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The Effect of E-Commerce on Grocery Store Choice and Retail Competition 电子商务对杂货店选择和零售竞争的影响
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/rne-2023-0017
Clara Etcheverry
{"title":"The Effect of E-Commerce on Grocery Store Choice and Retail Competition","authors":"Clara Etcheverry","doi":"10.1515/rne-2023-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2023-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract E-commerce continues its expansion, and most retail groups have opened online distribution channels in the French grocery market. Using purchasing data, I develop a store choice model and a supply model to estimate the effect of the online distribution channel on consumer welfare and retail competition. E-commerce leads to a small decrease in consumer surplus. Furthermore, only online leaders obtain more market shares and profits while the majority of retailers globally get lower market shares and profits with e-commerce.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"2 2 1","pages":"1 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76315961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Health Care Provider Networks: Are Insurers Better Off? 医疗保健提供者网络:保险公司是否更富有?
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1515/rne-2021-0038
M. Mougeot, Florence Naegelen
{"title":"Health Care Provider Networks: Are Insurers Better Off?","authors":"M. Mougeot, Florence Naegelen","doi":"10.1515/rne-2021-0038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2021-0038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Certain health insurers offer a free choice of providers and an identical copayment regardless of the provider. Others build networks and use selective contracting and financial incentives to channel policyholders to contracted suppliers. In the case of unregulated prices, we compare these two policies when the off-network medical service is not covered. We show how policy ranking depends on the characteristics of demand. If demand is linear, a for-profit insurer and a not-for-profit insurer obtain a higher profit and utility under selective contracting than under uniform reimbursement. In the constant elasticity case, these results do not hold. Insurers prefer uniform reimbursement while consumers are better off under selective contracting in both cases.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"16 1","pages":"187 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79640333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multimarket Contact and Profitability Implications for US Airlines 多市场联系和对美国航空公司盈利能力的影响
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1515/rne-2022-0031
Jules O. Yimga
{"title":"Multimarket Contact and Profitability Implications for US Airlines","authors":"Jules O. Yimga","doi":"10.1515/rne-2022-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2022-0031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Routine industrial analyses use internal market characteristics such as market shares to proxy for market power. However, recent studies argue that factors that are external to the market such as contact across multiple markets can be linked to tacit collusion. Using a structural demand and supply model for air travel, we quantify the variable profit effects of multimarket contact. We find that multimarket contact results in increases in variable profits ranging between $15,000 and $20,000 per contact in a quarter. Extrapolating this estimate across all contacts proves to be quite sizeable. These positive responses in profitability are especially stronger in less competitive markets. Our results, taken together, lend support to the mutual forbearance hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"213 - 230"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75037940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Platform Pricing Choice: Exclusive Deals or Uniform Prices 平台定价选择:独家交易或统一价格
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/rne-2017-0016
Shiva Shekhar
{"title":"Platform Pricing Choice: Exclusive Deals or Uniform Prices","authors":"Shiva Shekhar","doi":"10.1515/rne-2017-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2017-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Platforms choose between offering exclusive deals or uniform prices to content providers in a setting where content providers can multi-home or single-home. We find that platforms offer exclusive deals for sufficiently large or sufficiently small values of standalone benefits. For sufficiently large or small standalone benefits, there are relatively large or small proportion of multi-homers to single-homers, exclusive deals allow to extract more efficiently from the content provider type that is relatively large in the market. Hence, it becomes more lucrative to employ exclusive deals regardless of the pricing strategy chosen by rival platform. We find that for standalone benefits being sufficiently small, exclusive deals equilibrium is also the industry profit enhancing outcome. On the other hand, when standalone benefits are large, exclusive pricing deals equilibrium leads to a prisoner’s dilemma type of outcome.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":"159 - 186"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76921788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Broadband Internet and Income Inequality 宽带互联网与收入不平等
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/rne-2020-0042
G. V. Houngbonon, Julienne Liang
{"title":"Broadband Internet and Income Inequality","authors":"G. V. Houngbonon, Julienne Liang","doi":"10.1515/rne-2020-0042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2020-0042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Digital technologies like the Internet can affect income inequality through increased demand for employment in manual and abstract jobs and reduced demand for employment in routine jobs. In this paper, we combine city-level income distribution and jobs data with broadband data from France to investigate the impact of broadband Internet access on income inequality. Using an instrumental variable estimation strategy, we find that broadband Internet reduces income inequality through increased employment in manual jobs. These effects increase with the availability of skilled workers and are significant in cities with a large service sector or high-speed Internet access. Further, the diffusion of broadband Internet comes with relatively greater benefits in low-income cities compared to high-income cities. Several robustness checks support these findings.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"54 1","pages":"55 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73043390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Bundling and Consumer Churn in Telecommunications Markets 电信市场中的捆绑销售与消费者流失
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/rne-2021-0032
L. Grzybowski, Julienne Liang, Christine Zulehner
{"title":"Bundling and Consumer Churn in Telecommunications Markets","authors":"L. Grzybowski, Julienne Liang, Christine Zulehner","doi":"10.1515/rne-2021-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2021-0032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we analyze how fixed-mobile (quadruple-play) bundling impacts the decision of consumers to churn telecommunications services. We use a database from an European operator of fixed and mobile telecommunications services which includes information about 9.6 million fixed broadband subscribers and 14.2 million mobile subscribers between March 2014 and February 2015. These data is combined with socio-demographic characteristics from each municipality in this country. We find that consumers who bundle fixed and mobile services from the same provider are less likely to churn. Without fixed-mobile bundling the annual churn of fixed broadband consumers would increase from 8.4 to 9.2%. Furthermore, the consumer churn in the mobile market would increase from 11.5 to 13.1%. We conclude that in the current competitive environment in the country considered, bundling has a moderate impact on consumer retention on both fixed and mobile networks.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"9 1","pages":"35 - 54"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78809260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Planned Obsolescence with Network Effects 计划报废与网络效应
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1515/rne-2020-0053
Ó. Gutiérrez
{"title":"Planned Obsolescence with Network Effects","authors":"Ó. Gutiérrez","doi":"10.1515/rne-2020-0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2020-0053","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper appeals to the interplay between network effects and quality to justify the use of planned obsolescence by well-settled firms. We propose a simple contagion model to analyze an asymmetric duopoly market where an incumbent firm benefits, at least initially, from the first‐mover advantages attributed to network industries, while the entrant offers a product with higher quality. The simpler version of the model describes the evolution of the market shares, showing that network effects can overtake the quality effect if the market is sufficiently small. If the market lasts enough, network effects end up enhancing the effect of quality and the entrant gets a higher market share. If the incumbent can set the size of the market by launching a new product every so often, the model provides a rationale for the use of planned obsolescence from a strategic point of view. Social efficiency is then challenged.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"102 1","pages":"221 - 247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75803396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Payment System Self-Regulation through Fee Caps 通过收费上限进行支付系统自律
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2020-09-25 DOI: 10.1515/RNE-2020-0015
Griem Fabian
{"title":"Payment System Self-Regulation through Fee Caps","authors":"Griem Fabian","doi":"10.1515/RNE-2020-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/RNE-2020-0015","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the organization of a single (domestic) payment system. When card issuers that are members of a payment system set their fees individually, this gives rise to a free-riding problem, as in providing access to different customers, card issuers are complements from the perspective of each merchant. When payment systems can threaten to exclude, in particular, card issuers with a smaller customer base that do not adhere to a common cap on fees, this allows to restore the full internalization outcome, leading to lower fees but higher profits and higher welfare. When payment systems cannot threaten to exclude card issuers, the full internalization outcome arises only when card issuers are sufficiently symmetric.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"62 1","pages":"141-167"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73513480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Frontmatter
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2020-09-25 DOI: 10.1515/rne-2020-frontmatter3
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/rne-2020-frontmatter3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2020-frontmatter3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/rne-2020-frontmatter3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72394114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Expansion of Peer-to-Peer Lending 个人对个人贷款的扩张
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/rne-2020-0033
Olena Havrylchyk, Carlotta Mariotto, Talal-Ur- Rahim, Marianne Verdier
{"title":"The Expansion of Peer-to-Peer Lending","authors":"Olena Havrylchyk, Carlotta Mariotto, Talal-Ur- Rahim, Marianne Verdier","doi":"10.1515/rne-2020-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2020-0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We use data from the two leading US platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore the drivers of the growing consumer demand for peer-to-peer (P2P) credit. Despite the online nature of new entrants, we rely on the spatial autoregressive model because spatial effects play an important role. Our findings suggest that the initial growth of P2P lending was spurred by the global financial crisis, but its growth after 2011 occurred in counties that were underserved by bank branches. The growth of P2P lending is slower in counties with high bank concentration and this factor is the most robust, stable over time and economically important in our study. Counties with lower population density, lower share of educated and young people experience lower growth of P2P lending, consistent with the hypothesis that learning costs deter the entry of new entrants.","PeriodicalId":45659,"journal":{"name":"Review of Network Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":"145 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78548679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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