{"title":"Is Asking Questions Free of Charge? Questioning the Value of Independent Central Banks through the Lens of a European Credit Council","authors":"M. Thiemann","doi":"10.1515/ael-2022-0108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0108","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This discussion of Eric Monnet's idea of a European Credit Council evaluates the likely consequences of such a new institution. Based on a critical examination of the notion of economic expertise, it warns that such a council might legitimate an untenable status quo, while bringing little positive benefits. Such a council could however exercise a subversive role if its counterexpertise were to expose the limits to central bank independence in the context of the climate crisis, thus undermining the current set-up. Yet to play such a role would require a degree of confrontation which is unlikely to emerge from the council's envisioned setup.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76628088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Democratic Dangers of Central Bank Planning","authors":"N. Coombs","doi":"10.1515/ael-2022-0063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0063","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Eric Monnet makes the case that central banks should introduce welfare-oriented credit policies and suggests legitimating these new powers through the establishment of deliberative credit councils. In this article, I argue that Monnet fails to consider how his model of central bank planning might insulate rather than democratize central banking. With low trust in experts and no society-wide consensus about how best to respond to wicked problems such as climate change, the principal danger is that Monnet’s credit councils may allow political actors to pursue agendas they do not feel they can get past electorates. Indeed, political actors may see shaping central banks’ credit policies as preferable to engaging the contentious fiscal policy domain precisely because the effects of credit policies cannot be easily held to account by voters. I suggest that credit councils are unlikely to provide a democratic channel for redressing these problems because they will inevitably privilege the voices of experts from the financial sector, industry, and (non-)governmental organisations – a de facto epistocracy – over the lay publics subject to their decisions.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74025798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Democratic Challenge of Central Bank Credit Policies","authors":"E. Monnet","doi":"10.1515/ael-2022-0113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0113","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article provides a framework for understanding the economic role of central banks and their democratic legitimacy. I argue that thinking about the democratic challenges of central banking requires considering central banks’ insurance role and how their actions are part of credit policy. The contract between the central bank and the sovereign is incomplete because it cannot integrate all unforeseen contingencies, distributive consequences and interactions with other policies. This opens the door to viewing the legitimacy of central bank decisions through a process of deliberation, coordination and reflexivity, rather than only a delegation of power. I discuss a proposal for a European Credit Council, which would be a deliberative body aimed at strengthening Parliamentary power on monetary and credit policies, the democratic legitimacy of central bank policy in the Euro Area as well as its coordination with other European policies. More coordination, Parliamentary power and deliberation are consistent with central bank independence and aim to delimit more precisely the action of central banks within the macroeconomic and credit policies of the State.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78188212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Power of Coordination and Deliberation","authors":"E. Monnet","doi":"10.1515/ael-2022-0114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0114","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I provide comments and replies to the seven insightful contributions that discussed “The Democratic Challenge of Central Bank Credit Policies” and the proposal for a European Credit Council. I review how interdisciplinary scholarship on the political economy of central banking have shown the limits of simple principal-agent framework applied to central bank power and legitimacy. I emphasize why a change to central bank independence is not necessary for a fundamental change in the financial system and credit policies. I also argue that deliberations can have strong effects on decision-making and that the power of the people is not restricted to the legislative power.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86234863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Is the European Central Bank Supposed to Do?","authors":"C. Hartwell","doi":"10.1515/ael-2020-0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2020-0035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In July 2021, the European Central Bank (ECB) published a new monetary policy strategy, the first time in 17 years that it had undertaken a review of its monetary policy. In the intervening time, the world – and the economic challenges facing the ECB – have changed immensely but partly as a result of the ECB’s own maneuvering. In particular, monetary policy has been relied upon for every single malaise facing the global economy, including and up to the coronavirus pandemic. This paper argues that a review of central banks as an institutional mechanism in general, and in particular the ECB, was overdue but should not have been limited to policies; instead, an opportunity was missed to have an institutional review to examine whether or not it has been performing as intended. In particular, the vast experiment of unconventional monetary policy/issuance should have been more scrutinized from an institutional level as it appears to have contributed to the current problems the European economy faces. Europe and the ECB would be well served by taking stock of its actions over the past two decades and especially during the era of unconventional monetary policy to find a sustainable route forward.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76874936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A European Credit Council for Consistent and Informed Policymaking","authors":"Agnieszka Smoleńska","doi":"10.1515/ael-2022-0065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0065","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Banque Providence Eric Monnet draws on the history of central banking to investigate the problem of insufficient democratic anchoring of monetary policy. It is a very timely contribution, especially as the choices that the central bankers will face in the near future are bound to get ever more political. This article discusses Monnet’s proposals to increase central bank legitimacy through common deliberation of monetary policy authorities and economic policymakers, in particular in relation to EU’s credit policy. I draw on the rich literature on interinstitutional accountability to identify conditions for such an EU Credit Council to be fit for purpose. I further identify two specific EU contexts where further deliberation would be particularly called for: the differentiated monetary and internal market (credit) policies and the Green Deal. With regard to the first, I show how an EU Credit Council could help deepen our understanding of the mutual impact of advancing EU banking integration and continued existence of multiple currency regimes. With regard to the second, I discuss clarifications and adjustments needed in the EU legal framework to ensure that further policy coordination on financing the transition within such a Credit Council would facilitate the achievement of EU’s sustainability goals.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73888520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Case for a European Credit Council: Historical and Constitutional Fine-Tuning","authors":"Jens van ’t Klooster","doi":"10.1515/ael-2022-0074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0074","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Eric Monnet’s European Credit Council (ECC) is an innovative, historically-grounded institutional proposal for supporting the ECB in the design of its monetary policy operations. In this commentary, I seek to strengthen the case for the European Credit Council drawing on work in progress on the history of the ECB. I first discuss the tradition of moderate interventionism as it appears in Monnet’s (Monnet, E. (2018). Controlling credit: Central banking and the planned economy in Postwar France, 1948–1973. Cambridge University Press) study Controlling Credit. I show that the model of moderate interventionism was well-known to the drafters of the ECB statutes and efforts to categorically rule such policies out were simply unsuccessful. I suggest that this fortuitous choice has left ample legal space in the EU treaties for an ECC.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74300466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A European Credit Council? Lessons from the History of Italian Central Banking after World War II","authors":"M. Lupi","doi":"10.1515/ael-2022-0071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0071","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract By formulating a proposal for the “democratisation” of the ECB through the establishment of a European Credit Council, Eric Monnet makes a fundamental contribution to the contemporary debate on central banking. This idea appears to be in line with other critiques that often see the post-World War II institutional set-up as a model to be revived to bring central banks back to democracy after the neoliberal disengagement of the 1980s. However, I argue in this article that the intellectual optimism with which these historical experiences are often viewed can be misleading. Going beyond the French “ideal type” and focusing instead on the “twin case” of Italy, I intend to show how the attempt to democratically control the central bank has not always been linear nor necessarily democratic and successful. The establishment of a credit council did not prevent the Bank of Italy from enjoying a high degree of independence and ability to influence policy. At the same time, the widespread system of credit policy that the central bank has explicitly promoted in pursuit of the country’s development agenda has often degenerated into irrational and opaque practices, revealing the side effects of an economy in which a sustainable boundary between fiscal and monetary policy struggles to emerge. While the Italian experience might show how problematic and “fictitious” the relationship between the credit council and the central bank can be, it can also offer interesting insights for a better articulation of it.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78637658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction: Who Are Residual Claimants on a Company’s Net Assets?","authors":"Y. Fukui","doi":"10.1515/ael-2022-0081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0081","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Two papers on the nature of equity and its implication for accounting and public policy are introduced.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79441759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}