D. Dagon, M. Antonakakis, P. Vixie, Tatuya Jinmei, Wenke Lee
{"title":"Increased DNS forgery resistance through 0x20-bit encoding: security via leet queries","authors":"D. Dagon, M. Antonakakis, P. Vixie, Tatuya Jinmei, Wenke Lee","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455798","url":null,"abstract":"We describe a novel, practical and simple technique to make DNS queries more resistant to poisoning attacks: mix the upper and lower case spelling of the domain name in the query. Fortuitously, almost all DNS authority servers preserve the mixed case encoding of the query in answer messages. Attackers hoping to poison a DNS cache must therefore guess the mixed-case encoding of the query, in addition to all other fields required in a DNS poisoning attack. This increases the difficulty of the attack. We describe and measure the additional protections realized by this technique. Our analysis includes a basic model of DNS poisoning, measurement of the benefits that come from case-sensitive query encoding, implementation of the system for recursive DNS servers, and large-scale real-world experimental evaluation. Since the benefits of our technique can be significant, we have simultaneously made this DNS encoding system a proposed IETF standard. Our approach is practical enough that, just weeks after its disclosure, it is being implemented by numerous DNS vendors.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123757795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Keynote address","authors":"P. Syverson","doi":"10.1145/3260800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3260800","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122785793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Black-box accountable authority identity-based encryption","authors":"Vipul Goyal, Steve Lu, A. Sahai, Brent Waters","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455824","url":null,"abstract":"A well-known concern in the setting of identity based encryption is that the PKG is all powerful and has to be completely trusted. To mitigate this problem, the notion of Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption (A-IBE) was recently introduced by Goyal. Goyal provided constructions to realize the notion of A-IBE only in the white box and weak black box models. However, the security guarantees provided by these models fall short of those required in practice. In this paper, we resolve the main open question left in Goyal's work by providing a construction of a (fully) black box A-IBE system. Our construction is based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and uses techniques from key policy attribute based encryption.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131794261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"FairplayMP: a system for secure multi-party computation","authors":"Assaf Ben-David, N. Nisan, Benny Pinkas","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455804","url":null,"abstract":"We present FairplayMP (for \"Fairplay Multi-Party\"), a system for secure multi-party computation. Secure computation is one of the great achievements of modern cryptography, enabling a set of untrusting parties to compute any function of their private inputs while revealing nothing but the result of the function. In a sense, FairplayMP lets the parties run a joint computation that emulates a trusted party which receives the inputs from the parties, computes the function, and privately informs the parties of their outputs. FairplayMP operates by receiving a high-level language description of a function and a configuration file describing the participating parties. The system compiles the function into a description as a Boolean circuit, and perform a distributed evaluation of the circuit while revealing nothing else. FairplayMP supplements the Fairplay system [16], which supported secure computation between two parties. The underlying protocol of FairplayMP is the Beaver-Micali-Rogaway (BMR) protocol which runs in a constant number of communication rounds (eight rounds in our implementation). We modified the BMR protocol in a novel way and considerably improved its performance by using the Ben-Or-Goldwasser-Wigderson (BGW) protocol for the purpose of constructing gate tables. We chose to use this protocol since we believe that the number of communication rounds is a major factor on the overall performance of the protocol. We conducted different experiments which measure the effect of different parameters on the performance of the system and demonstrate its scalability. (We can now tell, for example, that running a second-price auction between four bidders, using five computation players, takes about 8 seconds.)","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114443028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charalampos Papamanthou, R. Tamassia, Nikos Triandopoulos
{"title":"Authenticated hash tables","authors":"Charalampos Papamanthou, R. Tamassia, Nikos Triandopoulos","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455826","url":null,"abstract":"Hash tables are fundamental data structures that optimally answer membership queries. Suppose a client stores n elements in a hash table that is outsourced at a remote server so that the client can save space or achieve load balancing. Authenticating the hash table functionality, i.e., verifying the correctness of queries answered by the server and ensuring the integrity of the stored data, is crucial because the server, lying outside the administrative control of the client, can be malicious. We design efficient and secure protocols for optimally authenticating membership queries on hash tables: for any fixed constants 0 < ε < 1 and κ > 1/ε, the server can provide a proof of integrity of the answer to a (non-)membership query in constant time, requiring O(nε/logκε--1 n) time to treat updates, yet keeping the communication and verification costs constant. This is the first construction for authenticating a hash table with constant query cost and sublinear update cost. Our solution employs the RSA accumulator in a nested way over the stored data, strictly improving upon previous accumulator-based solutions. Our construction applies to two concrete data authentication models and lends itself to a scheme that achieves different trade-offs---namely, constant update time and O(nε/logκε n) query time for fixed ε > 0 and κ > 0. An experimental evaluation of our solution shows very good scalability.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123386757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Building castles out of mud: practical access pattern privacy and correctness on untrusted storage","authors":"P. Williams, R. Sion, Bogdan Carbunar","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455790","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new practical mechanism for remote data storage with efficient access pattern privacy and correctness. A storage client can deploy this mechanism to issue encrypted reads, writes, and inserts to a potentially curious and malicious storage service provider, without revealing information or access patterns. The provider is unable to establish any correlation between successive accesses, or even to distinguish between a read and a write. Moreover, the client is provided with strong correctness assurances for its operations -- illicit provider behavior does not go undetected. We built a first practical system -- orders of magnitude faster than existing implementations -- that can execute over several queries per second on 1Tbyte+ databases with full computational privacy and correctness.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122829712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Revocation games in ephemeral networks","authors":"M. Raya, M. Manshaei, M. Félegyházi, J. Hubaux","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455797","url":null,"abstract":"A frequently proposed solution to node misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks is to use reputation systems. But in ephemeral networks - a new breed of mobile networks where contact times between nodes are short and neighbors change frequently - reputations are hard to build. In this case, local revocation is a faster and more efficient alternative. In this paper, we define a game-theoretic model to analyze the various local revocation strategies. We establish and prove the conditions leading to subgame-perfect equilibria. We also derive the optimal parameters for voting-based schemes. Then we design a protocol based on our analysis and the practical aspects that cannot be captured in the model. With realistic simulations on ephemeral networks we compare the performance and economic costs of the different techniques.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129359514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Robust defenses for cross-site request forgery","authors":"A. Barth, Collin Jackson, John C. Mitchell","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455782","url":null,"abstract":"Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a widely exploited web site vulnerability. In this paper, we present a new variation on CSRF attacks, login CSRF, in which the attacker forges a cross-site request to the login form, logging the victim into the honest web site as the attacker. The severity of a login CSRF vulnerability varies by site, but it can be as severe as a cross-site scripting vulnerability. We detail three major CSRF defense techniques and find shortcomings with each technique. Although the HTTP Referer header could provide an effective defense, our experimental observation of 283,945 advertisement impressions indicates that the header is widely blocked at the network layer due to privacy concerns. Our observations do suggest, however, that the header can be used today as a reliable CSRF defense over HTTPS, making it particularly well-suited for defending against login CSRF. For the long term, we propose that browsers implement the Origin header, which provides the security benefits of the Referer header while responding to privacy concerns.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131117556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Location privacy of distance bounding protocols","authors":"Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Srdjan Capkun","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455791","url":null,"abstract":"Distance bounding protocols have been proposed for many security critical applications as a means of getting an upper bound on the physical distance to a communication partner. As such, distance bounding protocols are executed frequently, e.g., to keep node locations up to date, etc. We analyze distance bounding protocols in terms of their location privacy and we show that they leak information about the location and distance between communicating partners even to passive attackers. This location and distance information may be highly sensitive since it can form the basis for access control, key establishment, or be used as input to location aware applications. We analyze, in a number of scenarios, how much information distance bounding protocols leak. We further discuss several straightforward countermeasures and show why they do not provide adequate protection against distance leakage. Finally, we propose a location private distance bounding protocol that maintains the properties of existing distance bounding protocols while leaking no information about the distance measured between the communicating parties.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115920307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Matthew Finifter, A. Mettler, N. Sastry, D. Wagner
{"title":"Verifiable functional purity in java","authors":"Matthew Finifter, A. Mettler, N. Sastry, D. Wagner","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455793","url":null,"abstract":"Proving that particular methods within a code base are functionally pure--deterministic and side-effect free--would aid verification of security properties including function invertibility, reproducibility of computation, and safety of untrusted code execution. Until now it has not been possible to automatically prove a method is functionally pure within a high-level imperative language in wide use, such as Java. We discuss a technique to prove that methods are functionally pure by writing programs in a subset of Java called Joe-E; a static verifier ensures that programs fall within the subset. In Joe-E, pure methods can be trivially recognized from their method signature. To demonstrate the practicality of our approach, we refactor an AES library, an experimental voting machine implementation, and an HTML parser to use our techniques. We prove that their top-level methods are verifiably pure and show how this provides high-level security guarantees about these routines. Our approach to verifiable purity is an attractive way to permit functional-style reasoning about security properties while leveraging the familiarity, convenience, and legacy code of imperative languages.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126869749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}