{"title":"Cryptographically verified implementations for TLS","authors":"K. Bhargavan, C. Fournet, R. Corin, E. Zalinescu","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455828","url":null,"abstract":"We intend to narrow the gap between concrete implementations of cryptographic protocols and their verified models. We develop and verify a small functional implementation of the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS 1.0). We make use of the same executable code for interoperability testing against mainstream implementations, for automated symbolic cryptographic verification, and for automated computational cryptographic verification. We rely on a combination of recent tools, and we also develop a new tool for extracting computational models from executable code. We obtain strong security guarantees for TLS as used in typical deployments.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123763174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Formal methods 2","authors":"A. Fournet","doi":"10.1145/3260812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3260812","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134461330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Access control","authors":"Ting Yu","doi":"10.1145/3260810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3260810","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124466267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A class of probabilistic models for role engineering","authors":"Mario Frank, D. Basin, J. Buhmann","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455809","url":null,"abstract":"Role Engineering is a security-critical task for systems using role-based access control (RBAC). Different role-mining approaches have been proposed that attempt to automatically infer appropriate roles from existing user-permission assignments. However, these approaches are mainly combinatorial and lack an underlying probabilistic model of the domain. We present the first probabilistic model for RBAC. Our model defines a general framework for expressing user permission assignments and can be specialized to different domains by limiting its degrees of freedom with appropriate constraints. For one practically important instance of this framework, we show how roles can be inferred from data using a state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithm. Experiments on both randomly generated and real-world data provide evidence that our approach not only creates meaningful roles but also identifies erroneous user-permission assignments in given data.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128914429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Identity-based encryption with efficient revocation","authors":"A. Boldyreva, Vipul Goyal, Virendra Kumar","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455823","url":null,"abstract":"Identity-based encryption (IBE) is an exciting alternative to public-key encryption, as IBE eliminates the need for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The senders using an IBE do not need to look up the public keys and the corresponding certificates of the receivers, the identities (e.g. emails or IP addresses) of the latter are sufficient to encrypt. Any setting, PKI- or identity-based, must provide a means to revoke users from the system. Efficient revocation is a well-studied problem in the traditional PKI setting. However in the setting of IBE, there has been little work on studying the revocation mechanisms. The most practical solution requires the senders to also use time periods when encrypting, and all the receivers (regardless of whether their keys have been compromised or not) to update their private keys regularly by contacting the trusted authority. We note that this solution does not scale well -- as the number of users increases, the work on key updates becomes a bottleneck. We propose an IBE scheme that significantly improves key-update efficiency on the side of the trusted party (from linear to logarithmic in the number of users), while staying efficient for the users. Our scheme builds on the ideas of the Fuzzy IBE primitive and binary tree data structure, and is provably secure.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126597020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Arnar Birgisson, Mohan Dhawan, Ú. Erlingsson, V. Ganapathy, L. Iftode
{"title":"Enforcing authorization policies using transactional memory introspection","authors":"Arnar Birgisson, Mohan Dhawan, Ú. Erlingsson, V. Ganapathy, L. Iftode","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455800","url":null,"abstract":"Correct enforcement of authorization policies is a difficult task, especially for multi-threaded software. Even in carefully-reviewed code, unauthorized access may be possible in subtle corner cases. We introduce Transactional Memory Introspection (TMI), a novel reference monitor architecture that builds on Software Transactional Memory--a new, attractive alternative for writing correct, multi-threaded software. TMI facilitates correct security enforcement by simplifying how the reference monitor integrates with software functionality. TMI can ensure complete mediation of security-relevant operations, eliminate race conditions related to security checks, and simplify handling of authorization failures. We present the design and implementation of a TMI-based reference monitor and experiment with its use in enforcing authorization policies on four significant servers. Our experiments confirm the benefits of the TMI architecture and show that it imposes an acceptable runtime overhead.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128188729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Applied cryptography 2","authors":"P. Golle","doi":"10.1145/3260817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3260817","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125799129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Computational soundness of observational equivalence","authors":"Hubert Comon-Lundh, V. Cortier","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455786","url":null,"abstract":"Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two versions of a protocol. In this paper, we show that computational proofs of indistinguishability can be considerably simplified, for a class of processes that covers most existing protocols. More precisely, we show a soundness theorem, following the line of research launched by Abadi and Rogaway in 2000: computational indistinguishability in presence of an active attacker is implied by the observational equivalence of the corresponding symbolic processes. We prove our result for symmetric encryption, but the same techniques can be applied to other security primitives such as signatures and public-key encryption. The proof requires the introduction of new concepts, which are general and can be reused in other settings.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129069348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multi-use unidirectional proxy re-signatures","authors":"Benoît Libert, Damien Vergnaud","doi":"10.1145/1455770.1455835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455835","url":null,"abstract":"In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss suggested a cryptographic primitive termed proxy re-signature in which a proxy transforms a signature computed under Alice's secret key into one from Bob on the same message. The proxy is only semi-trusted in that it cannot learn any signing key or sign arbitrary messages on behalf of Alice or Bob. At CCS 2005, Ateniese and Hohenberger revisited this primitive by providing appropriate security definitions and efficient constructions in the random oracle model. Nonetheless, they left open the problem of constructing a multi-use unidirectional scheme where the proxy is only able to translate in one direction and signatures can be re-translated several times. This paper provides the first steps towards efficiently solving this problem, suggested for the first time 10 years ago, and presents the first multi-hop unidirectional proxy re-signature schemes. Although our proposals feature a linear signature size in the number of translations, they are the first multi-use realizations of the primitive that satisfy the requirements of the Ateniese-Hohenberger security model. The first scheme is secure in the random oracle model. Using the same underlying idea, it readily extends into a secure construction in the standard model (i.e. the security proof of which avoids resorting to the random oracle idealization). Both schemes are computationally efficient but require newly defined Diffie-Hellman-like assumptions in bilinear groups.","PeriodicalId":440730,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134099652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}