IntertaxPub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.54648/taxi2023002
Felipe Thé Freire
{"title":"Article: Economic Substance for Holding Companies in the Post- BEPS World and after Recent ECJ Case-Law: An Analysis of Developments in Europe","authors":"Felipe Thé Freire","doi":"10.54648/taxi2023002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2023002","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last decade, following the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project (BEPS), the international tax framework has been in constant change. Some of those changes, such as the introduction of the Principal Purpose Test (PPT) in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model Convention and the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD I and II) in the European Union (EU) aim at denying benefits to corporate structures and transactions put in place by Multinational Corporations (MNEs) whenever those are deemed to be abusive. Recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments arguably further modified the international tax framework. One of the most important elements – following those developments – commonly analysed to assess abuse is ‘economic substance’. This article focuses on the analysis of substance requirements particularly for holding companies, which typically are less robust than those of companies generating active income. After analysing the definition and object of a holding company, the author explores the current views of the OECD and the EU on this topic, including ECJ jurisprudence, to assess to what extent those have converged. The article compares different instruments and concepts, as well as their underlying principles, aiming at applying them to specific cases of cross-border holding structures.\u0000Holding companies, substance, anti-tax avoidance directive (ATAD), principle purpose test (PPT), abuse of rights, tax treaty abuse, principal purpose test (PPT), general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), beneficial ownership","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71283912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntertaxPub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.54648/taxi2023003
A. Purpura
{"title":"Article: DAC6: Some (potential) Incompatibility Profiles with Article 6 ATAD","authors":"A. Purpura","doi":"10.54648/taxi2023003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2023003","url":null,"abstract":"From a comparative analysis of Article 6 Anti Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) and the Directive Administrative Cooperation (DAC)6, it would seem that the disclosure requirements of the latter are in accordance with the concept of tax avoidance (or ‘abuse of rights’) introduced by the general clause of Article 6 ATAD.\u0000Nevertheless, notwithstanding the consistency of the DAC6 with the general anti-abuse clause of the ATAD, at least two types of uncertainties appear to arise. The first concerns the consistency of the directive mentioned previously with the ultimate purpose of the anti-avoidance regulations (which is to exclusively prevent and counteract avoidance conduct). The second involves the compatibility of the disclosure requirements imposed by the directive with the general anti-abuse clauses currently in force in some European legal systems (for all, reference will be made to the Italian experience).\u0000The comparison outlined above would appear to demonstrate that the reporting obligations established by the DAC6 are overly broad and that they do not adequately take account of the ‘non-tax reasons’ that may justify the cross-border mechanism even for a transaction from which tax advantages may arise at the same time.\u0000ATAD, General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR), DAC-6, exchange of information, tax avoidance, Article 10-bis","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49487525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntertaxPub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.54648/taxi2023007
Jane Ferniss
{"title":"Article: Taxation of Bitcoins and Similar Cryptoassets in Scandinavia with Special Focus on Danish Law","authors":"Jane Ferniss","doi":"10.54648/taxi2023007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2023007","url":null,"abstract":"The taxation of bitcoins and similar cryptoassets is of immense economic importance to the individual taxpayer and to society as a whole. In recent years, they have effectuated a number of tax law issues in Denmark. In Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, the taxation of bitcoins and similar cryptoassets is based on the general rules of tax law. This article contains a comparative analysis of the three Scandinavian countries’ tax treatment of gains and losses on them. The analysis shows that the Norwegian and Swedish rules that have been significantly changed and modernized do not at all present the same challenges as the Danish rules. In Denmark, there is need for uniformity, predictability, and clarity to be introduced into the taxation rules. Therefore, the article also provides some reflections how to change the Danish tax legislation.\u0000Bitcoins, cryptocurrencies, cryptoassets, capital gains taxation, Danish income tax, Norwegian income tax, Swedish income tax, speculation taxation","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47863481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntertaxPub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.54648/taxi2022094
Suranjali Tandon
{"title":"Policy Note: Assessing the Impact of Pillar Two on Developing Countries","authors":"Suranjali Tandon","doi":"10.54648/taxi2022094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2022094","url":null,"abstract":"The Pillar Two reform is designed to end the four decade long race to the bottom that persisted despite the minimum standards and best practices promoted by the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Program. However, in the process of mending the inadequate international tax system, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) changed its agenda to addressing tax competition. With a wide objective of increasing the effective tax rates (ETRs) across jurisdictions to 15%, it disregards the constraints that it imposes on developing countries. This article demonstrates that the immediate revenue gains of developing countries remain limited, and the tax will restrict the ability to offer tax incentives and will undermine the sovereignty of states in its application to some extent.\u0000Pillar two, tax incentives, domestic minimum taxes, carve-outs, regulatory competition.","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45833717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntertaxPub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.54648/taxi2022096
L. de Broe
{"title":"Article: Some EU and Tax Treaty Law Considerations on the Draft EU Directive on Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals in the Union","authors":"L. de Broe","doi":"10.54648/taxi2022096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2022096","url":null,"abstract":"In this article the author examines whether the draft EU Directive on Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals complies with primary Union and whether the GloBE Model rules comply with the commitments undertaken by jurisdictions under their bilateral tax treaties that follow the OECD Model. Suggestions are also made on how the prevention and resolution of disputes under the Globe Model rules can be improved.\u0000Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals, GloBE Model Rules, draft EU Directive on Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals, Compliance with primary Union law, Compliance with the OECD Model Tax Convention, Dispute Prevention and Resolution.","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46553858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntertaxPub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.54648/taxi2022095
Gaëtan Zeyen
{"title":"Literature Review: Regulation and Tax in Space, Galya Savir. Kluwer Law Intl. 2021","authors":"Gaëtan Zeyen","doi":"10.54648/taxi2022095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2022095","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45075099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntertaxPub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.54648/taxi2022093
Mindy Herzfeld
{"title":"Article: Do GILTI + BEAT + BMT = GloBE?","authors":"Mindy Herzfeld","doi":"10.54648/taxi2022093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2022093","url":null,"abstract":"The enactment by the United States in August 2022 of a minimum tax on the global book earnings of large corporations (the book minimum tax, or BMT) raises the question of how the US minimum taxes – including the global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI), the base erosion and anti-abuse tax (the BEAT) and the BMT – interact with the global minimum tax, or GLoBE, agreed to by over 135 countries under an OECD framework. Particularly important are questions regarding the hierarchy in application of different regimes. In the context of multiple agreements for global minimum taxes, how to determine who gets priority of taxing rights?\u0000To answer these types of questions it’s helpful to parse the technical differences between the different minimum taxes outlined in the GLoBE model rules and the US GILTI, BEAT, and BMT. The GLoBE model rules fail to provide clear guidance as to whether or not either GILTI or the BMT will provide the United States with the first right to tax the earnings of US companies’ foreign subsidiaries and whether enactment of the BMT will shield US companies from having other countries impose additional taxes on their domestic earnings. But there are good reasons to conclude that taken as a whole, the panoply of minimum taxes enacted by the United States are at least equivalent to the regime for taxing multinationals’ global earnings proposed by the OECD.\u0000International tax, tax policy, OECD, minimum taxes, global minimum tax, alternative minimum tax, book minimum tax, pillar 2, GILTI.","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71283870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntertaxPub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.54648/taxi2022097
Dieter Bettens
{"title":"Article: The DEBRA Directive and Its Interplay With Pillar 2","authors":"Dieter Bettens","doi":"10.54648/taxi2022097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2022097","url":null,"abstract":"The Debt-Equity Bias Reduction Allowance (DEBRA) directive seeks to reduce the distortionary bias towards debt on the part of companies seeking investment. Two measures are introduced to achieve this, i.e., the deduction of a deemed interest expense on capital (DEBRA) and the further restriction of the deductibility of actual interest expense. The former seeks to promote the attractiveness of equity investments while the latter endeavours to reduce the attractiveness of debt investments. While these measures initially appear to be appropriate, another legislative initiative known as the Pillar 2 directive might undermine its effectiveness. Indeed, this directive attempts to impose a minimum tax rate of 15% on large entities’ profits wherever they operate. While uncommon, the DEBRA might reduce the effective tax rate (ETR) below 15% thereby effectuating the minimum tax. The limited deductibility of interest expense might do the opposite and increase the ETR above 15% thereby preventing such minimum tax. Thus, where the DEBRA directive provides a benefit, the Pillar 2 directive might eliminate it and, where the DEBRA directive introduces a disadvantage, the Pillar 2 directive may neutralize it.\u0000DEBRA, Pillar 2, minimum taxation, debt-equity bias, EU, debt-equity bias reduction allowance, tax incentives, Capital Markets Union, limitation on interest deductibility, ATAD.","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48876856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntertaxPub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.54648/taxi2022084
Błażej Kuźniacki
{"title":"Article: European Union Law and Global Investment Regime: Unshell Proposal as a Next (Mis)step of the EU Against Investment Treaty Arbitration?","authors":"Błażej Kuźniacki","doi":"10.54648/taxi2022084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2022084","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses a largely unchartered interdisciplinary research area of the global investment regime and European Union (EU) law with an emphasis on the prevention of international tax avoidance in the EU. It focuses on the intersections between newly proposed anti-tax avoidance legislation by the European Commission that is known as the Unshell Directive (UD) and international investment agreements (IIAs). In this article, the author sets a stage for the intersections by discussing the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law and the commission’s actions aimed against the most powerful enforcement tool in the global investment regime, i.e., the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, by attempting to render it illegal and ineffective within the EU. The corresponding reactions from the arbitral tribunals are also addressed. The discussion evolves to identify and analyse the interplay between the proposal of the UD (also the Unshell Proposal or UP) and the IIAs to reveal that the impact of the former on the latter is ambiguous by design in order to minimalize legal certainty vis-à-vis protection of foreign investment in the EU via shell entities. This constitutes a foundation for potential, seismic tensions between the UD and the global investment regime that are not beneficial for marketing and development of the EU internal (single) market and may thus weaken the EU’s global competitiveness in the area of foreign investments.\u0000international investment law, EU law, good faith, ISDS, tax avoidance, shell entities","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46425229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}