International Studies in the Philosophy of Science最新文献_第4页

Navigating Massimi’s Perspectival Garden with Inferential Forking Paths 用推理岔路探索马西米的透视花园

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-10-02 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2191168

Daian Bica

{"title":"Navigating Massimi’s Perspectival Garden with Inferential Forking Paths","authors":"Daian Bica","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2191168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2191168","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this review article, I situate Michela Massimi’s 2022 Perspectival Realism book in the broader state of the art of the contemporary philosophy of science by examining critically its contribution to the perspectival realism debate. Setting up a new agenda of philosophical problems for the perspectival realist, Massimi’s book is the most comprehensive assessment of perspectival realism since the publication of Giere’s 2006 Scientific Perspectivism (the starting point of the debate). The author carries out a scrupulous analysis of the historical, epistemological, and metaphysical foundations of perspectival realism—while she engages critically with the existing literature, she does so by giving a generous homage to the previous contributions to the state of the art (the works of Giere, Morrison, van Fraassen and others). However, I raise a batterie of questions about Massimi’s (perspectival) commitments, to bring into question the reach and the ambitions of her global project, specifically the rising tension between her modest epistemological beliefs in a plurality of culturally and historically situated perspectives and her ambitious metaphysical commitments towards a primitivist view about laws of nature.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"291 - 303"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47205225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Incorrigible Science and Doctrinal Pseudoscience 模糊科学与伪科学

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-10-02 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2218264

Kåre Letrud

{"title":"Incorrigible Science and Doctrinal Pseudoscience","authors":"Kåre Letrud","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2218264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2218264","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I respond to Sven Ove Hansson’s [2020. \"Disciplines, Doctrines, and Deviant Science.\" International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (1): 43-52. doi:10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258] discussion note on my (Letrud 2019) critique of his (2013) pseudoscience definition. My critique addressed what I considered to be issues with his choice of definiendum, the efficiency of the definition for debunking pseudoscience, and a problematic extensional overlap with bad science. I attempted to solve these issues by proposing some modifications to his definition. I shall address the four main points of the discussion: whether the primary definiendum ought to be ‘pseudoscience’ or ‘pseudoscientific statement’ (I make a moderate case for ‘pseudoscience’), whether ‘discipline’ is an apt category for the definiens (it is, extensionally), and how to go about debunking pseudoscience (it is complicated). And, perhaps most importantly, whether Hansson’s definition of pseudoscientific statement subsumes examples of bad science, and thus science. I present a case study of efforts at correcting unreliable models proliferating in the research literature. This case demonstrates how bad science can satisfy Hansson’s criteria for pseudoscientific statement, including the criterion of deviant doctrine.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"269 - 278"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48214471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

What is a Chemical Element? A Collection of Essays by Chemists, Philosophers, Historians, and Educators 什么是化学元素？化学家、哲学家、历史学家和教育家文集

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-10-02 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2195306

Pieter Thyssen

引用次数: 5

Reviewers Acknowledgement 评论家承认

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-09-27 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2123491

引用次数: 0

Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood 走向意识与自我的中性结构主义理论

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-07-08 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2092825

Janko Nešić

{"title":"Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood","authors":"Janko Nešić","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2092825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2092825","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"243 - 259"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45516524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Uses of Truth: Is There Room for Reconciliation of Factivist and Non-Factivist Accounts of Scientific Understanding? 真理的用途：科学理解的事实主义者和非事实主义者的叙述有调和的空间吗？

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-06-13 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2084329

L. Gurova

{"title":"The Uses of Truth: Is There Room for Reconciliation of Factivist and Non-Factivist Accounts of Scientific Understanding?","authors":"L. Gurova","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2084329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2084329","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One of the most lively debates on scientific understanding is standardly presented as a controversy between the so-called factivists, who argue that understanding implies truth, and the non-factivists whose position is that truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. A closer look at the debate, however, reveals that the borderline between factivism and non-factivism is not as clear-cut as it looks at first glance. Some of those who claim to be quasi-factivists come suspiciously close to the position of their opponents, the non-factivist, from whom they pretend to differ. The non-factivist, in turn, acknowledges that some sort of ‘answering to the facts’ is indispensable for understanding. This paper discusses an example of convergence of the initially rival positions in the debate on understanding and truth: the use of the same substitute for truth by the quasi-factivist Kareem Khalifa and the non-factivists Henk de Regt and Victor Gijsbers. It is argued that the use of ‘effectiveness’ as a substitute for truth by both parties is not an occasional coincidence of terms, it rather speaks about a deeper similarity which have important implications for understanding the essential features of scientific understanding.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"211 - 221"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48839773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Einstein’s Theory of Theories and Mechanicism 爱因斯坦的理论与机械论

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2130661

D. Maltrana, M. Herrera, Federico Benitez

引用次数: 4

A Defence of Functional Kinds: Multiple Realisability and Explanatory Counterfactuals 功能类型的辩护：多重可实现性与解释性反事实

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2144436

Gareth Fuller

引用次数: 0

Regulation and the Normativity Problem 规则与规范性问题

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2149050

D. Bolton, Predrag Šustar

{"title":"Regulation and the Normativity Problem","authors":"D. Bolton, Predrag Šustar","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2149050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2149050","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The concept of regulation pervades biology, for example in models of genetic regulatory networks and the endocrine system. Regulation has a normative opposite, dysregulation, which figures prominently in biomedical models of disease. The use of normative concepts in biology, however, has been thought to present some challenges for the physicalist view of the world, and various resolutions have been proposed. Up to now the problem of biological normativity has been debated largely in connection with the concept of biological information. In this paper we shift focus to the concept of biological regulation, proposing that it provides a promising new approach to these issues. Models of regulatory systems have several features: they are causal, but they do not deal with the energy exchanges and transformations covered by physics and chemistry; further, and entirely connected, regulatory systems can break down, and this is because they and their causal-regulatory properties are dependent on fragile molecular structures. Biological regulatory systems exhibit normativity, because they are not determined by physical and chemical laws, but their close relationship with physical laws and physicalist ontology is transparent.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"135 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49397185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Representation and Spacetime: The Hole Argument Revisited 表象与时空：孔论再探

IF 0.8 2区哲学

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2144457

Aboutorab Yaghmaie, Bijan Ahmadi Kakavandi, S. Masoumi, Morteza Moniri

引用次数: 0