欧洲信贷委员会?第二次世界大战后意大利中央银行的历史教训

Pub Date : 2022-12-09 DOI:10.1515/ael-2022-0071
M. Lupi
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引用次数: 1

摘要

埃里克·莫内通过建立欧洲信贷委员会提出了欧洲央行“民主化”的建议,对当代关于央行的辩论做出了根本性的贡献。这一想法似乎与其他批评意见一致,这些批评意见经常将二战后的制度设置视为一种模式,在20世纪80年代新自由主义脱离后,将中央银行带回民主。然而,我在这篇文章中认为,人们经常用理智的乐观态度来看待这些历史经验,这可能会产生误导。超越法国的“理想类型”,转而关注意大利的“双胞胎案例”,我打算展示民主控制央行的尝试并不总是线性的,也不一定是民主和成功的。设立信贷委员会并不妨碍意大利银行享有高度的独立性和影响政策的能力。与此同时,中央银行为追求国家发展议程而明确推行的广泛的信贷政策体系,往往退化为非理性和不透明的做法,暴露出财政政策和货币政策之间难以形成可持续界限的经济的副作用。尽管意大利的经历可能表明,信贷委员会与央行之间的关系可能存在多么大的问题和多么“虚构”,但它也可以为更好地阐明这一关系提供有趣的见解。
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A European Credit Council? Lessons from the History of Italian Central Banking after World War II
Abstract By formulating a proposal for the “democratisation” of the ECB through the establishment of a European Credit Council, Eric Monnet makes a fundamental contribution to the contemporary debate on central banking. This idea appears to be in line with other critiques that often see the post-World War II institutional set-up as a model to be revived to bring central banks back to democracy after the neoliberal disengagement of the 1980s. However, I argue in this article that the intellectual optimism with which these historical experiences are often viewed can be misleading. Going beyond the French “ideal type” and focusing instead on the “twin case” of Italy, I intend to show how the attempt to democratically control the central bank has not always been linear nor necessarily democratic and successful. The establishment of a credit council did not prevent the Bank of Italy from enjoying a high degree of independence and ability to influence policy. At the same time, the widespread system of credit policy that the central bank has explicitly promoted in pursuit of the country’s development agenda has often degenerated into irrational and opaque practices, revealing the side effects of an economy in which a sustainable boundary between fiscal and monetary policy struggles to emerge. While the Italian experience might show how problematic and “fictitious” the relationship between the credit council and the central bank can be, it can also offer interesting insights for a better articulation of it.
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