A European Credit Council for Consistent and Informed Policymaking

Abstract In Banque Providence Eric Monnet draws on the history of central banking to investigate the problem of insufficient democratic anchoring of monetary policy. It is a very timely contribution, especially as the choices that the central bankers will face in the near future are bound to get ever more political. This article discusses Monnet’s proposals to increase central bank legitimacy through common deliberation of monetary policy authorities and economic policymakers, in particular in relation to EU’s credit policy. I draw on the rich literature on interinstitutional accountability to identify conditions for such an EU Credit Council to be fit for purpose. I further identify two specific EU contexts where further deliberation would be particularly called for: the differentiated monetary and internal market (credit) policies and the Green Deal. With regard to the first, I show how an EU Credit Council could help deepen our understanding of the mutual impact of advancing EU banking integration and continued existence of multiple currency regimes. With regard to the second, I discuss clarifications and adjustments needed in the EU legal framework to ensure that further policy coordination on financing the transition within such a Credit Council would facilitate the achievement of EU’s sustainability goals.