Possible? The Division of Nothing in the Critique of Pure Reason","authors":"D. Smith","doi":"10.1515/kant-2023-2013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2023-2013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper develops a new interpretation of the “table of nothing” that appears at the end of the transcendental aesthetic in the Critique of Pure Reason. In contrast to previous interpretations, which have taken it to be part of Kant’s account of the failures of reason, this paper argues that it should be understood as proffering Kant’s positive account of the objects he will be concerned with in the transcendental dialectic, namely objects that, properly understood, are nothing. I examine the four nothings in turn, showing how Kant’s concern is to develop a positive account of each one that allows him to determine its object while recognizing that it in some sense is not. I introduce Allison’s distinction between error and illusion and argue that the table of nothing is Kant’s theoretical account of what illusions are as objects, and thereby explains how something like a transcendental dialectic is possible at all.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":"0 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44522804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}