{"title":"Public reason, democracy, and the ideal two-tier social choice model of politics","authors":"Cyril Hédoin","doi":"10.1007/s10602-024-09437-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article develops an account of political legitimacy based on the articulation of a social choice theoretic framework with the idea of public reason. I pursue two related goals. First, I characterize in detail what I call the Ideal Two-Tier Social Choice Model of Politics in conjunction with the idea of public reason. Second, I explore the implications of this model, when it is assumed that decision rules are among the constitutive features of the social alternatives on which individuals have preferences. The choice of the decision rule cannot be made independently of considerations regarding the likelihood that individuals will vote based on political judgments that are not publicly justified. The result is an account of political legitimacy according to which only “elitist” decision rules are amenable to public justification. Some of them are plainly compatible with liberal democracies as they currently exist. Others are however more naturally associated with the concept of epistocracy.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Constitutional Political Economy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-024-09437-0","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article develops an account of political legitimacy based on the articulation of a social choice theoretic framework with the idea of public reason. I pursue two related goals. First, I characterize in detail what I call the Ideal Two-Tier Social Choice Model of Politics in conjunction with the idea of public reason. Second, I explore the implications of this model, when it is assumed that decision rules are among the constitutive features of the social alternatives on which individuals have preferences. The choice of the decision rule cannot be made independently of considerations regarding the likelihood that individuals will vote based on political judgments that are not publicly justified. The result is an account of political legitimacy according to which only “elitist” decision rules are amenable to public justification. Some of them are plainly compatible with liberal democracies as they currently exist. Others are however more naturally associated with the concept of epistocracy.
期刊介绍：
Constitutional Political Economy is a forum for research in the broad area of constitutional analysis, which lies at the intersection of several approaches in modern economics, sharing a common interest in the systematic integration of the institutional dimension - the study of political, legal and moral institutions - into economic analysis.
While its primary discipline is economics, Constitutional Political Economy is explicitly interdisciplinary, aiming to encourage an exchange between the various social sciences, including law, philosophy, political science and sociology. Theoretical and empirical research, as well as contributions to constitutional policy issues, are considered for publication.
Officially cited as: Const Polit Econ
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