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La proximité du dirigeant et des administrateurs renforce-t-elle la position concurrentielle de la firme ? 经理和董事的接近是否加强了公司的竞争地位?
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2021-04-22 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.312.0095
Cédric Van Appelghem, Pascal Nguyên, Younes Ben Zaied
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引用次数: 0
Les barèmes, outils d’aide à la décision pour les justiciables et les juges 量表，为诉讼当事人和法官提供决策支持的工具
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2021-04-22 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.312.0031
Cécile Bourreau-Dubois, Bruno Deffains, Myriam Doriat-Duban, B. Jeandidier
{"title":"Les barèmes, outils d’aide à la décision pour les justiciables et les juges","authors":"Cécile Bourreau-Dubois, Bruno Deffains, Myriam Doriat-Duban, B. Jeandidier","doi":"10.3917/REDP.312.0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.312.0031","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"10 1","pages":"199-222"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82033092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
« Partager le revenu ». Pour une nouvelle formule de financement de l’enseignement supérieur qui vient de l’Oregon “分享收入”。俄勒冈州为高等教育提供新的资助方案
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2021-04-22 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.312.0005
Raul Magni-berton
{"title":"« Partager le revenu ». Pour une nouvelle formule de financement de l’enseignement supérieur qui vient de l’Oregon","authors":"Raul Magni-berton","doi":"10.3917/REDP.312.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.312.0005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"7 1","pages":"173-197"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83435400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Manipulabilité coalitionnelle du vote par note à trois niveaux : quantification et comparaison à trois autres règles de vote 联盟在三个层面操纵投票:量化和与其他三个投票规则的比较
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2021-04-22 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.312.0129
Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, D. Lepelley, Jérôme Serais, Hatem Smaoui
{"title":"Manipulabilité coalitionnelle du vote par note à trois niveaux : quantification et comparaison à trois autres règles de vote","authors":"Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, D. Lepelley, Jérôme Serais, Hatem Smaoui","doi":"10.3917/REDP.312.0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.312.0129","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"1 1","pages":"297-321"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82380414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Characterising Bilateral Trade between sub-Saharan Africa and China: The Specific Role of Institutional Quality 撒哈拉以南非洲与中国双边贸易的特征:制度质量的特殊作用
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2021-03-08 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.311.0063
Laurent Didier, J. Hoarau
{"title":"Characterising Bilateral Trade between sub-Saharan Africa and China: The Specific Role of Institutional Quality","authors":"Laurent Didier, J. Hoarau","doi":"10.3917/REDP.311.0063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.311.0063","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"25 1","pages":"57-88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73067999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Jacques Lesourne (1928-2020). Une méthode au service d’une vision 雅克·勒索恩(1928-2020)。为愿景服务的方法
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2021-03-08 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.311.0007
J. Thépot
{"title":"Jacques Lesourne (1928-2020). Une méthode au service d’une vision","authors":"J. Thépot","doi":"10.3917/REDP.311.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.311.0007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84928920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Biens méritoires et nudges dans le domaine de la santé publique 在公共卫生领域有价值的商品和促进
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2020-11-12 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.305.0121
Fabienne Oguer
{"title":"Biens méritoires et nudges dans le domaine de la santé publique","authors":"Fabienne Oguer","doi":"10.3917/REDP.305.0121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.305.0121","url":null,"abstract":"Cet article envisage les biens (de)meritoires dans le domaine de la sante publique\u0000(vaccination, depistage du cancer ou du cholesterol, tabac). Il adopte une approche de\u0000theorie des jeux et de design d’information fondee sur des nudges modelises comme\u0000un degre d’interventionnisme intermediaire entre un paternalisme faible et un paternalisme fort. Le jeu en information complete et le jeu de signal indiquent qu’un Etat\u0000suffisamment paternaliste a interet a avoir recours aux nudges pour declencher un\u0000comportement vertueux chez l’individu, et a faire preuve d’autoritarisme dans le cas\u0000d’addiction ou d’externalites. Le niveau optimal de nudges a mettre en œuvre etant une\u0000information privee, l’Etat peut demander a un regulateur de le conseiller sur le degre\u0000d’interventionnisme qu’il doit mettre en place. Le jeu en termes de design d’information verifie que l’influence du regulateur se reduit avec l’information supplementaire\u0000que l’Etat peut acquerir sur le type de l’individu selectionne.\u0000Classification JEL : C72 ; D83 ; D91","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"28 1","pages":"799-821"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80210861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Some k-scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle 委员会选举的若干k评分规则:协议与孔多塞原则
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2020-11-12 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.305.0021
Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, A. Tlidi
{"title":"On Some k-scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle","authors":"Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, A. Tlidi","doi":"10.3917/REDP.305.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.305.0021","url":null,"abstract":"Given a collection of individual preferences on a set of candidates and a desired number of winners, a multi-winner voting rule outputs groups of winners, which we call committees. In this paper, we consider five multi-winner voting rules widely studied in the literature of social choice theory: the k-Plurality rule, the k-Borda rule, the k-Negative Plurality rule, the Bloc rule, and the Chamberlin-Courant rule. The objective of this paper is to provide a comparison of these multi-winner voting rules according to many principles by taking into account a probabilistic approach using the well-known Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. We first evaluate the probability that each pair of the considered voting rules selects the same unique committee in order to identify which multi-winner rules are the most likely to agree for a given number of candidates and a fixed target size of the committee. In this matter, our results show that the Chamberlin-Courant rule and the k-Plurality rule on one side, and the k-Borda rule and the Bloc rule on the other side, are the pairs of rules that most agree in comparison to other pairs. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability of every multi-winner voting rule selecting the Condorcet committee a la Gehrlein when it exists. The Condorcet committee a la Gehrlein is a fixed-size committee such that every member defeats every non-member in pairwise comparisons. In addition, we compare the considered multi-winner voting rules according to their ability (susceptibility) to select a committee containing the Condorcet winner (loser) when one exists. Here, our results tell us that in general, the k-Borda rule has the highest performance amongst all the considered voting rules. Finally, we highlight that this paper is one of the very rare contributions in the literature giving exact results under the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) condition for the case of four candidates.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"13 1","pages":"699-725"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88222196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Incitations et Redistribution en France, 2010-2011 法国煽动与再分配，2010-2011
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2020-07-10 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.303.0345
S. Gauthier, Robin Le Huérou-Kérisel
{"title":"Incitations et Redistribution en France, 2010-2011","authors":"S. Gauthier, Robin Le Huérou-Kérisel","doi":"10.3917/REDP.303.0345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.303.0345","url":null,"abstract":"Nous etudions les limites de la redistribution qu’impliquent les asymetries d’information entre la puissance publique et les assujettis dans un modele de fiscalite optimale melant un impot direct sur le revenu et des impots indirects sur la consommation. En utilisant l’enquete Budget de Famille 2011, nous trouvons que la puissance publique souhaiterait favoriser les menages de la classe moyenne aisee situes aux alentours du sixieme decile de la distribution des depenses par unite de consommation. L’innovation de ce texte est de montrer que la redistribution en leur faveur est freinee par le risque que les menages des classes superieures, situes dans le dernier quartile de la distribution des depenses, relâchent leur contribution a l’effort productif.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"12 1","pages":"345-371"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82554996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Verdir la politique monétaire 绿化货币政策
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2020-07-10 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.303.0311
H. Kempf
{"title":"Verdir la politique monétaire","authors":"H. Kempf","doi":"10.3917/REDP.303.0311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.303.0311","url":null,"abstract":"Les banques centrales ont pris conscience recemment des risques economiques et\u0000financiers dont etait porteur un rechauffement climatique non controle et ont commence a se mobiliser. Mais jusqu’a present, la politique monetaire, pourtant au coeur\u0000de leurs missions, n’a pas ete integree a la lutte contre le rechauffement climatique. Le\u0000present article a pour but de montrer qu’il est possible de verdir la politique monetaire\u0000sans que cela mette en danger la mission premiere d’une banque centrale, la stabilisation macroeconomique et le controle de l’inflation. Il est possible de modifier le cadre\u0000operationnel dans lequel est conduite la politique monetaire pour inciter les banques\u0000commerciales a moduler leurs politiques d’octroi de credit en fonction des emissions\u0000de CO2 qui y sont liees. Deux options sont presentees. L’une passe par l’ajout d’une\u0000prime climatique au taux d’interet directeur specifique a la banque et a la notation\u0000climat de ses credits, l’autre passe par un traitement differencie des contreparties a la\u0000liquidite offerte par la banque centrale en fonction des emissions CO2 qui y sont associees. La mise en oeuvre de ces mesure est discutee, en particulier leur compatibilite\u0000avec les objectifs de stabilisation macroeconomique de la politique monetaire.\u0000Classification JEL: E52, E58, Q54","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"1 1","pages":"311-343"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89475050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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