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A Pragmatic Account of Rephrase in Argumentation 论证中重述的语用阐释
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7212
M. Koszowy, S. Oswald, Katarzyna Budzynska, Barbara Konat, P. Gygax
{"title":"A Pragmatic Account of Rephrase in Argumentation","authors":"M. Koszowy, S. Oswald, Katarzyna Budzynska, Barbara Konat, P. Gygax","doi":"10.22329/il.v42i1.7212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v42i1.7212","url":null,"abstract":"In the spirit of the pragmatic account of quotation and reporting offered by Macagno and Walton (2017), we outline a systematic pragmatic account of rephrasing. For this purpose, we combine two interrelated methods of inquiry into the variety of uses of rephrase as a persuasive device: (i) the annotation of rephrase types to identify locutionary and illocutionary aspects of rephrase, (ii) the crowd–sourced examination of rephrase types to investigate their perlocutionary effects. As it draws on Waltonian insights and on empirical and experimental research on the (mis)use of rephrase, our approach allows us to ground a novel theoretically–informed and data–driven pragmatic account of rephrase.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49349244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Introduction to the Special Issue 特刊简介
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7210
Fabrizio Macagno, Alice Toniolo
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue","authors":"Fabrizio Macagno, Alice Toniolo","doi":"10.22329/il.v42i1.7210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v42i1.7210","url":null,"abstract":"Douglas Walton’s work is extremely vast, multifaceted, and interdisciplinary. He developed theoretical proposals that have been used in disciplines that are not traditionally related to philosophy, such as law, education, discourse analysis, artificial intelligence, or medical communication. Through his papers and books, Walton redefined the boundaries not only of argumentation theory, but also logic and philosophy. He was a philosopher in the sense that his interest was developing theoretical models that can help explain reality, and more importantly interact with it. For this reason, he proposed methods that have been used for analyzing different types of dialogical interactions, and modeling procedures for regulating them.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45009830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is Every Definition Persuasive? 每个定义都有说服力吗？
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7211
Jakub Pruś, Andrew Aberdein
{"title":"Is Every Definition Persuasive?","authors":"Jakub Pruś, Andrew Aberdein","doi":"10.22329/il.v42i1.7211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v42i1.7211","url":null,"abstract":"“Is every definition persuasive?” If essentialist views on definition are rejected and a pragmatic account adopted, where defining is a speech act which fixes the meaning of a term, then a problem arises: if meanings are not fixed by the essence of being itself, is not every definition persuasive? To address the problem, we refer to Douglas Walton’s impressive intellectual heritage—specifically on the argumentative potential of definition. In finding some non-persuasive definitions, we show not every definition is persuasive. The persuasiveness lies not in syntactic or semantic properties, but the context. We present this pragmatic account and provide rules for analysing and evaluating persuasive definition—a promising direction for further research.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46670272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Distinction Between False Dilemma and False Disjunctive Syllogism 假困境与假析取三段论的区别
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6233
Taeda Tomic
{"title":"The Distinction Between False Dilemma and False Disjunctive Syllogism","authors":"Taeda Tomic","doi":"10.22329/il.v41i4.6233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v41i4.6233","url":null,"abstract":"Since a clear account of the fallacy of false disjunctive syllogism is missing in the literature, the fallacy is defined and its three types are differentiated after some preliminaries. Section 4 further elaborates the differentia specifica for each of the three types by analyzing relevant argument criticism of each, as well as the related profiles of dialogue. After defining false disjunctive syllogisms, it becomes possible to distinguish between a false dilemma and a false disjunctive syllogism: section 5 analyzes their similarities (which explains why the fallacies are often confused with one another) and section 6 explains their differences.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"50 1","pages":"607-639"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138515727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Discovering Warrants in Political Argumentation 政治论证中的权证发现
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6765
I. Gallhofer, W. Saris
{"title":"Discovering Warrants in Political Argumentation","authors":"I. Gallhofer, W. Saris","doi":"10.22329/il.v41i4.6765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v41i4.6765","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers deny a proposal for actions can be deduced from arguments for or against the proposal because they may be incompatible. Nevertheless, people in general, and politicians especially, make decisions and present arguments they believe are convincing. We studied politicians who made decisions in complex situations. They spoke about possible actions, their consequences, the probabilities of these consequences and their evaluations, but rarely indicated why their arguments led to their choice. We hypothesized implicit argumentation rules involved and checked whether they predicted those choices. We found seven implicit informal logic rules involved. We also found a random sample of people made the same choices based on the same arguments, suggesting basic warrants by which people argue about decisions.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45823797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Simple Theory of Argument Schemes 论证方案的简单理论
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6671
Geoff Goddu
{"title":"A Simple Theory of Argument Schemes","authors":"Geoff Goddu","doi":"10.22329/il.v41i4.6671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v41i4.6671","url":null,"abstract":"While there has been in depth discussion of many particular argumentation schemes, some lament that there is little to no theory underpinning the notion of an argumentation scheme. Here I shall argue against the utility of argument schemes, at least as a fundamental part of a complete theory of arguments.  I shall also present and defend a minimalist theory of their nature—a scheme is just a set of proposition expressions and propositional functions. While simple, the theory contravenes several typical desiderata of argumentation schemes such as (i) aiding in the identification of enthymemes and (ii) keeping arguments constrained to a manageable taxonomy. So much the worse for the desiderata. Instead, I shall recommend focusing less on schemes and more on the component propositional functions.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"50 1","pages":"539-578"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138515726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On Appeals to Non-existent Authorities as Arguments from Analogy 论诉诸不存在的权威作为类比论证
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6662
Martin Hinton
{"title":"On Appeals to Non-existent Authorities as Arguments from Analogy","authors":"Martin Hinton","doi":"10.22329/il.v41i4.6662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v41i4.6662","url":null,"abstract":"Herein, I consider arguments resting on an appeal to a non-existent authority as a species of argument from authority, and ultimately show them to be reliant on arguments from analogy in their inferential force. Three sub-types of argument are discussed: from authorities as yet unborn, no longer living, or incapable of ever doing so. In each case it is shown that an element of arguing from analogy is required since there can be no direct evidence of any assertions of the source. In conclusion, it is suggested that such steps of analogy are employed frequently in traditional arguments from authority.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"52 1","pages":"579-606"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138515745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reflections on Minimal Adversariality 关于最小对抗性的思考
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6876
T. Govier
{"title":"Reflections on Minimal Adversariality","authors":"T. Govier","doi":"10.22329/il.v41i4.6876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v41i4.6876","url":null,"abstract":"Beginning with my 1999 account in The Philosophy of Argument, this essay explores views about adversariality in argument.  Although my distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is widely accepted, there are flaws in my defense of the claim that all arguments exhibit minimal adversariality and in a lack of sensitivity to aspects of gender and culture. Further discussions of minimal adversariality, including those of Scott Aikin, John Casey, Katharina Stevens and Daniel Cohen, are discussed. The claim that all argument are adversarial in at least a minimal sense is defended due to its connection with arguers’ intent to support their conclusions.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43119514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Argumentative Bullshit 爱争论的废话
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i3.6838
J. Gascón
{"title":"Argumentative Bullshit","authors":"J. Gascón","doi":"10.22329/il.v41i3.6838","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v41i3.6838","url":null,"abstract":"Harry Frankfurt characterised bullshit as assertions that are made without a concern for truth. Assertions, however, are not the only type of speech act that can be bullshit. Here, I propose the concept of argumentative bullshit and show how a speech acts account of bullshit assertions can be generalised to bullshit arguments. Argumentative bullshit, on this account, would be the production of an argument without a concern for the supporting relation between reasons and claim.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42358068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Introduction to the Special Issue 特刊简介
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i3.6873
L. Bermejo-Luque, Andrei Moldovan
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue","authors":"L. Bermejo-Luque, Andrei Moldovan","doi":"10.22329/il.v41i3.6873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v41i3.6873","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47502332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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