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Introduction 介绍
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-09-08 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2022-2035
K. Pollok
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引用次数: 0
Self-Legislating Machines: What can Kant Teach Us about Original Intentionality? 自我立法机器：康德能教会我们什么关于初心的东西？
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-09-08 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2022-2030
R. Evans
{"title":"Self-Legislating Machines: What can Kant Teach Us about Original Intentionality?","authors":"R. Evans","doi":"10.1515/kant-2022-2030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I attempt to address a fundamental challenge for machine intelligence: to understand whether and how a machine’s internal states and external outputs can exhibit original non-derivative intentionality. This question has three aspects. First, what does it take for a machine to exhibit original de dicto intentionality? Second, what does it take to exhibit original de re intentionality? Third, what is required for the machine to defer to the external objective world by respecting the word-to-world direction of fit? I attempt to answer the first challenge by providing a constitutive counts-as understanding of de dicto intentionality. This analysis involves repurposing Kant’s vision of a self-legislating agent as a specification of a machine that reprograms itself. I attempt to answer the second and third challenges by extending Kant’s synchronic model of de dicto intentionality with Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s diachronic model of de re intentionality, using Hegel’s notion of recollection to provide an understanding of what is involved in achieving deference to the external world.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48437386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant’s Ontology of Appearances and the Synthetic Apriori 康德的现象本体论与综合先验
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-09-08 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2022-2027
C. Friebe
{"title":"Kant’s Ontology of Appearances and the Synthetic Apriori","authors":"C. Friebe","doi":"10.1515/kant-2022-2027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Kant’s ontology of appearances implies that the numerical distinctness of empirical objects is grounded in their appearance-aspect, more precisely in space as pure intuition, in which alone such objects can be given. With distinguishing concepts things can only be thought: in contrast to Leibniz’s complete concepts and to Kripke’s rigid designators, Kant’s general concepts do not entail their referents analytically. They must be applied to intuition, i. e. be completed synthetically. Consequently, Kant’s ontology of merely singular (but not unique) individuals (Einzeldinge) is closely connected with a genuine semantics of synthetic reference via intuition, expressed by irreducible demonstratives such as “this”, “here”, and “now”. Accordingly, the judgment “There can be (or could have been) indiscernibles” is synthetic-apriori, which distinguishes Kant’s view both from skeptical empiricism and from heavyweight ontological realism.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45126618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Kant’s Ontological Phenomenalism 康德本体论现象论
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2022-2038
M. Pickering
{"title":"Kant’s Ontological Phenomenalism","authors":"M. Pickering","doi":"10.1515/kant-2022-2038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Immanuel Kant’s oft-repeated statement that physical objects are mere representations has given rise to various phenomenalist interpretations. Here I understand phenomenalism to be the view that physical objects are actual or possible perceptions. I argue for a novel phenomenalist interpretation: for Kant a physical object is nothing but the sum of actual and possible perceptions that agree with its empirical concept. I argue that this interpretation is supported by the textual evidence and that this interpretation is not vulnerable to objections commonly made against phenomenalist interpretations. I also argue that the textual evidence provides more support for this interpretation than it does for certain other phenomenalist interpretations.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43053057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Beauty Makes Humanity: The Application of Kant’s Aesthetic Power of Judgment in Value Choice 美造就人：康德审美判断力在价值选择中的运用
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-08-24 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2022-2036
Zhengmi Zhouhuang
{"title":"Beauty Makes Humanity: The Application of Kant’s Aesthetic Power of Judgment in Value Choice","authors":"Zhengmi Zhouhuang","doi":"10.1515/kant-2022-2036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I use Kant’s theory of the aesthetic power of judgment to solve the problem of nonmoral value choice, which Kant himself did not deal with, and prove that my reconstruction can fit into Kant’s philosophy and function as a harmonization and unification of morality and happiness. First, I revisit Kant’s early view of intellectualized happiness to establish the feasibility of this project in Kant’s ethics. Second, by analogy with the contemplative judgment of taste and practical artistic creation, I argue for the universal communicability of pleasure in value choice from the transcendental perspective, on the one hand, and explain the various choices by individuals in reality from the empirical perspective, on the other. Ultimately, I connect the pursuit of intellectual happiness with the fulfillment of the imperfect duty of one’s own perfection, through which a transition from nature to freedom can be accomplished in Kant’s philosophy.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41952042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revelation’s Entrenchment in Pure Reason in Fichte’s Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung 《探求启示
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2022-2013
Amit Kravitz
{"title":"Revelation’s Entrenchment in Pure Reason in Fichte’s Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung","authors":"Amit Kravitz","doi":"10.1515/kant-2022-2013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Kant’s dictum, morality leads inescapably to religion. Notably, this implies two unavoidable shifts: From ‘morality’ to the ‘religion of reason’ and from the ‘religion of reason’ to ‘positive religions’ (‘revelation’). I explain the grounds for each shift, focusing on the different kinds of necessity involved. I then analyze Fichte’s Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (1792), which mainly addresses the second shift, discussed only briefly by Kant. As I show, whereas for Kant revelation is conditioned by a prior free determination of the will, for Fichte it obtains a primordial status. I explain how Fichte’s approach fills in the Kantian gap between the concept of God, which seems to exclude the possibility of revelation, and the unavoidable human need to assume such an occurrence.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41369689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Troubling Relationship between Pleasure and Universality in Kant’s Impure Aesthetic Judgements 康德《不纯粹的审美判断》中愉悦与普遍性的纠结关系
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2022-2011
James Phillips
{"title":"The Troubling Relationship between Pleasure and Universality in Kant’s Impure Aesthetic Judgements","authors":"James Phillips","doi":"10.1515/kant-2022-2011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Kant calls judgements of adherent beauty impure aesthetic judgements because they presuppose the empirical concept of the object and are thus not determined exclusively by a feeling of pleasure. Glossed over in Kant’s account is what kind of universality these judgements have. This article argues that the subjective universality of pure aesthetic judgements and the objective universality of cognitive judgements do not merge in impure aesthetic judgements and that the tension between them reaches also into Kant’s pure aesthetic judgements with their unstable relations between the pleasure of the a priori harmony of the faculties and the empirical object named beautiful. Pleasure, which for Kant is communicable while nonetheless not being discursive, is always to some extent lost for words.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43123287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
KANT 300 康德300
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2022-2025
{"title":"KANT 300","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/kant-2022-2025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2025","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43989938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rudolf Meer: Der transzendentale Grundsatz der Vernunft: Funktion und Struktur des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2019 [Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte 207]. xii + 314 S. ISBN 978-3-11-062316-1. 鲁道夫·米尔：《理性的超越原则：纯粹理性批判的超越辩证法附录的功能与结构》。柏林/波士顿：Walter de Gruyter，2019【Kantstudien Supplement Hefte 207】。xii314S。ISBN 978-3-11-062316-1。
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2020-0030
Thierry Schütz
{"title":"Rudolf Meer: Der transzendentale Grundsatz der Vernunft: Funktion und Struktur des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2019 [Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte 207]. xii + 314 S. ISBN 978-3-11-062316-1.","authors":"Thierry Schütz","doi":"10.1515/kant-2020-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2020-0030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45151591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Der „erste Satz“ in Grundlegung I 基础I中的“第一句话”
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
KANT-STUDIEN Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/kant-2022-2015
K. Steigleder
{"title":"Der „erste Satz“ in Grundlegung I","authors":"K. Steigleder","doi":"10.1515/kant-2022-2015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I try to show that the question of what the “first proposition” in Groundwork I is can be answered by textual evidence. At the end of paragraph 15 of GMS I, Kant recapitulates the “first proposition”. It is: “Eine Handlung aus Pflicht sondert den Einfluss der Neigung ganz ab.“ (“An action from duty puts aside entirely the influence of inclination.”). It is also shown that this “proposition” summarizes an important result of Kant’s argument in the preceding paragraphs 8–13 and is presupposed by the “second proposition” and by Kant’s whole argument in the paragraphs 14 and 15, which he recapitulates in the last sentence of paragraph 15.","PeriodicalId":45952,"journal":{"name":"KANT-STUDIEN","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45239438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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