Journal of the American Philosophical Association最新文献

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The Social Philosophy of Gerald Gaus: Moral Relations Amid Control, Contestation, and Complexity 杰拉尔德·高斯的社会哲学:控制、争论与复杂性中的道德关系
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-08-18 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.16
Kevin Vallier
{"title":"The Social Philosophy of Gerald Gaus: Moral Relations Amid Control, Contestation, and Complexity","authors":"Kevin Vallier","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.16","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Gerald Gaus was one of the leading liberal theorists of the early twenty-first century. He defended liberal order based on its unique capacity to handle deep disagreement and pressed liberals toward a principled openness to pluralism and diversity. Yet, almost everything written about Gaus's work is evaluative: determining whether his arguments succeed or fail. This essay breaks from the pack by outlining underlying themes in his work. I argue that Gaus explored how to sustain moral relations between persons in light of the institutional threats of social control, evaluative pluralism, and institutional complexity, and the psychological threat of acting solely from what I shall call the mere first-personal point of view. The idea of public justification is the key to sustaining moral relations in the face of such challenges. When a society's moral and political rules are justified to each person, moral relations survive the threats they face.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45616868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Reasons-Responsiveness and the Challenge of Irrelevance 理性的回应与无关性的挑战
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-08-18 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.25
Jing. Hu
{"title":"Reasons-Responsiveness and the Challenge of Irrelevance","authors":"Jing. Hu","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.25","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Carolina Sartorio has criticized the reasons-responsiveness theory of freedom for being inconsistent with the actual-sequence view motivated by the Frankfurt-style cases. Specifically, reasons-responsiveness conceived as a modal property does not pertain to the actual sequence of the agent's action and thereby it is irrelevant to the agent's freedom and moral responsibility. Call this the challenge of irrelevance. In this article, I present this challenge in a new way that overcomes certain limitations of Sartorio's argument. I argue that the root of the challenge is that reasons-responsiveness as an unmanifested modal property seems to be nonexplanatory for the agent's action. I show that reasons-responsiveness theorists will confront this challenge even if they do not endorse the actual-sequence view. Finally, I deflate this challenge with David Lewis's model of causal explanation, showing that reasons-responsiveness is explanatory in virtue of providing information about the causal history of the agent's action.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42247881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Narrative Determination 叙事的决心
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-08-18 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.26
P. Studtmann, C. Shields
{"title":"Narrative Determination","authors":"P. Studtmann, C. Shields","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.26","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The traditional problem of free will has reached an impasse; we are unlikely to see progress without rethinking the terms in which the problem had been cast. Our approach offers an alternative to the standard terms of the debate, by developing an authorially parameterized approach articulated within a two-dimensional semantics for temporal predicates.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43466298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Colonial Genealogies of National Self-Determination 民族自决的殖民家谱
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-08-17 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.23
Torsten Menge
{"title":"Colonial Genealogies of National Self-Determination","authors":"Torsten Menge","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.23","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Self-determination is a central concept for political philosophers. For example, many have appealed to this concept to defend a right of states to restrict immigration. Because it is deeply embedded in our political structures, the principle possesses a kind of default authority and does not usually call for an elaborate defense. In this paper, I will argue that genealogical studies by Adom Getachew, Radhika Mongia, Nandita Sharma, and others help to challenge this default authority. Their counter-histories show that the principle was used to justify, strengthen, and adapt imperial rule in the twentieth century. In particular, the idea that controlling a population's composition through regulating immigration is an essential aspect of self-determination emerged as a response to White anxieties about the migration of negatively racialized groups. Genealogies have not been adequately appreciated as a critical tool within the mainstream of political philosophy. I show that these genealogies have a critical role to play because they unsettle our uncritical attachment to the structures of the nation-state system and raise serious questions about the meaning and emancipatory force of the principle of self-determination.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45908258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Ordinary Meaningful Life 平凡而有意义的人生
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-08-17 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.19
Joshua Glasgow
{"title":"The Ordinary Meaningful Life","authors":"Joshua Glasgow","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.19","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It is widely thought that we have good reason to try to be important. Being important or doing significant things is supposed to add value to our lives. In particular, it is supposed to make our lives exceptionally meaningful. This essay develops an alternative view. After exploring what importance is and how it might relate to meaning in life, a series of cases are presented to validate the perspective that being important adds no meaning to our lives. The meaningful life does need valuable projects, activities, and relationships. But no added meaning is secured by those projects, activities, and relationships being especially significant. The extraordinary life has no more meaning than the ordinary life.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43563516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Robert Boyle and Natural Kinds 罗伯特·波义耳和自然种类
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-08-17 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.17
H. T. Adriaenssen, L. Nauta
{"title":"Robert Boyle and Natural Kinds","authors":"H. T. Adriaenssen, L. Nauta","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.17","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper studies Robert Boyle's account of kinds and classification. A number of commentators have argued that, for Boyle, classifications are inevitably the product of conventions. Others have challenged this reading, arguing that, according to Boyle, the corpuscular makeup of bodies gives rise to hard-edged natural kinds and classes. We argue that Boyle's position is more complicated than the available realist and conventionalist readings acknowledge. We argue that, according to Boyle, the individuation of kinds was to some degree the result of convention. At the same time, however, Boyle held that our classificatory practices are subject to constraints. We identify some of these constraints by turning to Boyle's discussion of the late scholastic debate about the plurality of forms, in particular the contributions of Jacopo Zabarella and Daniel Sennert. In this way, we clarify how Boyle strikes a balance between realist and conventionalist elements in his treatment of kinds.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47717528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Constructing Moral Equality 构建道德平等
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-08-17 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.24
Suzy Killmister
{"title":"Constructing Moral Equality","authors":"Suzy Killmister","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.24","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Moral equality—the idea that ‘we’ all have equal moral worth, our interests ought to count for the same, and we possess the same bundle of basic rights—is one of the most central principles of liberal thought, being regularly drawn on as a presupposition of moral and political inquiry. Perhaps because it is so often relied on as a presupposition, however, moral equality is more often assumed than argued for. When moral equality is argued for, the most common tactic is to appeal to some inherent property. As is well established, however, such property-based defenses of moral equality face two significant challenges: the problem of exclusion and the problem of inequality. In light of these challenges, in this article I put forward a new, revisionist account of moral equality. Taking inspiration from recent work in the social metaphysics of human kinds, I argue that moral equality ought to be seen as a component of a status that we confer on one another, rather than (grounded in) a property inherent in certain individuals. Conceiving of moral equality this way, I argue, side-steps both the problem of exclusion and the problem of natural equality.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47851133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Against Irrationalism in the Theory of Propaganda 反对宣传理论中的非理性主义
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-07-28 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.4
Megan Hyska
{"title":"Against Irrationalism in the Theory of Propaganda","authors":"Megan Hyska","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.4","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to many accounts, propaganda is a variety of politically significant signal with a distinctive connection to irrationality. This irrationality may be theoretical, or practical; it may be supposed that propaganda characteristically elicits this irrationality anew, or else that it exploits its prior existence. The view that encompasses such accounts we will call irrationalism. This essay presents two classes of propaganda that do not bear the sort of connection to irrationality posited by the irrationalist: hard propaganda and propaganda by the deed. Faced with these counterexamples, some irrationalists will offer their account of propaganda as a refinement of the folk concept rather than as an attempt to capture all of its applications. The author argues that any refinement of the concept of propaganda must allow the concept to remain essentially political, and that the irrationalist refinement fails to meet this condition.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43521398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Empirical and Philosophical Reflections on Trust 信任的实证与哲学思考
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-07-27 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.14
S. Pouryousefi, Jonathan Tallant
{"title":"Empirical and Philosophical Reflections on Trust","authors":"S. Pouryousefi, Jonathan Tallant","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.14","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A dominant claim in the philosophical literature on trust is that we should stop thinking in terms of group trustworthiness or appropriate trust in groups. In this paper, we push back against this claim by arguing that philosophical work on trust would benefit from being brought into closer contact with empirical work on the nature of trust. We consider data on reactive attitudes and moral responsibility to adjudicate on different positions in the philosophical literature on trust. An implication of our argument is that the distinction between different kinds of groups—mere groups versus institutional groups—deserves more attention than is currently recognized in the philosophical literature on trust.\u0000 In the first section of the paper, we draw some basic philosophical distinctions concerning the nature and kinds of trust. In section two, we present the positions taken by Hawley (2017), who argues against trust in groups, and Faulkner (2018), who argues in favor of trust in groups. In section three, we introduce some empirical data and suggest that, albeit tentatively, this looks to undermine Hawley's position and is compatible with Faulkner's approach. We thus suggest, on the basis of the evidence that we have available, that we have reasons to prefer the position taken by Faulkner (2018) over that taken by Hawley (2017). We end by discussing some implications for distinctions between different kinds of groups relevant for future philosophical work on trust.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48301323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Epistemic Paternalism via Conceptual Engineering 概念工程中的认知家长制
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-07-27 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.22
Eve Kitsik
{"title":"Epistemic Paternalism via Conceptual Engineering","authors":"Eve Kitsik","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.22","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay focuses on conceptual engineers who aim to improve other people's patterns of inference and attention by shaping their concepts. Such conceptual engineers sometimes engage in a form of epistemic paternalism that I call paternalistic cognitive engineering: instead of explicitly persuading, informing and educating others, the engineers non-consultatively rely on assumptions about the target agents’ cognitive systems to improve their belief forming. The target agents could reasonably regard such benevolent exercises of control as violating their sovereignty over their own belief formation. This is a pro tanto reason against such engineering. In addition to the relevant projects of conceptual engineering, paternalistic cognitive engineering plausibly includes certain kinds of nudging and evidence suppression. I distinguish the sovereignty-based concern from other ethical worries about conceptual engineering and discuss how one might justify the relevant conceptual engineering projects despite the sovereignty-based reason against them.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42866978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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