竞争者优惠券:剩余串通的补救措施

IF 1.3 4区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Joseph E Harrington
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引用次数: 0

摘要

有充分证据表明,即使卡特尔被竞争管理机构关闭,价格仍保持在超竞争水平。只要市场条件保持合理稳定,合谋价格仍可能与激励相容,因此合谋平衡可能在企业不再从事非法交流后继续存在。这种情况提出了一个具有挑战性的难题:由于过去的非法行为,对消费者的伤害依然存在,但却没有明显的补救措施。本文以优惠券的形式提供了一种补救措施。作为竞争主管机构处罚的一部分,每个卡特尔成员都必须向过去的购买者发放优惠券。与通常形式不同的是,这些优惠券只能用于向企业的竞争对手购买。我将向大家展示这种临时干预是如何帮助稳定合谋并恢复竞争的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Competitor Coupons: A Remedy for Residual Collusion
There are well-documented episodes of prices remaining at supracompetitive levels even after a cartel was shut down by the competition authority. As long as market conditions remain reasonably stable, collusive prices may still be incentive compatible so the collusive equilibrium could continue after firms are no longer engaging in illicit communications. This situation poses a challenging dilemma: consumer harm persists because of past unlawful conduct but there is no apparent recourse. This paper offers a remedy in the form of coupons. As part of the penalty imposed by the competition authority, each cartel member is required to distribute coupons to its past purchasers. Contrary to their usual form, these coupons can only be used to buy from a firm’s competitors. I show how this temporary intervention can help destabilize collusion and restore competition.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
26.70%
发文量
16
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