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Constitutional Political Economy最新文献

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Constitutional landmarks: Supreme Court Decisions on Separation of Powers, Federalism, and Economic rights by Charles M. Lamb and Jacob R. Neiheisel. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 2021. pp.296. 978-3-030-55574-0 (hardcover) 宪法里程碑：Charles M. Lamb 和 Jacob R. Neiheisel 合著的《最高法院关于分权、联邦制和经济权利的裁决》。瑞士：Palgrave Macmillan.2021. pp.296.978-3-030-55574-0 (精装)
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-09-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09446-z
Firman Pranoto, Runy Rusdyantinah Indrawaty, Triadika Nugraha, Jumriani Sultan, Zafrullah Zafrullah
{"title":"Constitutional landmarks: Supreme Court Decisions on Separation of Powers, Federalism, and Economic rights by Charles M. Lamb and Jacob R. Neiheisel. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 2021. pp.296. 978-3-030-55574-0 (hardcover)","authors":"Firman Pranoto, Runy Rusdyantinah Indrawaty, Triadika Nugraha, Jumriani Sultan, Zafrullah Zafrullah","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09446-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09446-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The book “Constitutional Landmarks: Supreme Court Decisions on Separation of Powers, Federalism, and Economic Rights” by Charles M. Lamb and Jacob R. Neiheisel offers an in-depth analysis of the role of the United States Supreme Court in shaping legal policy through a series of landmark decisions. The book examines a number of turning-point cases in American legal history, focusing on three key concepts: separation of powers, federalism, and economic rights. Through analyses of cases such as Bowsher v. Synar, Morrison v. Olson, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and Lochner v. New York, the author explores how the Supreme Court navigates constitutional boundaries and upholds fundamental principles that shape the country’s legal framework.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Election campaign finance bans and corruption: effectiveness across parliamentary and presidential democracies 竞选资金禁令与腐败：议会制和总统制民主国家的有效性
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09447-y
Rajeev K. Goel, Michael A. Nelson
{"title":"Election campaign finance bans and corruption: effectiveness across parliamentary and presidential democracies","authors":"Rajeev K. Goel, Michael A. Nelson","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09447-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09447-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using data on a large sample of nations, this research studies the effects of campaign finance reforms on corruption, including bans on contributions by trade unions and corporations. The focus on campaign finance bans in presidential versus parliamentary democracies is a unique aspect. We find that, while bans on campaign donations to political parties and candidates by trade unions are effective in reducing corruption, their efficacy varies across presidential and parliamentary democracies. Specifically, bans on campaign contributions to political candidates and parties reduce corruption in presidential democracies, but they are ineffective in parliamentary democracies. Campaign contribution bans on corporations are largely ineffective. When a broader measure of institutional quality/enforcement is considered, its effectiveness dominates the effects of individual bans. Some of these findings are unique and suggest that policymakers considering combating corruption should take into account the form of democracy, the type of campaign finance ban, and the nation’s overall institutional quality.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142194562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Italian Constitutional Court and recentralization along the pendulum of regionalism 意大利宪法法院与地区主义钟摆上的权力下放
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-08-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09445-0
Andrea Filippetti, Sandro Rondinella, Fabrizio Tuzi
{"title":"The Italian Constitutional Court and recentralization along the pendulum of regionalism","authors":"Andrea Filippetti, Sandro Rondinella, Fabrizio Tuzi","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09445-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09445-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper employs a quantitative analysis of the disputes between central and regional government concerning the role of the Italian Constitutional Court, focusing on the context of decentralization initiated during the late 1990s. The econometric evidence demonstrates a significant decrease in favourable outcomes for regional governments following the process of recentralization, which was commenced by central government in 2011 in response to a major financial crisis. The results of this study support the perspective of a centralistic attitude of the courts in litigation concerning subnational governments and provide fresh insights into the role of the courts in the relationship between recentralization and major economic crises.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141941805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-compliance as a determinant of constitutional change? A comparative study 不遵守是宪法变革的决定因素？比较研究
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09444-1
Tim Schnelle
{"title":"Non-compliance as a determinant of constitutional change? A comparative study","authors":"Tim Schnelle","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09444-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09444-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It has often been claimed that if constitutions are not complied with, they will be changed. Because an ineffective constitutional contract is a bad contract, a lack of enforcement should induce constitutional reform. This paper empirically tests this conjecture based on a dataset of 170 countries from 1950 to 2018. The results indicate that the size of the <i>de jure/de facto</i> gap has no effect on the likelihood of constitutional change as such. However, after differentiating between amendments and replacements as distinct modes of constitutional reform, the results imply that non-compliance robustly increases the probability of constitutional replacement only. This relationship is primarily driven by an implementation gap regarding political and civil rights. Expected moderating effects of interpersonal trust and civil society organizations as catalysts for successful civil reform movements cannot be empirically supported. Overall, this has important consequences for the writers of future constitutions. If reformers desire longevity for their new constitutional framework, they must be aware that utopian promises may backfire by provoking a quick replacement of their rules.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141784283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Constitutional artisans: James Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom on artifactual man, the constitutional attitude, and the political economy of constitutional design 宪法工匠：詹姆斯-布坎南和文森特-奥斯特罗姆论人造人、宪法态度和宪法设计的政治经济学
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09443-2
Paul Lewis, John Meadowcroft
{"title":"Constitutional artisans: James Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom on artifactual man, the constitutional attitude, and the political economy of constitutional design","authors":"Paul Lewis, John Meadowcroft","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09443-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09443-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the relationship between the work of James Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom. It adds to existing work by providing a comprehensive analysis of Buchanan’s and Ostrom’s changing views about how the ‘logical foundations of constitutional democracy’ should be conceptualised. The paper traces how in the 1960s and 1970s Ostrom took inspiration from the rational choice analysis of constitutional democracy in Buchanan and Tullock’s <i>The Calculus of Consent</i>, explaining how it shaped his reading of key texts in political theory and his analysis of public administration. It then discusses how Buchanan subsequently drew on Ostrom’s notion of artifactual man in developing his understanding of the ‘constitutional attitude’ necessary for individuals to engage in institutional design. It then explores how, from the mid-to-late 1990s, Ostrom became increasingly critical of Buchanan’s reliance on rational choice theory for his analysis of constitutional decision-making, identifying this as a key difference between their views.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141550489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A majority rule philosophy for instant runoff voting 即时决胜投票的多数决制理念
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09442-3
Ross Hyman, Deb Otis, Seamus Allen, Greg Dennis
{"title":"A majority rule philosophy for instant runoff voting","authors":"Ross Hyman, Deb Otis, Seamus Allen, Greg Dennis","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09442-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09442-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We present the core support criterion, a voting criterion satisfied by Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) that is analogous to the Condorcet criterion but reflective of a different majority rule philosophy. Condorcet methods can be thought of as conducting elections between each pair of candidates, counting all ballots to determine the winner of each pair-election. IRV can also be thought of as conducting elections between all pairs of candidates but for each pair-election only counting ballots from voters who do not prefer another major candidate (as determined self-consistently from the IRV social ranking) to the two candidates in contention. The appropriateness of including all ballots or a subset of ballots for a pair-election, depends on whether the society deems the entire or a selected ballot set in compliance with freedom of association, which implies freedom of non-association, for a given pair election. Arguments based on freedom of association rely on more information about an electorate than can be learned from ranked ballots alone. We present a freedom-of-association based argument to explain why IRV may be preferable to Condorcet in some circumstances, including the 2022 Alaska special congressional election and the 2009 Burlington Vermont mayoral election, based on the political context of those elections.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141529119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
From one crisis to another: the European central bank’s role from the great recession to the Ukraine war 从一场危机到另一场危机：从大衰退到乌克兰战争期间欧洲中央银行的作用
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09441-4
Giusy Chesini, Francesca Fauri
{"title":"From one crisis to another: the European central bank’s role from the great recession to the Ukraine war","authors":"Giusy Chesini, Francesca Fauri","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09441-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09441-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper examines the changing role of the European Central Bank over the last 15 years and holds that the ECB has gone through a process of learning by doing, relying on earlier crisis experiences in forming its response to successive crises. This learning process has enabled it to sustain the euro countries against various exogenous shocks both within the power of its mandate and beyond it, implementing novel reforms. We argue, in fact, that crises stimulated institutional innovations such as the introduction of Eurozone banking supervision and the European Banking Union. The latter was a particularly ground-breaking idea, not contemplated by the Treaties, and addressed to exceptional endogenous dynamics. During the last two emergencies, triggered by the pandemic and the war, the ECB seems finally to have learned how to manage crises via a synergic use of available tools. </p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141188969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The United States fiscal constitution since the congressional budget impoundment and control act 自《国会预算扣押和控制法》以来的美国财政宪法
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-05-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09439-y
Jonathan W. Plante
{"title":"The United States fiscal constitution since the congressional budget impoundment and control act","authors":"Jonathan W. Plante","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09439-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09439-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite both chambers of the United States Congress passing budgetary rules to limit deficits and public debts, the deficit and, as a result, public debt, have increased dramatically. Most political economy literature has attributed these phenomena to the tragedy of the fiscal commons or political budget cycles. In contrast, this paper attributes these phenomena to a change in the fiscal constitution—specifically, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBICA) of 1974. Prior to the passage of the CBIA, the fiscal constitution was such that the Executive Branch led the federal budgeting process. The Executive Branch leading the budgetary process effectively established a constraint on Congress’ propensity to use deficit and public debt finance. The passage of CBICA, however, established a new fiscal constitution that removed this constraint. The CBICA provided Congress with the lead over the budgeting process. This new fiscal constitution established by the CBICA caused an increase in deficits and public debt—despite budgetary rules aiming to stop such increases. Budgetary historical narratives are provided to support the theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141061116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Border militarization and domestic institutions 边境军事化和国内机构
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-05-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09440-5
Nathan P. Goodman
{"title":"Border militarization and domestic institutions","authors":"Nathan P. Goodman","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09440-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09440-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of border policies and the increased militarization of border control practices on the expansion of police powers, the erosion of constitutional constraints and on other institutional spillovers. In recent decades, the Border Patrol has been integrated with the broader national security state as part of the war on drugs and the war on terror. This has entailed the acquisition of military hardware, the incorporation of organizational structures and training originally developed in the military, and increased interaction with the military, intelligence agencies, and defense contractors. The Border Patrol has frequently lent their equipment, personnel, and powers to domestic policing that has only a tangential relationship with border security. Border militarization therefore contributes to expansions in the scope of police powers and the erosion of constitutional constraints. This process undermines functional polycentricity, and thereby alters the incentives and knowledge of political decision-makers.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141146642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political conflict, political polarization, and constitutional compliance 政治冲突、政治两极化和遵守宪法
IF 0.8
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09434-3
Jacek Lewkowicz, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, Jan Fałkowski
{"title":"Political conflict, political polarization, and constitutional compliance","authors":"Jacek Lewkowicz, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, Jan Fałkowski","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09434-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09434-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>While the economic approach to constitutions highlights their contribution to resolving conflict, recent work on the <i>de jure</i>–<i>de facto</i> distinction in relation to various constitutional rules suggests that political conflict and polarization could play a role in explaining the size and evolution of the gap between constitution text and constitutional practice. In this paper, we are interested in the relationship between the degree of conflict in the political arena within the state, captured by the polarization of the political landscape, as well as the underlying political polarization in society, and compliance of government actors with the country’s constitution. Based on a number of theoretical arguments, we provide an empirical investigation for ca. 170 countries in the period 1975–2020, using the new Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database. Our results suggest that constitutional non-compliance is associated with more intense political polarization in society, but it does not seem to be correlated with polarization of the political landscape.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140626730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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