{"title":"How Execs Earn Sweet Fees on Buybacks (#2) - Nvidia Case Study","authors":"M. Gumport","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.993964","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Absolute analysis of accretion is a definitive measure of a buyback's contribution to shareholder wealth. In a case study of a world class corporation, NVIDIA spends $0.6 billion to repurchase 8.0% of its outstanding shares. The stock subsequently rises 90.1%. Absolute analysis shows ongoing NVIDIA shareholders benefit by $1.35 (3.8%) before tax considerations due to the direct effect of the buyback; managers benefit by up to $2.96 per option. Management option holders receive 30.9% of the buyback's stock price appreciation, akin to a \"1.7/20\" hedge fund fee structure for executive option holders. The small shareholder benefit, large gain for options, and sizable trading activity beg the questions: Should shareholder returns on buybacks be reported? Do benefits adequately compensate for 10b-18, 10b5-1, insider trading and option compensation governance liabilities?","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.993964","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Absolute analysis of accretion is a definitive measure of a buyback's contribution to shareholder wealth. In a case study of a world class corporation, NVIDIA spends $0.6 billion to repurchase 8.0% of its outstanding shares. The stock subsequently rises 90.1%. Absolute analysis shows ongoing NVIDIA shareholders benefit by $1.35 (3.8%) before tax considerations due to the direct effect of the buyback; managers benefit by up to $2.96 per option. Management option holders receive 30.9% of the buyback's stock price appreciation, akin to a "1.7/20" hedge fund fee structure for executive option holders. The small shareholder benefit, large gain for options, and sizable trading activity beg the questions: Should shareholder returns on buybacks be reported? Do benefits adequately compensate for 10b-18, 10b5-1, insider trading and option compensation governance liabilities?