{"title":"Paving the Way for Better Telecom Performance: Evidence from the Telecommunication Sector in MENA Countries","authors":"Riham A. Ezzat","doi":"10.1515/rne-2016-0042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2016-0042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since the 1980s, developing countries started to adopt telecom reforms due to pressures from international institutions. However, Middle East and North African (MENA) countries lagged in adopting such reforms. Even after introducing telecom reforms in MENA region beginning in 1995, not all countries became better off in terms of various performance indicators. Therefore, this paper empirically assesses the effects of regulation, privatization and liberalization reforms, as well as their simultaneous presences, on the sector performance in the telecommunication sector using a sample of 17 MENA countries for the period 1995–2010. We assume that different reforms are affected by institutional, political and economic determinants with respect to the level of democracy, the legal origin, the natural resources rents per country and the year of independence from colonization. We use IV-2SLS (Instrumental Variable Two-Stage Least Squares) estimation to analyze the effect of different reforms on telecom performance in terms of access, productivity and affordability in the fixed and the mobile sector. We find that privatization of the main incumbent operator and fixed-line market liberalization affect the sector performance negatively in terms of fixed access and affordability. Moreover, we find that the simultaneous presence of an independent regulator and a privatized incumbent helps to eliminate drawbacks on the sector performance resulting from privatization. However, the simultaneous presences of the other reforms in terms of regulation-competition and privatization-fixed competition do not help to improve the sector performance.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"8 1","pages":"157 - 199"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84977889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Empirical Examination of Why Mobile Money Schemes Ignite in Some Developing Countries but Flounder in Most","authors":"David S. Evans, Alexis Pirchio","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2578312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2578312","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Mobile money schemes have grown rapidly in some developing countries but failed in many more. This paper reports the results of an empirical study of mobile money schemes in 22 developing countries chosen based on prior evidence to include roughly equal numbers of successes and failures. It uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence to determine why some countries succeeded in launching mobile money schemes and others failed. The analysis is guided by multi-sided platform economics and in particular recent work on the role of ignition and critical mass. It finds among other things heavy regulation, and in particular an insistence that banks play a central role in the schemes, which is generally fatal to igniting mobile money schemes.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"90 1","pages":"397 - 451"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76308668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Alternative Public Policies on the Deployment of New Communications Infrastructure – A Survey","authors":"Wolfgang Briglauer, Stefan Frübing, I. Vogelsang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2530983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2530983","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on alternative policies to promote new fiber-based communications infrastructures addresses (i) various kinds of ex ante sector-specific regulations, (ii) deregulatory approaches based on effective competition law implementation and competitive market structures including co-investment models, and (iii) public subsidies to cover non-profitable (white) areas. The authors identify significant research gaps and present a generic framework for policy recommendations. Public subsidies emerge as the dominant policy alternative in white areas, whereas access regulations can be the preferred policy in white or gray areas, where only monopoly structure or co-investment models lead to private investment. Deregulatory policies might be preferable in gray areas, provided there is sufficient pressure from competitive outside options and if competition law is strong. Finally, deregulatory policies including soft regulation are the dominant policy in black areas, where several independent infrastructure operators exist.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":"227 - 270"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2014-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82248506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Extent to which the Presence of Intermediate-stop(s) Air Travel Products Influences the Pricing of Nonstop Air Travel Products","authors":"Philip G. Gayle, Chi-Yin Wu","doi":"10.1515/rne-2015-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2015-0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Analysts of air travel markets, which include antitrust authorities, are interested in understanding the extent to which the presence of intermediate stop(s) products influences the pricing of nonstop products. This paper uses a structural econometric model to investigate the potential pricing interdependence between these two product types in domestic air travel markets. Counterfactual experiments using the estimated model suggest that in many (but far from a majority) markets the current prices of nonstop products are at least 5% lower than they would otherwise be owing to the presence of intermediate-stop(s) products.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"53 1","pages":"355 - 395"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86501311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Commercial Ceilings Appropriate for the Regulation of Free-to-Air TV Channels?","authors":"J. Rothbauer, G. Sieg","doi":"10.1515/rne-2013-0111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2013-0111","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Commercial ceilings not only restrict broadcasters in their decisions about commercial broadcasting time, but also affect their differentiation of program content. This study examines the welfare effects of commercial ceilings in a two-sided free-to-air TV market, taking into account welfare with respect to content differentiation. We identify a second-best commercial ceiling that maximizes welfare in the absence of enforceable program content regulation and identify the situations in which laissez faire is optimal. The deregulation of commercial broadcasting can improve welfare, even if the laissez-faire level of commercial broadcasting time is excessive.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"157 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91317445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"R&D Cooperation in Regular Networks with Endogenous Absorptive Capacity","authors":"L. Correani, Giuseppe Garofalo, Silvia Pugliesi","doi":"10.1515/rne-2014-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2014-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper we analyze how firms’ R&D investment decisions, firms’ profits and social welfare are affected by absorptive capacity; that is, the ability of a firm to learn from other collaborating firms. The model developed is a strategic regular network where firms have the opportunity to form pair-wise collaborative links with other firms and then compete à la Cournot. Different to the existing literature, we find that firms’ R&D efforts could increase or decrease with the degree of the network, depending on the level of absorptive capacity, the market size and the network dimension. In particular, in the case of small market size and low learning effect, the connection between firms drives up research investments. Moreover, if absorptive capacity is sufficiently low, the research collaboration between firms turns out not to be desirable from a private point of view while, in line with the existing literature, social efficiency requires a complete or intermediate level of collaborative activity. We also show that the complete network is pair-wise stable and socially optimal for an intermediate level of spillover intensity, while the empty network maximizes firms’ profits when absorptive capacity is small, yet it is not pair-wise stable.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"191 - 226"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73835545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Two-Sided Markets","authors":"M. Bourreau, Marianne Verdier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2442166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2442166","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we analyze the impact of cooperation on R&D investments in a two-sided market, where platforms compete in quantities. We show that if indirect externalities are of a moderate magnitude, the threshold degree of spillovers above which cooperation spurs R&D investments and enhances social welfare increases with the degree of externalities. If indirect externalities are of a strong magnitude, cooperation can also be beneficial in terms of welfare for low degrees of spillovers.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"16 1","pages":"175 - 190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2014-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82280139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Montolio, Francesc Trillas, Elisa Trujillo-Baute
{"title":"Regulatory Environment and Firm Performance in EU Telecommunications Services","authors":"D. Montolio, Francesc Trillas, Elisa Trujillo-Baute","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2422325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2422325","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We empirically estimate the effects of regulated access prices and firms’ multinational status on firm performance by using firm, corporate group, and country level information for the European broadband market between 2002 and 2010. Three measures of firm performance are used, namely: market share, revenue and productivity. Special attention is paid to differences in the impact on the performance measures depending on a firm’s position as either a market incumbent or entrant. We find that while access prices have a negative effect on entrants’ market share and revenue, the effect on incumbents’ market share, revenue and productivity is positive. Further, we find that multinational entrants perform better than national entrants in terms of their market share but worse in terms of their revenue and productivity. The opposite is true of incumbent multinationals which perform better than nationals in terms of their revenue and productivity but worse in terms of their market share. This confirms that a firm’s multinational status has a significant impact on its performance, and that this impact differs for incumbents and entrants. Finally, when evaluating the impact of access prices on firm performance at the mean performance of national and multinational firms, we find that the impact of access prices is lower for multinational than for national firms.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"271 - 302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2014-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75443969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managing Consumer Referrals on a Chain Network","authors":"Maria N. Arbatskaya, Hideo Konishi","doi":"10.1515/rne-2014-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2014-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider a monopoly that sets a price and differentiated referral fees to spread product information along a simple consumer communication network (a chain). The profit-maximizing solution involves standard monopoly pricing and referral fees that provide consumers with strictly positive referral incentives. Effective price discrimination among consumers based on their positions in the chain occurs both in the case of differentiated referral fees and in the case of uniform referral fees.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"69 - 94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2014-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81199248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investment in Two-Sided Markets and the Net Neutrality Debate","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/rne-2012-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2012-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper develops a game-theoretic model based on a two-sided market framework to compare Internet service providers’ (ISPs) investment incentives, content providers’ (CPs) participation, and social welfare between neutral and non-neutral network regimes. We find that ISPs’ investments are driven by the trade-off between softening consumer price competition and increasing revenues from CPs. Specifically, investments are higher in the non-neutral regime because it is easier to extract revenue through appropriate CP pricing. On the other hand, participation of CPs may be reduced in a non-neutral network due to higher prices. The net impact of non-neutrality on social welfare is determined by which of these two effects is dominant. Overall, we find that the non-neutral network is always welfare superior in a “walled-gardens” model, while the neutral network is superior in a “priority lanes” model when CP-quality heterogeneity is large. These results provide useful insights that inform the net-neutrality debate.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"355 - 402"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2014-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77173407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}