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Constitutional Political Economy最新文献

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Political conflict, political polarization, and constitutional compliance 政治冲突、政治两极化和遵守宪法
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09434-3
Jacek Lewkowicz, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, Jan Fałkowski
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引用次数: 0
Dred Scott and Gettysburg in Tullock’s constitutional mythology and Civil War memory 图鲁克的宪法神话和内战记忆中的德雷德-斯科特和盖茨堡
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-04-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09436-1
Daniel Kuehn
{"title":"Dred Scott and Gettysburg in Tullock’s constitutional mythology and Civil War memory","authors":"Daniel Kuehn","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09436-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09436-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Between 1965 and 1988, Gordon Tullock dramatically altered his view of the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision of 1857 (Dred Scott v. Sandford. (1857). 60 U.S. 393.). In 1965, Tullock maintained the orthodox view that Dred Scott was incorrectly decided and justifiably reversed by the bloodshed of the Civil War. By the 1980s, Tullock changed his view, asserting instead that Dred Scott correctly interpreted a pro-slavery and racist Constitution. He maintained his earlier views on the emancipationist purpose of the Civil War in reversing Dred Scott. This paper explores Tullock’s evolving understanding of the Dred Scott decision, the Civil War, and the Battle of Gettysburg through the interpretive lenses of constitutional mythology and Civil War memory.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140578533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public reason, democracy, and the ideal two-tier social choice model of politics 公共理性、民主和理想的双层社会政治选择模式
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-04-05 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09437-0
Cyril Hédoin
{"title":"Public reason, democracy, and the ideal two-tier social choice model of politics","authors":"Cyril Hédoin","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09437-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09437-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article develops an account of political legitimacy based on the articulation of a social choice theoretic framework with the idea of public reason. I pursue two related goals. First, I characterize in detail what I call the Ideal Two-Tier Social Choice Model of Politics in conjunction with the idea of public reason. Second, I explore the implications of this model, when it is assumed that decision rules are among the constitutive features of the social alternatives on which individuals have preferences. The choice of the decision rule cannot be made independently of considerations regarding the likelihood that individuals will vote based on political judgments that are not publicly justified. The result is an account of political legitimacy according to which only “elitist” decision rules are amenable to public justification. Some of them are plainly compatible with liberal democracies as they currently exist. Others are however more naturally associated with the concept of epistocracy.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140578715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Economy of Classical Athens. Organization, Institutions and Society by Emmanouil, Marios, L. Economou 古典雅典的经济。Emmanouil, Marios, L. Economou 著《组织、制度和社会
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09435-2
George Tridimas
{"title":"The Economy of Classical Athens. Organization, Institutions and Society by Emmanouil, Marios, L. Economou","authors":"George Tridimas","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09435-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09435-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140035484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to: The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs 更正：与康德赛特兼容的最佳选举方法：排序配对
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09431-6
{"title":"Correction to: The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09431-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09431-6","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>An error is corrected in the paper by Charles T. Munger, Jr., <em>The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs</em>, Const Polit Econ (2022).</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139977229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conquest and rents: a political economy of dictatorship and violence in Muslim societies. by Faisal Z. Ahmed. Cambridge University Press. 2023. Paperback ISBN: 978-1-009-36751-6, 35$, 250 pages. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009367509 征服与租金：穆斯林社会独裁与暴力的政治经济学》，作者费萨尔-Z.艾哈迈德著。剑桥大学出版社。2023.平装 ISBN：978-1-009-36751-6，35 美元，250 页。DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009367509
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-02-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09433-4
Fatih Kırşanlı
{"title":"Conquest and rents: a political economy of dictatorship and violence in Muslim societies. by Faisal Z. Ahmed. Cambridge University Press. 2023. Paperback ISBN: 978-1-009-36751-6, 35$, 250 pages. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009367509","authors":"Fatih Kırşanlı","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09433-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09433-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139840667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conquest and rents: a political economy of dictatorship and violence in Muslim societies. by Faisal Z. Ahmed. Cambridge University Press. 2023. Paperback ISBN: 978-1-009-36751-6, 35$, 250 pages. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009367509 征服与租金：穆斯林社会独裁与暴力的政治经济学》，作者费萨尔-Z.艾哈迈德著。剑桥大学出版社。2023.平装 ISBN：978-1-009-36751-6，35 美元，250 页。DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009367509
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-02-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09433-4
Fatih Kırşanlı
{"title":"Conquest and rents: a political economy of dictatorship and violence in Muslim societies. by Faisal Z. Ahmed. Cambridge University Press. 2023. Paperback ISBN: 978-1-009-36751-6, 35$, 250 pages. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009367509","authors":"Fatih Kırşanlı","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09433-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09433-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139780985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction: The case for Instant Runoff Voting 更正：立即决胜投票的理由
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09430-z
Rob Richie, Jeremy Seitz-Brown, Lucy Kaufman
{"title":"Correction: The case for Instant Runoff Voting","authors":"Rob Richie, Jeremy Seitz-Brown, Lucy Kaufman","doi":"10.1007/s10602-023-09430-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-023-09430-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139605955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction: The case for minimax-TD 更正：最小差额--最大差额的理由
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-01-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09432-5
Richard B. Darlington
{"title":"Correction: The case for minimax-TD","authors":"Richard B. Darlington","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09432-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09432-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139613629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The nation-state foundations of constitutional compliance 遵守宪法的民族国家基础
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09427-8
Peter Grajzl, Jerg Gutmann, Stefan Voigt
{"title":"The nation-state foundations of constitutional compliance","authors":"Peter Grajzl, Jerg Gutmann, Stefan Voigt","doi":"10.1007/s10602-023-09427-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-023-09427-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We bring attention to a previously overlooked determinant of de jure-de facto constitutional gaps: a polity’s transition to a nation-state. We argue that nation-statehood, predicated on the formation of a strong sense of national identity, lowers the government’s incentive to violate constitutional provisions. To test our theory, we use a recently released longitudinal database on constitutional compliance and exploit variation in the timing of countries’ attainment of nation-statehood. Our empirical findings substantiate our hypothesis. Based on our preferred estimation approach, nation-statehood bolsters both overall constitutional compliance and constitutional compliance within the subdomains of basic rights, civil rights, and property rights &amp; the rule of law. The estimated long-run effects of nation-statehood on constitutional compliance are considerable in size. Our analysis, thus, illuminates the foundational role of nation-statehood in fostering constitutional compliance.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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