Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Cultural Diversity on Wall Street: Evidence from Consensus Earnings Forecasts","authors":"Kenneth J. Merkley, Roni Michaely, Joseph Pacelli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3068232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3068232","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how cultural differences among agents influence the aggregate outcome of a common forecasting task. Using both exogenous shocks to sell-side analyst diversity and panel regression methods, we find that increases in analyst cultural diversity positively affect the quality of the consensus earnings forecast. We further provide evidence on the potential mechanisms underlying this result by showing that cultural diversity is associated with improvements in individual analyst forecasts, greater analyst conference call participation and interaction, and greater diversity in analyst education backgrounds and professional interests. Overall, our results indicate that greater cultural differences among agents producing an aggregate forecast are associated with a higher quality consensus forecast.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129947405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Role of the Media in Hedge Fund Activism","authors":"Xinjie Wang, Ge Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3584071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3584071","url":null,"abstract":"Using a large set of hedge fund 13D filing and news data for the period of 2000 to 2019, we document that firms with more negative media sentiment are more likely to be targeted by hedge funds. The media sentiment of target firms reverts to normal level after the 13D filing dates. Our analysis of media sentiment for different corporate events shows that event-specific media sentiment is associated with the specific objectives of activism campaigns. The firm’s fundamental information captured by media sentiment drives the hedge fund targeting event and such targeting generates higher long-term stock returns. Our findings suggest that negative public perception is a key factor driving activists' selection of targets.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132830631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What Is the Value of Internal Auditing? – A Literature Review on Qualitative and Quantitative Perspectives","authors":"A. Eulerich, Marc Eulerich","doi":"10.5117/mab.94.50375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5117/mab.94.50375","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, research on internal audit has developed significantly. Numerous papers have discussed the importance of internal auditing (IA) as a central pillar of the corporate governance system. Through its activities, IA supports the Audit Committee and the CEO/C-Level. As an independent, objective assurance and advisory function, it is designed to add value through the audit of the internal control system, risk management and the governance processes. Interestingly, research on internal audit unfortunately rarely corresponds to these added value concept defined in the core responsibilities. Therefore, this literature review attempts to highlight the possible perspectives of the added value discussion and to help define future research avenues.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133530425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategic Interactions Between Tax and Statutory Auditors and Different Information Regimes: Implications for Tax Audit Efficiency","authors":"Kay Blaufus, Jens Robert Schöndube, Stefan Wielenberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3566897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3566897","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether tax audit regimes become more efficient if (i) there are audited financial statements and (ii) tax auditors have access to the internal statutory audit report revealing information about statutory audit adjustments. Our analysis is based on a standard tax compliance game that we extend to model the strategic interaction among a firm issuing financial and tax reports, a statutory auditor, and a tax auditor. We find that the efficiency effects of additional information depend on the strength of tax auditor incentives and the weight that firms place on book income. For high-powered tax auditor incentives, we obtain no information effect on our efficiency measures. For low-powered tax auditor incentives, we find an ambiguous effect, and for mediumpowered tax auditor incentives and firms that place a high weight on book income, tax audit efficiency increases if the tax auditor has access to additional information. In the latter case, we find that granting the tax auditor access to the internal statutory audit report increases firms' tax compliance, raises tax revenues, and decreases tax audit frequency.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117203431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Audit Committee Member Characteristics and Committee Effectiveness: Evidence from Turkish Banking Sector","authors":"Y. O. Erzurumlu, Gürcan Avci","doi":"10.1504/ijmef.2020.10030104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/ijmef.2020.10030104","url":null,"abstract":"Lack of corporate governance was addressed as one of the reasons for financial scandals and crises experienced during the 2000s. Financial crises were followed by audit committee mechanism revision, and focus shifted onto how audit committees' governance quality could be improved. Using a unique data set, this study investigates the impact of audit committee membership characteristics on the governing quality of the audit committee measured by operational loss in the Turkish banking sector. Results imply that gender diversification and multiple directorships of the members improve the governance effectiveness while auditing background alone does not make significant improvement after controlling for industry experience. Differences in cultural background and insufficient funding of the committee could be detrimental to the effectiveness of banks' audit committees at mitigating operational risk. Trends of the member characteristics for 2006-2012 suggest that the 2008 turbulence has mainly had a disciplinary effect on effective audit committees.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"54 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120988832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Formation of Organizational Forms of Internal Control and Audit","authors":"N. Pailodze, R. Kutateladze, Tornike Dzagnidze","doi":"10.33152/jmphss-4.2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33152/jmphss-4.2.5","url":null,"abstract":"Relevance of the topic is related to the fact that the creation and development of internal audit function are connected to the creation and development of joint-stock companies caused by post-soviet privatization of property in Georgia. The evolution of the Joint Stock Company facilitated the development of organizational forms of control and internal audit among them. As in the rest of the world, the most important form of big business is a Joint Stock Company (corporation) that features segregation of management and ownership functions, complicated organizational structure, joint interests of parties of corporate relations, and influence of malty-granular consolidated factors. The methodological basis of the work has become the general and specific scientific method of understanding economic events and facts, namely: separately the methods used for analysis and synthesis, since these two have included economic and statistical analysis. Key Findings are a system of quantitative and qualitative indicators that expresses the economic interests and control parameters of a group of corporate governance entities. It will help to evaluate the level of performance of the analytical facility using the paired comparison method. Modern businesses operate in fast-changing market conditions with high level of uncertainty and high risks that make corporate governance more difficult, making company management less capable to respond swiftly and competently to growing challenges. Internal Audit so far is an unappreciated instrument of corporate governance. The formation of internal audit structures in companies promotes the safety of management and proprietors, determines the greatest risk zones, and protects the company from future errors and shortcomings. In addition, internal audit facilitates the identification of weaknesses and finding the principles of management that have been violated. A fairly effective system of corporate governance and control gives the opportunity to make private investments, including those that are not very large. The existence of an internal audit in the economic entities is especially important to the business owners since they are distant from direct management; they are concentrated on the strategic management, and operation’s management controls are handed over to the company management.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"342 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122473169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Executive Compensation Changes In Response to Personal Income Tax Shocks (Who Pays the CEO’s Income Taxes?)","authors":"Benjamin Bennett, J. Coles, Zexi Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3540304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540304","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effects of personal income tax on executive compensation. Using a difference-in-differences approach based on large shocks to personal income tax rates, we find CEOs receive higher pay two years after tax increases. The higher tax burden drives CEOs to sell stock of their firms for liquidity reasons. Accordingly, boards increase equity-based pay to strengthen incentives. Pay raises after tax increases are negatively associated with CEO turnover, while the lack of a pay raise leads to lower firm performance. The effect of personal income tax on compensation is asymmetric; CEOs do not receive pay cuts following tax cuts.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133704960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Interim CEO and Corporate Long-term Investment: Evidence from an Emerging Market","authors":"Fei Wu, Jing Yu, Yujie Zhao, Donghua Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3104287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3104287","url":null,"abstract":"Building on the short-term nature of interim CEO contracts, this paper examines the effect of interim CEO appointment on corporate long-term investment measured by a firm’s R&D spending. We find robust evidence that the corporate R&D investment level is significantly lower during the interim CEO appointment period. The negative association between R&D investments and the interim CEO appointment is most pronounced when interim CEOs exhibit a myopic tendency. The primary findings disappear in the subsample of state-owned companies, highlighting the bright side of state ownership in ameliorating managerial myopia. Finally, we document that appointing an interim CEO is costly for shareholders in the short run as well as the long run.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132428933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lean Accounting VS Financial Management: Awareness and Overview","authors":"Mohammed M. Soliman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3534862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3534862","url":null,"abstract":"For the past decades, financial folks relied on old principles, techniques and theories in determining the performance of the companies and give feed backs to the executives and CEOs so they can make the necessary improvement and take decisions. The CEO wants help finding the resources to fund a new project; he wants to know where we can improve costs in products and services, and he wants to know whether improvements made have resulted in financial gain. The CEO needs help seeing where the company has improved or declined and what the future looks like given the current circumstances.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114928934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CEO Political Ideology, Shareholder Primacy and Dividend Policy","authors":"A. Bayat, M. Goergen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3522270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3522270","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that CEOs have different attitudes toward the firm’s stakeholders and that these differences in attitudes affect the firm’s decision making. We hypothesize that these differences stem from differences in political ideology: Liberal CEOs, as compared to their conservative counterparts, pay less attention to shareholders and this is reflected in dividend policy. To test the validity of our hypothesis, we measure CEO ideology by political donations. We study the CEOs of S&P 500 firms during 1997-2014 and find that firms with liberal CEOs are less likely to pay dividends and have significantly lower dividend payouts. In contrast, conservative CEOs pay more dividends, even if this requires redundancies.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123738819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}