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Constructing Moral Equality 构建道德平等
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-08-17 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.24
Suzy Killmister
{"title":"Constructing Moral Equality","authors":"Suzy Killmister","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.24","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Moral equality—the idea that ‘we’ all have equal moral worth, our interests ought to count for the same, and we possess the same bundle of basic rights—is one of the most central principles of liberal thought, being regularly drawn on as a presupposition of moral and political inquiry. Perhaps because it is so often relied on as a presupposition, however, moral equality is more often assumed than argued for. When moral equality is argued for, the most common tactic is to appeal to some inherent property. As is well established, however, such property-based defenses of moral equality face two significant challenges: the problem of exclusion and the problem of inequality. In light of these challenges, in this article I put forward a new, revisionist account of moral equality. Taking inspiration from recent work in the social metaphysics of human kinds, I argue that moral equality ought to be seen as a component of a status that we confer on one another, rather than (grounded in) a property inherent in certain individuals. Conceiving of moral equality this way, I argue, side-steps both the problem of exclusion and the problem of natural equality.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47851133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Against Irrationalism in the Theory of Propaganda 反对宣传理论中的非理性主义
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-07-28 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.4
Megan Hyska
{"title":"Against Irrationalism in the Theory of Propaganda","authors":"Megan Hyska","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.4","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to many accounts, propaganda is a variety of politically significant signal with a distinctive connection to irrationality. This irrationality may be theoretical, or practical; it may be supposed that propaganda characteristically elicits this irrationality anew, or else that it exploits its prior existence. The view that encompasses such accounts we will call irrationalism. This essay presents two classes of propaganda that do not bear the sort of connection to irrationality posited by the irrationalist: hard propaganda and propaganda by the deed. Faced with these counterexamples, some irrationalists will offer their account of propaganda as a refinement of the folk concept rather than as an attempt to capture all of its applications. The author argues that any refinement of the concept of propaganda must allow the concept to remain essentially political, and that the irrationalist refinement fails to meet this condition.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43521398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Epistemic Paternalism via Conceptual Engineering 概念工程中的认知家长制
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-07-27 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.22
Eve Kitsik
{"title":"Epistemic Paternalism via Conceptual Engineering","authors":"Eve Kitsik","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.22","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay focuses on conceptual engineers who aim to improve other people's patterns of inference and attention by shaping their concepts. Such conceptual engineers sometimes engage in a form of epistemic paternalism that I call paternalistic cognitive engineering: instead of explicitly persuading, informing and educating others, the engineers non-consultatively rely on assumptions about the target agents’ cognitive systems to improve their belief forming. The target agents could reasonably regard such benevolent exercises of control as violating their sovereignty over their own belief formation. This is a pro tanto reason against such engineering. In addition to the relevant projects of conceptual engineering, paternalistic cognitive engineering plausibly includes certain kinds of nudging and evidence suppression. I distinguish the sovereignty-based concern from other ethical worries about conceptual engineering and discuss how one might justify the relevant conceptual engineering projects despite the sovereignty-based reason against them.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42866978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Empirical and Philosophical Reflections on Trust 信任的实证与哲学思考
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-07-27 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.14
S. Pouryousefi, Jonathan Tallant
{"title":"Empirical and Philosophical Reflections on Trust","authors":"S. Pouryousefi, Jonathan Tallant","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.14","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A dominant claim in the philosophical literature on trust is that we should stop thinking in terms of group trustworthiness or appropriate trust in groups. In this paper, we push back against this claim by arguing that philosophical work on trust would benefit from being brought into closer contact with empirical work on the nature of trust. We consider data on reactive attitudes and moral responsibility to adjudicate on different positions in the philosophical literature on trust. An implication of our argument is that the distinction between different kinds of groups—mere groups versus institutional groups—deserves more attention than is currently recognized in the philosophical literature on trust.\u0000 In the first section of the paper, we draw some basic philosophical distinctions concerning the nature and kinds of trust. In section two, we present the positions taken by Hawley (2017), who argues against trust in groups, and Faulkner (2018), who argues in favor of trust in groups. In section three, we introduce some empirical data and suggest that, albeit tentatively, this looks to undermine Hawley's position and is compatible with Faulkner's approach. We thus suggest, on the basis of the evidence that we have available, that we have reasons to prefer the position taken by Faulkner (2018) over that taken by Hawley (2017). We end by discussing some implications for distinctions between different kinds of groups relevant for future philosophical work on trust.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48301323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Singular Terms and Ontological Seriousness 单数与本体论的严重性
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-07-27 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.10
A. Schipper
{"title":"Singular Terms and Ontological Seriousness","authors":"A. Schipper","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.10","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Linguistic ontologists and antilinguistic, ‘serious’ ontologists both accept the inference from ‘Fido is a dog’ to ‘Fido has the property of being a dog’ but disagree about its ontological consequences. In arguing that we are committed to properties on the basis of these transformations, linguistic ontologists employ a neo-Fregean meta-ontological principle, on which the function of singular terms is to refer. To reject this, serious ontologists must defend an alternative. This paper defends an alternative on which the function of singular terms is not generally to refer and on which they are generally ontologically noncommittal. This is the best way to reject linguistic, ‘easy’ arguments for the existence of properties. The account recommends neutralism about quantification (drawing on Barcan Marcus and Meinongianism), coherently bringing together two important yet uncombined meta-ontological movements. Moreover, it employs Ramseyan insights about the transformations to provide a nonreductionist, non-error-theoretic redundancy approach to explicit talk about properties.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43808802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of Conciliationists 衡量同伴分歧的良性反应:调解主义者的智力谦卑和积极开放的思维
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-07-18 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.8
J. Beebe, Jonathan D. Matheson
{"title":"Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of Conciliationists","authors":"J. Beebe, Jonathan D. Matheson","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.8","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or ‘sticking to one's guns’ in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual humility, courage, grit, and actively open-minded thinking, on the other. We observed positive correlations between measures of conciliationism, intellectual humility, and actively open-minded thinking but failed to find any reliable association between steadfastness, courage, and grit. Our studies reveal that there are at least two important intellectual virtues associated with conciliationist responses to peer disagreement (viz., intellectual humility and actively open-minded thinking) and two vices associated with steadfast responses (intellectual arrogance and myside bias). These findings shed new light on the overall epistemic goodness of the conciliationist perspective.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41910882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
A Holist Balance Scale 整体平衡量表
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-06-22 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.13
C. Tucker
{"title":"A Holist Balance Scale","authors":"C. Tucker","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.13","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Scale-based models of weighing reasons face challenges concerning the context sensitivity of weight, the aggregation of weight, and the methodology for determining what the weights of reasons are. I resolve these challenges.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44244948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Free Will Skeptics Can Have Their Basic Desert and Eat It Too 自由意志怀疑论者可以拥有他们的基本沙漠并吃掉它
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-06-22 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.7
L. Vicens
{"title":"Free Will Skeptics Can Have Their Basic Desert and Eat It Too","authors":"L. Vicens","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.7","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this essay, I argue that if we assume with free will skeptics that people lack moral responsibility, or at least a central form of it, we may still maintain that people are ‘basically’ deserving of certain treatment in response to their behavior. I characterize basic-desert justifications for treatment negatively, as justifications that do not depend on consequentialist, contractualist, or relational considerations. Appealing to attributionist accounts of responsibility as well as the symbolic value of protest, I identify protest as a response that may be basically deserved even in the absence of free will, on the grounds that it is a fitting response to the intrinsic features of agents and their actions. The position defended is not a standard form of semi-compatibilism as it allows that some responses to behavior—such as punishment—that would be basically deserved were people free are not basically deserved in the absence of free will.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47120248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
How to Be a Feminist Muslim 如何成为一名穆斯林女权主义者
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-06-06 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.9
Fatema Amijee
{"title":"How to Be a Feminist Muslim","authors":"Fatema Amijee","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.9","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Can Muslim values be reconciled with a feminist outlook? The question is pressing on both an individual level—for Muslim feminists—and on a political level—for the project of making Islamic practice compatible with the ideals of a just and liberal society. A version of this question arises specifically for the central Muslim text, the Quran: Can the message of the Quran be reconciled with a feminist outlook? There have, broadly speaking, been two approaches to this more specific question. I argue that both are inadequate. I then develop a novel approach to reconciliation that does not threaten the objective and universal normative force Muslims attribute to the Quran. My approach is revolutionary rather than apologetic and carves out a central role for moral understanding in Islam-as-practiced.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47174498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Artworks are Valuable for Their Own Sake 艺术品因其本身而有价值
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-05-30 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.5
Gerad Gentry
{"title":"Artworks are Valuable for Their Own Sake","authors":"Gerad Gentry","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.5","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 To hold that artworks are valuable for their own sake—regardless of whatever secondary value they may have, such as entertainment, formation, education, or a pleasurable experience—is to hold that their final worth is not derived from external or secondary ends. I call this collective set of views the end-in-itself view (or EI view). Nicholas Stang recently leveled a twofold charge of reductio ad absurdum and operating from a double standard against the EI view. In this article, I refute Stang by showing that the charges do not obtain for at least one variation of the EI view that holds artworks to be valuable for their own sake as internally purposive ends-in-themselves (the IP view).","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41967462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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