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Journal of Competition Law & Economics最新文献

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Concentration and Competition: Evidence From Europe and Implications For Policy 集中与竞争:来自欧洲的证据及其对政策的启示
4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhad012
Gábor Koltay, Szabolcs Lorincz, Tommaso Valletti
{"title":"Concentration and Competition: Evidence From Europe and Implications For Policy","authors":"Gábor Koltay, Szabolcs Lorincz, Tommaso Valletti","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper provides new evidence on proxy indicators of market power for major European countries. The data show moderately increasing average industry concentration over the last two decades, a considerably increasing proportion of high-concentration industries, and an overall tendency toward oligopolistic structure. Estimates of aggregate profitability also show a sustained increase over the recent decades for European economies. Although the academic and policy debate is not settled as to whether the causes of these trends are policy driven or reflect technological improvement, our findings suggest that competition policy is likely to face more challenges as large companies are becoming more common in more and more industries.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135687483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Antitrust Economics of Cryptocurrency Mining 加密货币开采的反垄断经济学
4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-05-15 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhad006
Florian Deuflhard, C-Philipp Heller
{"title":"Antitrust Economics of Cryptocurrency Mining","authors":"Florian Deuflhard, C-Philipp Heller","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The development of blockchain-based applications, to date mostly virtual currencies, touches many areas of law and economics. The most well-known applications of public blockchains rely on Proof of Work as a consensus mechanism in which miners compete to solve a cryptographic puzzle. We argue that economic tools for market definition may be adapted to delineate relevant cryptocurrency mining markets. Antitrust law can help to prevent network attacks and exclusion of transactions with lower fees by large miners. When multiple blockchains are part of the same market, the role of network effects in securing the leading position of more established cryptocurrencies can potentially lead to exclusionary behaviour.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"218 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135086232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competitive Neutrality: OECD Recommendations and the Australian Experience 竞争中立:经合组织的建议和澳大利亚的经验
4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-02 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhad003
Rhonda L Smith, Deborah Healey, Xue Bai
{"title":"Competitive Neutrality: OECD Recommendations and the Australian Experience","authors":"Rhonda L Smith, Deborah Healey, Xue Bai","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The OECD in May 2021 adopted a recommendation that governments “ensure competitive neutrality to the maximum extent practicable and unless overriding Public Policy Objectives require otherwise.” This article discusses practical issues surrounding the formal implementation of competitive neutrality in a jurisdiction, using the well-established Australian framework as an exemplar. It illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the Australian system and provides guidance to other jurisdictions in formulating their approaches to implementing the Recommendation. It demonstrates that implementation of competitive neutrality at a practical level is a complex exercise, which demands both strategic vision and detailed planning.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135423688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
DELINEATING ZERO-PRICE MARKETS WITH NETWORK EFFECTS: AN ANALYSIS OF FREE MESSENGER SERVICES 描述具有网络效应的零价格市场:对免费信使服务的分析
IF 1.5 4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2022-12-02 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhac014
Akihiro Nakamura, Takanori Ida
{"title":"DELINEATING ZERO-PRICE MARKETS WITH NETWORK EFFECTS: AN ANALYSIS OF FREE MESSENGER SERVICES","authors":"Akihiro Nakamura, Takanori Ida","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhac014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhac014","url":null,"abstract":"Billions of users worldwide utilize digital zero-price services every day. This study proposes a market definition method for digital zero-price services, using the messenger service as an example. We employ the small but significant nontransitory increase in cost test, which is an improved version of the small but significant nontransitory increase in price test, and conduct conjoint analysis while considering the network effect, a characteristic of digital services. Our results show that the price elasticity of demand is 0.628 and the critical markup ratio is 1.492–1.542 when only the price effect is considered. When the direct network effect is considered, the price elasticity of demand is 1.728 and the critical markup ratio is 0.479–0.529. Furthermore, when considering a two-sided market with indirect network effects, the price elasticity of demand is 2.162 and the critical markup ratio is 0.363–0.413. Thus, the price elasticity of demand for free messenger services is higher when the network effects and two-sided markets are considered.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"20 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138513977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Distributive Justice by Antitrust: The Robin Hood Cartel 论反托拉斯的分配正义:罗宾汉卡特尔
IF 1.5 4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2022-02-17 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab031
Maarten Pieter Schinkel
{"title":"On Distributive Justice by Antitrust: The Robin Hood Cartel","authors":"Maarten Pieter Schinkel","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab031","url":null,"abstract":"Equity concerns in antitrust could justify market power in return for a fairer allocation by weighing the consumer welfare of certain disadvantaged groups more heavily. A simple example of an equity-justified agreement illustrates how seeking distributive justice through relaxed antitrust enforcement is ineffective and inefficient. Permitting competitors to jointly set prices gives them the power to price discriminate, which they could use to redistribute wealth by overcharging the rich and giving lower than competitive prices to the poor. Provided society values redistribution enough, such a ‘Robin Hood cartel’ is profitable, despite losing money on the poor and creating deadweight losses. Yet the poor will be given only what is minimally required in return for permission to take from the rich. Without conditions, the joint-profit maximizing wealth redistribution is nothing more than alms for the poor. They receive more under a full-payout plan, but total deadweight losses remain high. In essence, assigning a larger relative consumer welfare weight to the poor discounts the inefficiencies on the rich.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"37 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138513979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab029
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61532591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhac001
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhac001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhac001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61533319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Collusion as Environmental Protection—An Economic Assessment 合谋作为环境保护的一种经济评价
IF 1.5 4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-10-11 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab025
C. Veljanovski
{"title":"Collusion as Environmental Protection—An Economic Assessment","authors":"C. Veljanovski","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines the relationship between the environment, sustainability, and European competition law. It shows that the European Commission’s decisional practice not to exempt anticompetitive agreements under Article 101(3) TFEU is because it selectively prosecutes hardcore cartels. The alleged ‘sustainability gap’ in EU antitrust is, therefore, more apparent than real. It is also shown that the Commission has adopted an efficient enforcement approach given the institutional and budgetary constraints it faces. On the other hand, the Commission’s guidelines on Article 101 TFEU lack coherence and consistency with its overarching Treaty obligations. The pros and cons of expanding Article 101(3) TFEU to take account of the third-party environmental and public policy factors are examined.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43487154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Common Ownership Patterns in the European Banking Sector—The Impact of the Financial Crisis1 欧洲银行业的共同所有权模式——金融危机的影响1
IF 1.5 4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-10-08 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab023
Albert Banal-Estañol, Nuria Boot, J. Seldeslachts
{"title":"Common Ownership Patterns in the European Banking Sector—The Impact of the Financial Crisis1","authors":"Albert Banal-Estañol, Nuria Boot, J. Seldeslachts","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We provide a description of ownership patterns in the top 25 European banks for the period 2003–2015, where we especially focus on the global financial crisis. Investment managers, such as Blackrock, are dominant in terms of number of blockholdings in different banks, maintaining fairly stable “common ownership” networks throughout our sample. However, the financial crisis led to capital injections by governments in several banks in trouble, which in turn led to a jump in holdings by governments, which typically are “non-common owners” (i.e., they hold only shares in only one bank). This jump translated into these investors temporarily being the top investor with a large share, and non-common owners being the majority among large shareholders. A brief comparison with US banks uncovers large ownership differences between the European and US banking sectors. We briefly discuss what these ownership patterns might imply for competition, stability and performance in the banking industry.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45463002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
On the Risks of Using the Sequential Product-Level SSNIP Approach to Identify Relevant Antitrust Markets‡ 论使用序贯产品级SSNIP方法识别相关反垄断市场的风险
IF 1.5 4区 社会学
Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-10-06 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab020
Jorge Padilla, S. Piccolo, Pekka Sääskilahti
{"title":"On the Risks of Using the Sequential Product-Level SSNIP Approach to Identify Relevant Antitrust Markets‡","authors":"Jorge Padilla, S. Piccolo, Pekka Sääskilahti","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a recent influential paper Coate et al. (2021) have criticized the sequential product-level approach to market definition in merger review. They argue that a simultaneous market-level approach to critical loss is more appropriate than a product-level critical loss analysis, because under certain plausible demand scenarios (nonlinear demand functions) the latter could yield the wrong answer on market definition—i.e., excessively broad or narrow markets. We extend their analysis by showing that a sequential product-level approach actually leads to an excessively narrow market definition when the typical nonlinear demand functions used in merger analysis are employed.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61532420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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