Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies最新文献

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How Execs Earn Sweet Fees on Buybacks (#2) - Nvidia Case Study 高管们如何从回购中赚取丰厚的费用(#2)——英伟达案例研究
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-06-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.993964
M. Gumport
{"title":"How Execs Earn Sweet Fees on Buybacks (#2) - Nvidia Case Study","authors":"M. Gumport","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.993964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.993964","url":null,"abstract":"Absolute analysis of accretion is a definitive measure of a buyback's contribution to shareholder wealth. In a case study of a world class corporation, NVIDIA spends $0.6 billion to repurchase 8.0% of its outstanding shares. The stock subsequently rises 90.1%. Absolute analysis shows ongoing NVIDIA shareholders benefit by $1.35 (3.8%) before tax considerations due to the direct effect of the buyback; managers benefit by up to $2.96 per option. Management option holders receive 30.9% of the buyback's stock price appreciation, akin to a \"1.7/20\" hedge fund fee structure for executive option holders. The small shareholder benefit, large gain for options, and sizable trading activity beg the questions: Should shareholder returns on buybacks be reported? Do benefits adequately compensate for 10b-18, 10b5-1, insider trading and option compensation governance liabilities?","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130284656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Credit Channel of Tax Policy 税收政策的信用渠道
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1009827
H. Strulik
{"title":"The Credit Channel of Tax Policy","authors":"H. Strulik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1009827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1009827","url":null,"abstract":"A neoclassical growth model is augmented by a corporate sector, financial intermediation, and a set of tax rates. In this setting, capital structure is determined by the interplay between an advantage of debt finance resulting from the tax system and a disadvantage resulting from asymmetric information and the entailed agency costs. Effects of capital tax reforms are investigated with a special focus on the credit channel that operates through the finance decision of firms. The theoretical part of the article derives which financial and real effects of private and corporate income tax policies can be expected. Using a calibration with U.S. data, the applied part demonstrates that tax cuts cause significant adjustments of capital structure. Nevertheless, the credit channel creates relatively small effects of tax reforms on consumption, investment, and growth.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"226 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117318649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Schumpeterian Analysis of Deficit-Financed Dividend Tax Cuts 赤字融资派息减税的熊彼特分析
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-05-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1270612
P. Peretto
{"title":"A Schumpeterian Analysis of Deficit-Financed Dividend Tax Cuts","authors":"P. Peretto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1270612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1270612","url":null,"abstract":"I propose a Schumpeterian analysis of the growth and welfare effects of a deficit-financed cut of the tax rate on distributed dividends. I find that income per capita growth initially accelerates and then decelerates, eventually converging to a long-run value lower than the starting one. Interestingly, lower steady-state growth occurs despite the fact that - in line with intuition - the economy's saving ratio rises. Most importantly, I find that the policy's effect on welfare is negative. The mechanism that delivers these results is that taxes on distributed dividends affect differently the returns to investing in the growth of existing product lines and in the development of new product lines, and thus reallocate resources across activities that have different growth opportunity. The analysis is particularly relevant to the current debate about the Job Growth and Taxpayer Relief reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), a real-world large-scale experiment in fiscal policy. A surprising implication is that the JGTRRA targeted the wrong tax rate: Holding the financing method (debt) equal, it should have cut the tax rate on corporate income, thereby reducing the distortions of the internal investment decisions of firms and improving growth and welfare.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"205 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124618346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Rethinking Lintner: An Alternative Dynamic Model of Dividends 重新思考林特纳:股息的另一种动态模型
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-05-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1361725
Larry Bauer, Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya
{"title":"Rethinking Lintner: An Alternative Dynamic Model of Dividends","authors":"Larry Bauer, Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1361725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361725","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical modeling of dividends has been dominated by Lintner (1956). However, Lintner's model suffers from the logical paradox that if companies have target payout ratios then in the steady state the companies will have reached those target payout ratios. Moreover as demon-strated by Bond and Mougoue (1991) Lintner's model is also poorly specified when earnings are serially correlated. This twin shortfall of Lintner's model motivated us to explore the possibility of an alternative dynamic empirical model of dividends. We test our model by cross sectional Tobit regression as well as by time series fitting. We find that the results of the Tobit regression are consistent with the predictions of our model. In time series testing, we find that one of our models fits the empirical reality at least 75% of the time. For firms with longer data series of 35 years or more, our model describes the empirical data succinctly in 96% of the cases.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133894512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Investment, Financing Constraints, and Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from the Advertising Expenditures of Multinational Firms 投资、融资约束和内部资本市场:来自跨国公司广告支出的证据
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-05-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.892340
C. Fee, Charles J. Hadlock, J. R. Pierce
{"title":"Investment, Financing Constraints, and Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from the Advertising Expenditures of Multinational Firms","authors":"C. Fee, Charles J. Hadlock, J. R. Pierce","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.892340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.892340","url":null,"abstract":"We find a significant positive relation between a firm's advertising spending in the United States and its contemporaneous foreign cash flow. This relation holds even after controlling for factors that should be related to the optimal level of domestic advertising, and it is stronger for subsets of firms that we expect to be relatively more financially constrained. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a causal and economically substantial link between cash flow and investment spending, even for intangible investments such as advertising. Our evidence also suggests that firms have active internal capital markets in which capital is moved across geographic regions. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":" 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132159453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 137
The Cost of Going Public to Preexisting Shareholders 上市对现有股东的成本
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.719743
Steven D. Dolvin, Bradford D. Jordan
{"title":"The Cost of Going Public to Preexisting Shareholders","authors":"Steven D. Dolvin, Bradford D. Jordan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.719743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.719743","url":null,"abstract":"IPO underpricing has been extensively studied; however, its impact on the wealth of preexisting shareholders has not been closely examined. Thus, we address the question of whether or not periods of high underpricing adversely affect preexisting shareholders. Unlike underpricing, we find that the percentage of shareholder wealth lost is surprisingly stable over time, which appears to be attributable, at least in part, to the share issuance (i.e., overhang) decisions of preexisting owners during such periods.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127036611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Why Do Firms Pay Dividends? International Evidence on the Determinants of Dividend Policy 公司为什么要派息?股利政策决定因素的国际证据
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.887643
Igor Osobov, David J. Denis
{"title":"Why Do Firms Pay Dividends? International Evidence on the Determinants of Dividend Policy","authors":"Igor Osobov, David J. Denis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.887643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.887643","url":null,"abstract":"In the US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, and Japan, the propensity to pay dividends is higher among larger, more profitable firms, and those for which retained earnings comprise a large fraction of total equity. Although there are hints of reductions in the propensity to pay dividends in most of the sample countries over the 1994-2002 period, they are driven by a failure of newly listed firms to initiate dividends when expected to do so. Dividend abandonment and the failure to initiate by existing nonpayers are economically unimportant except in Japan. Moreover, in each country, aggregate dividends have not declined and are concentrated among the largest, most profitable firms. Finally, outside of the US there is little evidence of a systematic positive relation between relative prices of dividend paying and non-paying firms and the propensity to pay dividends. Overall, these findings cast doubt on signaling, clientele, and catering explanations for dividends, but support agency cost-based lifecycle theories.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132949286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 981
Myopic Marketing Management: Evidence of the Phenomenon and Its Long-Term Performance Consequences in the SEO Context 短视营销管理:现象的证据及其在SEO背景下的长期绩效后果
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-05-01 DOI: 10.1287/MKSC.1060.0261
Natalie Mizik, R. Jacobson
{"title":"Myopic Marketing Management: Evidence of the Phenomenon and Its Long-Term Performance Consequences in the SEO Context","authors":"Natalie Mizik, R. Jacobson","doi":"10.1287/MKSC.1060.0261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/MKSC.1060.0261","url":null,"abstract":"Managers often have incentives to artificially inflate current-term earnings by cutting marketing expenditures, even if it comes at the expense of long-term profits. Because investors rely on current-term accounting measures to form expectations of future-term profits, inflating current-term results can lead to enhanced current-term stock price. We present evidence that some firms engage in this type of “myopic marketing management” at the time of a seasoned equity offering (SEO). In particular, a greater proportion of firms than is typical report earnings higher than normal and marketing expenditures lower than normal at the time of their SEO. Although they realize that firms might be undertaking strategies to artificially inflate current-term earnings, the financial markets are not adequately identifying and properly valuing the firms doing so. Our results indicate that myopic firms are able to temporarily inflate their stock market valuation, but in the long run, as the consequences of cutting marketing spending become manifest, they have inferior stock market performance. We propose some actions that might reduce the incentives for myopic behavior.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122292388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 231
APV and WACC with Constant Book Leverage Ratio 固定账面杠杆率下的APV和WACC
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-04-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.980265
Pablo Fernández
{"title":"APV and WACC with Constant Book Leverage Ratio","authors":"Pablo Fernández","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.980265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980265","url":null,"abstract":"We value a company that targets its capital structure in book-value terms. This capital structure definition provides us with a Value of Tax Shields that lies between those of Modigliani-Miller (fixed debt) and Miles-Ezzell (fixed market-value leverage ratio). If a company targets its leverage in market value terms, has less value than if it targets the leverage in book value terms. How could some manager target leverage in market value terms? We also present empirical evidence that permits to conclude that debt is more related to the book value of the assets than to their market value.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130179442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
An Empirical Test of Option Based Default Probabilities using Payment Behavior and Auditor Notes 基于支付行为和审计师笔记的期权违约概率实证检验
Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies Pub Date : 2007-03-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.975304
Tom E. S. Farmen, Nico van der Wijst, Sjur Westgaard
{"title":"An Empirical Test of Option Based Default Probabilities using Payment Behavior and Auditor Notes","authors":"Tom E. S. Farmen, Nico van der Wijst, Sjur Westgaard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.975304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.975304","url":null,"abstract":"This paper empirically tests the hypotheses from the Black and Scholes, Merton framework (BSM) concerning the probability of default. Payment behavior and auditor notes are used as proxy variables for financial distress. The results show that the standard deviation of equity is the most significant parameter when predicting financial distress, but also the equity ratio (equity to total assets) has a significant influence. An increase in the volatility of equity increases the probability of distress, while an increase in the equity ratio reduces this probability. The expected return on equity and time horizon of debt have little effect on financial distress in our empirical model. The results gives support for using the BSM model in credit risk applications.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125389686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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