高管薪酬如何随着个人所得税冲击而变化(谁为CEO支付所得税?)

Benjamin Bennett, J. Coles, Zexi Wang
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们研究了个人所得税对高管薪酬的影响。采用基于个人所得税税率大幅冲击的差异中之差方法,我们发现,在增税两年后,首席执行官的薪酬更高。较高的税负促使首席执行官出于流动性原因出售公司股票。因此,董事会增加基于股权的薪酬,以加强激励。增税后的加薪与CEO的离职率呈负相关,而不加薪则会导致公司业绩下降。个人所得税对薪酬的影响是不对称的;首席执行官们在减税后不会减薪。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Executive Compensation Changes In Response to Personal Income Tax Shocks (Who Pays the CEO’s Income Taxes?)
We study the effects of personal income tax on executive compensation. Using a difference-in-differences approach based on large shocks to personal income tax rates, we find CEOs receive higher pay two years after tax increases. The higher tax burden drives CEOs to sell stock of their firms for liquidity reasons. Accordingly, boards increase equity-based pay to strengthen incentives. Pay raises after tax increases are negatively associated with CEO turnover, while the lack of a pay raise leads to lower firm performance. The effect of personal income tax on compensation is asymmetric; CEOs do not receive pay cuts following tax cuts.
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