Is Every Definition Persuasive?

IF 0.9 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Jakub Pruś, Andrew Aberdein
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

“Is every definition persuasive?” If essentialist views on definition are rejected and a pragmatic account adopted, where defining is a speech act which fixes the meaning of a term, then a problem arises: if meanings are not fixed by the essence of being itself, is not every definition persuasive? To address the problem, we refer to Douglas Walton’s impressive intellectual heritage—specifically on the argumentative potential of definition. In finding some non-persuasive definitions, we show not every definition is persuasive. The persuasiveness lies not in syntactic or semantic properties, but the context. We present this pragmatic account and provide rules for analysing and evaluating persuasive definition—a promising direction for further research.
每个定义都有说服力吗?
“每个定义都有说服力吗?”如果对定义的本质主义观点被拒绝,而采用语用主义的解释,其中定义是一种固定术语意义的言语行为,那么问题就出现了:如果意义不是由存在的本质本身固定的,那么不是每个定义都有说服力吗?为了解决这个问题,我们参考了道格拉斯·沃尔顿令人印象深刻的知识遗产——特别是关于定义的论证潜力。在寻找一些不具说服力的定义时,我们表明并非每个定义都具有说服力。说服力不在于句法或语义性质,而在于语境。我们提出了这一语用解释,并提供了分析和评估说服性定义的规则,这是一个有希望进一步研究的方向。
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来源期刊
Informal Logic
Informal Logic PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
审稿时长
12 weeks
期刊介绍: Informal Logic publishes articles that advance the dialectic in reasoning and argumentation theory and practice. Primary criteria for the acceptance of articles with a theoretical focus or interest are: (1) the article advances the dialectic or constitutes an interesting comment on it: it presents a cogent argument, objection, interpretation or position that is an advance in relation to the background of issues and controversies on the topic; or it casts the issue addressed in a new and worthwhile light; and (2) the article makes explicit reference to the pertinent literature on its topic, and it discharges the burden of proof imposed by that scholarship. Primary criteria for acceptance of articles devoted to the teaching of informal logic, critical thinking or argumentation include: originality; utility; timeliness; and evidence of the effectiveness of the methods, materials, technologies, etc., proposed. The standard criteria for scholarly publication—topical fit with the subjects covered in the journal; adequacy of coverage to the issue addressed; clarity, organization and literateness of the prose; conceptual clarity and cogency of argumentation—apply ceteris paribus to the selection of all articles, notes and reviews.
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