Journal of Competition Law & Economics最新文献

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab029

引用次数: 0

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhac001

引用次数: 3

Collusion as Environmental Protection—An Economic Assessment 合谋作为环境保护的一种经济评价

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-10-11 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab025

C. Veljanovski

引用次数: 0

Common Ownership Patterns in the European Banking Sector—The Impact of the Financial Crisis1 欧洲银行业的共同所有权模式——金融危机的影响1

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-10-08 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab023

Albert Banal-Estañol, Nuria Boot, J. Seldeslachts

引用次数: 2

On the Risks of Using the Sequential Product-Level SSNIP Approach to Identify Relevant Antitrust Markets‡ 论使用序贯产品级SSNIP方法识别相关反垄断市场的风险

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-10-06 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab020

Jorge Padilla, S. Piccolo, Pekka Sääskilahti

引用次数: 0

Prospective Welfare Analysis—Extending Willingness-To-Pay Assessment to Embrace Sustainability 前瞻性福利分析——扩展支付意愿评估以拥抱可持续性

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-09-22 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab021

R. Inderst, Stefan Thomas

{"title":"Prospective Welfare Analysis—Extending Willingness-To-Pay Assessment to Embrace Sustainability","authors":"R. Inderst, Stefan Thomas","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we outline how a future change in consumers’ willingness-to-pay can be accounted for in a consumer welfare effects analysis in antitrust. Key to our solution is the prediction of preferences of new consumers and changing preferences of existing consumers in the future. The dimension of time is inextricably linked with that of sustainability. Taking into account the welfare of future cohorts of consumers, concerns for sustainability can therefore be integrated into the consumer welfare paradigm to a greater extent. As we argue in this paper, it is expedient to consider changes in consumers’ willingness-to-pay, in particular if society undergoes profound changes in such preferences, for example, caused by an increase in generally available information on environmental effects of consumption, and a rising societal awareness about how consumption can have irreversible impacts on the environment. We offer suggestions on how to conceptionalize and operationalize the projection of such consumers’ changing preferences in a “prospective welfare analysis.” This increases the scope of the consumer welfare paradigm and can help to solve conceptual issues regarding the integration of sustainability into antitrust enforcement while keeping consumer surplus as a quantitative gauge.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44046103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Using the Statistical Concept of “Severity” to Assess the Compatibility of Seemingly Contradictory Statistical Evidence (With a Particular Application to Damage Estimation) 使用“严重性”的统计概念来评估看似矛盾的统计证据的兼容性（特别适用于损失估计）

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-08-27 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab017

Peter Bönisch, R. Inderst

引用次数: 0

Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Italian Interlocking Ban: An Empirical Analysis of the Personal Ties Among The Largest Banking and Insurance Groups in Italy 评估意大利连锁禁令的有效性：对意大利最大银行和保险集团个人关系的实证分析

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-08-06 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab014

F. Ghezzi, Chiara Picciau

{"title":"Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Italian Interlocking Ban: An Empirical Analysis of the Personal Ties Among The Largest Banking and Insurance Groups in Italy","authors":"F. Ghezzi, Chiara Picciau","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhab014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In 2011, Italy introduced a ban on interlocking directorates in the financial sector, prohibiting members of the boards of directors and of the internal control bodies, as well as top managers of banking, insurance, and financial companies, from holding any such office in a competing company or group. Empirical studies have demonstrated conflicting results concerning the effectiveness of the Italian anti-interlocking provision. Some studies claim that interlocking directorates have decreased but have not been completely eliminated, which suggests possible persisting limits to competition. Other studies instead show the ban to have a procompetitive effect, at least in the banking sector, which would be at odds with a slight reduction in personal ties. Our article addresses this inconsistency by mapping the interlocking directorates among the 25 largest banking groups and the 25 largest insurance groups operating in Italy before and after the introduction of the ban. We show that although interlocking directorates were widespread at the end of 2010, the interlocking ban reached its goal in the banking and insurance sectors. Anticompetitive effects may, however, still exist, especially considering that the anti-interlocking provision does not affect ownership connections among competing financial companies and groups.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41431952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Incentivizing Private Antitrust Enforcement to Promote Leniency Applications 激励私人反垄断执法促进宽大申请

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-07-21 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB009

Sinchit Lai

引用次数: 1

Patent Assertion Entities and Patent Ownership Transparency: Strategic Recording of Patent Transactions at the Uspto 专利断言实体与专利所有权透明度：美国专利局专利交易的战略记录

IF 1.5 4区社会学

Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-07-17 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB013

Valerio Sterzi

{"title":"Patent Assertion Entities and Patent Ownership Transparency: Strategic Recording of Patent Transactions at the Uspto","authors":"Valerio Sterzi","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Many patent assertion entities (PAEs) hide behind multiple unknown subsidiaries or shell companies with obscure ownership. Meanwhile, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), like many other patent offices, does not impose a strict time period for recording the change of ownership of a patent, allowing the holder to gain an advantage by controlling the timing of its ownership disclosure. In this paper, we study to which extent PAEs delay the recording of the U.S. patent reassignments of patents that they will subsequently use in infringement patent lawsuits. On average, PAEs notify the change of ownership more quickly than producing firms, but this is not the case for the patents that they will litigate relatively far in time. In particular, the correlation between the recording lag of the patent transaction and the litigation spell is higher when the patent acquirer is a PAE (than when it is a producing firm) or when the acquirer will litigate the patent in the Eastern District of Texas, famously home to opportunistic litigations. Finally, we find that transactions involving unknown subsidiaries of PAEs are recorded at the USPTO significantly later than those involving PAE parent companies or their known subsidiaries.","PeriodicalId":45547,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law & Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48710234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5