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Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy最新文献

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Note to the Reader 读者须知
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000193
Johannes L. Brandl, M. David, Martina Fürst, G. Melchior, Dolf Rami, M. Reicher, Leopold Stubenberg
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引用次数: 0
Intentionality as Consciousness of Marks 作为标志意识的意向性
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000187
Davide Dalla Rosa
{"title":"Intentionality as Consciousness of Marks","authors":"Davide Dalla Rosa","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000187","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this short comment, I will first recapitulate some of the substantive claims Textor attributes to Brentano, and then propose to use Kant’s epistemology to extend the central argumentative conclusion of Textor’s article, namely the assertion that “where there is something mental, there is awareness of marks”.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46968827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Judgement and Intentionality in Early Brentano 早期布伦塔诺的判断与意向
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000181
M. van der Schaar
{"title":"Judgement and Intentionality in Early Brentano","authors":"M. van der Schaar","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000181","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000There are two notions of intentionality: the first contains the thesis that our acts of thinking, judging and loving have a content; the second that our mental acts are about something external to the act. Brentano uses the term ‘intentionality’ only in relation to the first notion; for him, intentionality does not function as a bridge between the mind and the external world. Is it possible for a phenomenologist like Brentano to give an account of the second notion of intentionality? It is argued that this is possible, but not without introducing the notion of judgement. A comparison with Mill’s distinction between connotation and denotation, and with Frege’s distinction between sense and reference shows how original Brentano’s theory is.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44805235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Franz Brentano: Die intentionale Beziehung und die Bedeutung der Namen und Aussagen 弗兰茨·布兰蒂诺:这是不依个人意志的关系和名字和阵列的意义
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000189
Joelma Marques de Carvalho, J. Brandl, Carlo Ierna
{"title":"Franz Brentano: Die intentionale Beziehung und die Bedeutung der Namen und Aussagen","authors":"Joelma Marques de Carvalho, J. Brandl, Carlo Ierna","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000189","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42783966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Front matter 前页
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-10001-02000
{"title":"Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/18756735-10001-02000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-10001-02000","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134922057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Der Gegenstandsbegriff als terminologische Hürde für Brentanos Konzeption intentionaler Inexistenz 在brentano的概念中，预期死亡的时间上的障碍之一
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000191
J. Brandl
{"title":"Der Gegenstandsbegriff als terminologische Hürde für Brentanos Konzeption intentionaler Inexistenz","authors":"J. Brandl","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000191","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Brentano’s use of the expression ‘intentional inexistence’ poses a considerable terminological problem. This is due not only to the expressions ‘intentional’ and ‘inexistence’ contained in it. The biggest hurdle is the liberal use of the expression ‘object’, which is encouraged by Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistent (or immanent) objects. Carlo Ierna tries to meet this problem with a strategy that allows to hold on to the notion of intentional inexistence without accepting immanent objects. The originality of his interpretation lies, as I will show in my commentary, in the fact that it tries to achieve its goal by terminological measures alone. Following the same line, I will argue that Brentano’s self-correction, made in the second edition of his Psychology, can also be interpreted in this context as a terminological move.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48375692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Das intentionale Objekt als Unding 作为撤销的有意对象
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000190
C. Ierna
{"title":"Das intentionale Objekt als Unding","authors":"C. Ierna","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000190","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The so-called “intentional object” occupies a central position in the debates about intentionality in Brentano and the Brentano School. How does it relate to the correlate, the content, or the intended, possibly external, transcendent object? Does it perhaps even coincide with one of these? There was no clear consensus on this neither in Brentano’s time nor today. In order to develop a new perspective on the problem of the intentional object, I would like to introduce a deliberately radical interpretation and related terminological change: what if we were to avoid any talk of “object” in this context altogether? Perhaps this could help avoid the ambiguities and misunderstandings associated with talk of “intentional objects.” In my contribution I would like to sketch such an interpretation and consider whether this attempt could be useful to reframe the debate.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42057866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Naming and Free Will 命名和自由意志
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000177
Pedro Merlussi, Fabio Lampert
{"title":"Naming and Free Will","authors":"Pedro Merlussi, Fabio Lampert","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000177","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Rigidity does interesting philosophical work, with important consequences felt throughout metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and so on. The authors’ aim in this article is to show that rigidity has yet another role to play, with surprising consequences for the problem of free will and determinism, for the phenomenon of rigidity has the upshot that some metaphysically necessary truths are up to us. The significance of this claim is shown in the context of influential arguments against free will. The authors show that some virtually indisputable inference rules employed in formulations of the Consequence Argument, as well as in fatalistic arguments, fail with a variety of counter-examples. Along the way, the authors compare the present arguments to other, similar arguments made in recent years.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42674935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Why Attitudes Are Not Character Traits 为什么态度不是性格特征
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000180
René Baston
{"title":"Why Attitudes Are Not Character Traits","authors":"René Baston","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000180","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In social psychology, explicit and implicit attitudes play an important role for behavior prediction and explanation. Edouard Machery claims that attitudes are not mental states but dispositional character traits. The goal of this article is to show that this conceptualization of attitudes comes with two weaknesses: first, the author will show that if attitudes are traits, they are unmeasurable, or if we assume that a part of the trait is measurable, then we do not need the trait-picture, because then the classic attitude-picture is sufficient. Second, it is unclear how the trait-picture leads to attitudes that explain behavior.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48449618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Loosely Wittgensteinian Conception of the Linguistic Understanding of Large Language Models like BERT, GPT-3, and ChatGPT 大型语言模型如BERT、GPT-3和ChatGPT的语言理解的松散维特根斯坦概念
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000182
Reto Gubelmann
{"title":"A Loosely Wittgensteinian Conception of the Linguistic Understanding of Large Language Models like BERT, GPT-3, and ChatGPT","authors":"Reto Gubelmann","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000182","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this article, I develop a loosely Wittgensteinian conception of what it takes for a being, including an AI system, to understand language, and I suggest that current state of the art systems are closer to fulfilling these requirements than one might think. Developing and defending this claim has both empirical and conceptual aspects. The conceptual aspects concern the criteria that are reasonably applied when judging whether some being understands language; the empirical aspects concern the question whether a given being fulfills these criteria. On the conceptual side, the article builds on Glock’s concept of intelligence, Taylor’s conception of intrinsic rightness as well as Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. On the empirical side, it is argued that current transformer-based NNLP models, such as BERT and GPT-3 come close to fulfilling these criteria.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64935572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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