On Distributive Justice by Antitrust: The Robin Hood Cartel

Abstract

Equity concerns in antitrust could justify market power in return for a fairer allocation by weighing the consumer welfare of certain disadvantaged groups more heavily. A simple example of an equity-justified agreement illustrates how seeking distributive justice through relaxed antitrust enforcement is ineffective and inefficient. Permitting competitors to jointly set prices gives them the power to price discriminate, which they could use to redistribute wealth by overcharging the rich and giving lower than competitive prices to the poor. Provided society values redistribution enough, such a ‘Robin Hood cartel’ is profitable, despite losing money on the poor and creating deadweight losses. Yet the poor will be given only what is minimally required in return for permission to take from the rich. Without conditions, the joint-profit maximizing wealth redistribution is nothing more than alms for the poor. They receive more under a full-payout plan, but total deadweight losses remain high. In essence, assigning a larger relative consumer welfare weight to the poor discounts the inefficiencies on the rich.