平台独占条款的福利效应

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-04 DOI:10.1515/rne-2023-0014

Marit Holler

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引用次数: 0

摘要

买家通常活跃在多个数字平台上，而看门人平台可以强迫卖家按照合同只使用一个平台。本文考虑了在平台双寡头、卖方收取会员费的情况下，这种排他性条款对买方、卖方和平台的福利效应。将部分多套住房的买家和卖家与部分多套住房的买家和单套住房的卖家进行比较。结果表明，排他性条款主要损害的是总福利。如果卖家只在一个平台上销售，买家就会遭殃，而平台和卖家则在某些条件下从排他性条款中获益。在存在排他性条款的环境下，当跨集团利益强、平台差异化弱导致价格竞争激烈时，排他性条款可以起到增强福利的作用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Welfare Effects of Platforms’ Exclusivity Clauses

Abstract Buyers are often active on multiple digital platforms, while gatekeeper platforms can force sellers contractually to use one platform exclusively. This paper considers the welfare effects of such exclusivity clauses for buyers, sellers and platforms in a platform duopoly with a seller membership fee. A setting with partially multihoming buyers and sellers is compared to one with partially multihoming buyers and singlehoming sellers. It is shown that exclusivity clauses predominately harm total welfare. Buyers suffer if sellers are exclusive on one platform, while platforms and sellers benefit from exclusivity clauses under certain conditions. In an environment with exclusivity clauses, when strong cross-group benefits and weak platform differentiation result in fierce price competition, exclusivity clauses can be welfare-enhancing.

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来源期刊

Review of Network Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Network Economics seeks to help policy makers, academics, and practitioners keep informed of new research and policy debate in network economics and related subjects that are relevant to the study of network industries. By publishing high quality research on topical issues relevant to network industries, it is hoped readers will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the economic issues involved and that this will improve the quality of decision making by private and public organisations, and debate among researchers. The articles can cover specific network industries, or may deal with general issues that have relevance to a number of different network industries, including topics in the economics of networks, regulation, competition law, or industrial organisation. Papers that provide insights into policy debates are especially welcome, as are up-to-date surveys, book reviews, and comments.