International Journal of Refugee Law最新文献

{"title":"The Refugee in International Law","authors":"Hugo Storey","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eead009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eead009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135533698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Turning Points in International Protection: Onwards and Upwards, or U-Turns and Roundabouts?","authors":"Jane McAdam","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eead005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eead005","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Turning Points in International Protection: Onwards and Upwards, or U-Turns and Roundabouts? Get access Jane McAdam Jane McAdam j.mcadam@unsw.edu.au Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Journal of Refugee Law, Volume 35, Issue 1, March 2023, Pages 1–9, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eead005 Published: 09 October 2023","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135532172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Trafficked Adult Males as \u2028(Un)Gendered Protection Seekers: Between Presumption of Invulnerability and Exclusion from Membership of a Particular Social Group","authors":"Noemi Magugliani","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eeac030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeac030","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Guidelines on International Protection No 7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Being Trafficked recognize that, although not all trafficked persons fall within the scope of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, some could satisfy all elements of the refugee definition. Such a possibility is not least implicit in the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, as well as in the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. In order to obtain asylum, trafficked persons and their legal representatives tend to rely on the trafficked person being recognized as a member of a particular social group (PSG), and on establishing a well-founded fear of persecution on such a ground. While women trafficked for sexual exploitation have been recognized as members of a PSG in several jurisdictions, although not always in a consistent manner, the recognition of trafficked men as members of a PSG has proven to be more challenging. It is argued that the difficulties faced by adult men are attributable to the gender stereotyping operationalized by asylum decision-making bodies, which have consistently failed to recognize the gender dimension of trafficking with respect to men and boys, focusing almost entirely on women and girls as gendered subjects. In addition, the difficulties are also attributable to the nature of the exploitation to which most trafficked men are subjected, as forced labour and forced criminality are considered ‘lesser’ harms than sexual exploitation, and because violations of socio-economic rights as a ground for asylum are not yet fully recognized. This contribution explores the theoretical underpinnings of these two elements and their impact on the assessment of asylum claims brought by trafficked adult men, using the United Kingdom as a case study.","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43832890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What Can Artificial Intelligence Do for Refugee Status Determination? A Proposal for Removing Subjective Fear","authors":"Niamh Kinchin, D. Mougouei","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eeac040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeac040","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The drive for innovation, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness has seen governments increasingly turn to artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance their operations. The significant growth in the use of AI mechanisms in the areas of migration and border control makes the potential for its application to the process of refugee status determination (RSD), which is burdened by delay and heavy caseloads, a very real possibility. AI may have a role to play in supporting decision makers to assess the credibility of asylum seekers, as long as it is understood as a component of the humanitarian context. This article argues that AI will only benefit refugees if it does not replicate the problems of the current system. Credibility assessments, a central element of RSD, are flawed because the bipartite standard of a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ involves consideration of a claimant’s subjective fearfulness and the objective validation of that fear. Subjective fear imposes an additional burden on the refugee, and the ‘objective’ language of credibility indicators does not prevent the challenges decision makers face in assessing the credibility of other humans when external, but largely unseen, factors such as memory, trauma, and bias, are present.\u0000 Viewing the use of AI in RSD as part of the digital transformation of the refugee regime forces us to consider how it may affect decision-making efficiencies, as well as its impact(s) on refugees. Assessments of harm and benefit cannot be disentangled from the challenges AI is being tasked to address. Through an analysis of algorithmic decision making, predictive analysis, biometrics, automated credibility assessments, and digital forensics, this article reveals the risks and opportunities involved in the application of AI in RSD. On the one hand, AI’s potential to produce greater standardization, to mine and parse large amounts of data, and to address bias, holds significant possibility for increased consistency, improved fact-finding, and corroboration. On the other hand, machines may end up replicating and manifesting the unconscious biases and assumptions of their human developers, and AI has a limited ability to read emotions and process impacts on memory. The prospective nature of a well-founded fear is counter-intuitive if algorithms learn based on training data that is historical, and an increased ability to corroborate facts may shift the burden of proof to the asylum seeker. Breaches of data protection regulations and human rights loom large. The potential application of AI to RSD reveals flaws in refugee credibility assessments that stem from the need to assess subjective fear. If the use of AI in RSD is to become an effective and ethical form of humanitarian tech, the ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ standard should be based on objective risk only.","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41383005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"It’s Not What You Know, It’s How You Use It: The Application of Country of Origin Information in Judicial Refugee Status Determination Decisions – A Case Study of Germany","authors":"Valentin Feneberg, Nick Gill, Nicole Hoellerer, Laura Scheinert","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eeac036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeac036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Existing research has emphasized the different forms of expert knowledge available to refugee status determination (RSD) decision makers, as well as the differing conditions under which it is produced. However, little work has been done to address how decision makers interpret, represent, and use such evidence in their written decisions. This study investigates how country of origin information (COI) is used in judicial RSD decisions, taking decisions of Germany’s Higher Administrative Courts on Syrian draft evaders as a case study. The analysis shows that the courts draw different conclusions from the same evidence, utilizing interpretation, framing, and citation styles to amplify or dampen the persuasive force of COI in their reasoning. As such, legal reasoning dominates evidence, meaning that evidence is discursively highly malleable, frequently incidental to legal reasoning, and does not produce legal consensus. These findings raise concerns that decision makers use COI selectively to justify the positions they have adopted, rather than allowing their conclusions to be directed by COI. The article concludes by reflecting on what, if anything, should be done about these seemingly opaque and unaccountable textual and discursive forms of discretionary power.","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47903050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Addressing Heteronormativity: The Not-So-Lost Requirement of Discretion in (Austrian) Asylum Law","authors":"Petra Sussner","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eeac018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeac018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In refugee matters concerning sexual orientation, ‘discretion’ reasoning is as commonplace as it is unlawful. In its 2013 ruling in X, Y, and Z, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) declared that it was unreasonable to expect that asylum seekers should conceal their sexual orientation by being ‘discreet’ in order to avoid persecution, and that such a requirement in domestic refugee status determination procedures would be incompatible with European Union (EU) law. However, this did not put an end to the matter. Discretion reasoning still forms part of the process to determine refugee status in many EU countries. This article examines the persistence of discretion reasoning, using Austria as an example. It argues that, whilst the CJEU definitively banned such reasoning, the court failed to give any indication as to how decision makers should proceed from this point. X, Y, and Z has thus created a legal vacuum, and there is a risk that normative sociocultural concepts like heteronormativity will be applied in such cases. Indeed, despite the CJEU ruling, it is still common in many societies to expect that LGBTIQ people be discreet. As such, decision makers may find themselves imposing a discretion requirement, even if unconsciously. The main aim of the article is to assess the resulting persistence of discretion reasoning through the lens of heteronormativity, and to provide practical suggestions for assessing refugee status in a way that ensures discretion is no longer required.","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42132265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Building Walls at Sea: An Assessment of the Legality of the Greek Floating Barrier","authors":"D. F. Georgoula","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eeac021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeac021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In January 2020, against the backdrop of the Mediterranean refugee crisis, Greece announced its intention to install a floating barrier in the maritime passage between Turkey and Lesvos as a measure to deter the flow of asylum seekers arriving by sea. This article analyses the implications and assesses the legality of installing a floating barrier in light of the law of the sea, human rights law, and refugee law.","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49218580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unaccompanied Children in Limbo: The Causes and Consequences of Uncertain Legal Status","authors":"Joseph Lelliott","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eeac024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeac024","url":null,"abstract":"Unaccompanied children seeking international protection often find themselves with forms of discretionary, time-limited, or otherwise uncertain legal status in countries outside their own. This may be due to the available options for legal status or to long delays in determination of protection claims, among other factors. While the legal and policy reasons for this vary, of particular concern is the imposition of such uncertainty to discourage children from persisting with protection claims, to deter others from arriving, to delay status resolution until adulthood, or to facilitate removal. Children possessing a legal status that is insecure or uncertain may be described as being in ‘legal limbo’. This article explores this issue and examines the often deleterious consequences of limbo for unaccompanied children. Through an analysis and comparison of Australia and the United Kingdom, it explains ‘legal limbo’ as a function of States’ desire to deter, control, and punish irregular migration. This article argues that an approach based on rights, as opposed to migration control, must guide the availability of secure legal status to unaccompanied children. To this end, it articulates the basis of an obligation to provide these children such status, drawing on their rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and on the commentary of treaty bodies. The article concludes by calling for better pathways to permanent stay for unaccompanied children.","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":"19 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138510103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Refugee Law Initiative Declaration on Externalisation and Asylum","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eeac022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeac022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45638172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Clamouring for Legal Protection: What the Great Books Teach Us About People Fleeing from Persecution","authors":"S. Behrman","doi":"10.1093/ijrl/eeac031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeac031","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45807,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Refugee Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41862758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}