{"title":"A duty to enhance? Genetic engineering for the human Mars settlement.","authors":"Evie Kendal","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00221-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00221-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Humans living off-world will face numerous physical, psychological and social challenges and are likely to suffer negative health effects due to their lack of evolutionary adaptation to space environments. While some of the necessary adaptations may develop naturally over many generations, genetic technologies could be used to speed this process along, potentially improving the wellbeing of early space settlers and their offspring. With broad support, such a program could lead to significant genetic modification of off-world communities, for example, to limit radiation damage on body systems or prevent bone and muscle loss in reduced gravity conditions. Given the extreme stressors of living off-world, and the need to have a healthy workforce to support a fledgling human settlement, those in favour of using genetic technologies to enhance settlers might even claim there is a moral imperative to protect their health in the face of the unique threats of space travel, especially for children born in settlements who did not take on these risks voluntarily. For some, this might simply be an extension of procreative beneficence. However, ethical concerns arise regarding the risks of embracing a eugenicist agenda and the potential impacts on the rights of future settlers to refuse such genetic enhancements for themselves or their children.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142562892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Personal reflections on navigating plural values in the implementation of voluntary assisted dying in Victoria, Australia.","authors":"Margaret O'Connor","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00209-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00209-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper is a personal reflection on involvement in the development of the first voluntary assisted dying legislation in Australia. Points of contention are discussed, where plural values were evident, as the legislation progressed towards implementation. Finally, ongoing areas of difficulty with the legislation are listed, where further thought is required to ensure ease of access for those in need.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142510003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Edna Mutua, A Davis, E Laurie, T Lembo, M Melubo, K Mnzava, E Msoka, F Nasua, T Ndibohoye, R Zadoks, B Mmbaga, S Mshana
{"title":"Antibiotic prescription, dispensing and use in humans and livestock in East Africa: does morality have a role to play?","authors":"Edna Mutua, A Davis, E Laurie, T Lembo, M Melubo, K Mnzava, E Msoka, F Nasua, T Ndibohoye, R Zadoks, B Mmbaga, S Mshana","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00208-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00208-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Background: </strong>Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global threat to human and livestock health. Although AMR is driven by use of antimicrobials, it is often attributed to \"misuse\" and \"overuse\", particularly for antibiotics. To curb resistance, there has been a global call to embrace new forms of moral personhood that practice \"proper\" use, including prescription, dispensing and consumption of antimicrobials, especially antibiotics. This paper seeks to reflect on complex questions about how morality has become embedded /embodied in the AMR discourse as presented in the data collected on antimicrobial prescription, dispensing and use in human and livestock health in Tanzania, primarily focusing on antibiotics.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>This reflection is anchored on Jarrett Zigon's morality framework that is comprised of three dimensions of discourse; the institutional, public, and embodied dispositions. The data we use within this framework are derived from a qualitative study targeting human and animal health care service providers and community members in northern Tanzania. Data were collected through 28 in-depth interviews and ten focus group discussions and analysed through content analysis after translation and transcription. In addition, a review of the Tanzania's National Action Plans on antimicrobial resistance was conducted.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>Application of the framework demonstrates points of convergence and divergence in the institutional morality discourse articulated by the Tanzania National Action Plans, the public discourse and the embodied dispositions/ lived experiences of human and animal health care service providers and community members. We demonstrate that AMR is not just associated with \"inappropriate\" behaviour on the part of drug prescribers, dispensers, and users but also with shortcomings in health systems and service delivery.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: </strong>Antibiotic dispensing and use practices that may be associated with the development of AMR should not be viewed in isolation from the broader health context within which they occur.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142477163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book review: ethics of artificial intelligence.","authors":"Mohammad Hosseini","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00219-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00219-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The book Ethics of Artificial Intelligence offers a solid exploration of arguments and real-world examples that enrich the ongoing debate surrounding AI ethics. With 12 insightful chapters, the book delves into pressing ethical issues, such as the enhancement of human abilities, the nature of consciousness, and questions of responsibility and accountability in various contexts where AI technology is used. This work connects technology ethics with broader philosophical discussions and provides valuable perspectives on the societal implications of AI. Engaging and accessible, it can serve as an essential resource for scholars, technology-enthusiasts, policymakers, and anyone with an interest in the transformative potential of AI and its ethical dimensions.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142477164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tess Johnson, Lerato Ndlovu, Omolara O Baiyegunhi, Wezzie S Lora, Nicola Desmond
{"title":"Coercive public health policies need context-specific ethical justifications.","authors":"Tess Johnson, Lerato Ndlovu, Omolara O Baiyegunhi, Wezzie S Lora, Nicola Desmond","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00218-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00218-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Public health policies designed to improve individual and population health may involve coercion. These coercive policies require ethical justification, and yet it is unclear in the public health ethics literature which ethical concepts might justify coercion, and what their limitations are in applying across contexts. In this paper, we analyse a number of concepts from Western bioethics, including the harm principle, paternalism, the public interest, and a duty of easy rescue. We find them plausible justifications for coercion in theory, but when applied to case studies, including HIV testing in Malawi, vaccine mandates in South Africa, and prohibitions of antibiotic use in livestock in the EU, their limitations become clear. We argue that the context-specificity of ethical justifications for coercion has been overlooked, and there is more work needed to identify context-relevant ethical justifications for coercive policies in various settings and for various populations, rather than relying on universalising Western bioethical justifications across all contexts.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142477165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public health, pluralism, and the telos of political virtue.","authors":"Kathryn L MacKay","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00216-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00216-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the ethics of public health, questions of virtue, that is, of what it means for public health to act excellently, have received little attention. This omission needs remedy first because achieving improvements in population-wide health can be in tension with goals like respect for the liberty, self-determination, or non-oppression of various individuals or groups. A virtue-ethics approach is flexible and well-suited for the kind of deliberation required to resolve or mitigate such tension. Public health requires practically wise and careful thinking, which virtue ethics brings with it. Furthermore, too tight a focus on delivering outcomes in determining how public health should act has, in some cases, actually undermined its ability to achieve those consequences. However, the main concern about incorporating virtue into public health in a pluralistic society is likely to be that virtue is generally teleological, and we would surely need some widely agreed upon idea of something like flourishing or the common good for this to work. In this paper, I propose that for public health to express virtue in its work, it must express a commitment to justice as it goes about its business promoting and protecting the health of the population. Justice is both a contributor toward better health for groups in society, and a worthwhile goal in its own right. I will sketch an argument that justice as non-oppression - not merely health equity - is the right telos toward which excellent public health should aim in a pluralist society.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142368196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Smoking & autonomy: the generational tobacco endgame.","authors":"Shazeea Mohamed Ali","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00207-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00207-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>New Zealand and Malaysia have abandoned plans to introduce a generational smoking ban because of concerns that such a policy is incompatible with liberal democracy as it undermines autonomy. This paper challenges this claim by showing that smoking is not an autonomous act. Autonomy requires a deliberation of preferences, wills and inclinations. This does not occur in smokers because of three related factors: nicotine addiction, cognitive biases and psychosocial development in addiction. Nicotine addiction results in strong physical and psychological desires to seek pleasure and to avoid withdrawal. This is further potentiated by conditioned behaviour. Cognitive biases explain why smokers act in ways that are detrimental to their health. Psychosocial development explains how the brains of smokers are unable to make rational decisions. This combination renders smokers unable to reflect on their actions and thus act autonomously. This stance is compatible with Mill's view that actions that devalue autonomy cannot be considered autonomous. Defenders of liberalism should not be quick to dismiss a smoking ban and can instead foster autonomy by supporting it.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142366872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The immorality of bombing abortion clinics as proof that abortion is not murder.","authors":"Gabriel Andrade","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00213-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00213-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Roe v. Wade decision was overturned in the United States in 2022. This implies that while abortion remains legal in most jurisdictions, it is no longer a constitutional right, thus paving the way for making it illegal. Ever since the Roe v. Wade decision, there have been bombings and other violent attacks against abortion providers and abortion clinics, claiming some fatal victims. The overwhelming majority of anti-abortion activists condemn such violence. At the same time, most anti-abortion activists consider the fetus a person, and ultimately believe that abortion is a form of murder. In this article, I argue that if abortion is murder, then anti-abortion violent activists have moral license to bomb abortion clinics. To do so, I rely on the principles of Just War theory. Ultimately, I rely on a modus tollens argument to prove that abortion is not murder: if abortion is murder, then activists have moral justification in bombing abortion clinics; activists do not have moral justification in bombing abortion clinics; therefore, abortion is not murder. Apart from attempting to prove that abortion is not murder, I also attempt to show the incoherence of the anti-abortion view.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142297937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The provision of abortion in Australia: service delivery as a bioethical concern.","authors":"Nathan Emmerich","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00215-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00215-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Despite significant progress in the legalization and decriminalization of abortion in Australia over the past decade or more recent research and government reports have made it clear that problems with the provision of services remain. This essay examines such issues and sets forth the view that such issues can and should be seen as (bio)ethical concerns. Whilst conscientious objection-the right to opt-out of provision on the basis of clear ethical reservations-is a legally and morally permissible stance that healthcare professionals can adopt, this does not mean those working in healthcare can simply elect not to be providers absent a clear ethical rationale. Furthermore, simple non-provision would seem to contravene the basic tenants of medical professionalism as well as the oft raised claims of the healthcare professions to put the needs of patients first. Recognizing that much of the progress that has been made over the past three decades can be attributed to the efforts of dedicated healthcare professionals who have dedicated their careers to meeting the profession's collective responsibilities in this area of women's health and reproductive healthcare, this paper frames the matter as a collective ethical lapse on the part of healthcare professionals, the healthcare professions and those involved in the management of healthcare institutions. Whilst also acknowledging that a range of complex factors have led to the present situation, that a variety of steps need to be taken to ensure the proper delivery of services that are comprehensive, and that there has been an absence of critical commentary and analysis of this topic by bioethicists, I conclude that there is a need to (re)assess the provision of abortion in Australia at all levels of service delivery and for the healthcare professions and healthcare professionals to take lead in doing so. That this ought to be done is clearly implied by the healthcare profession's longstanding commitment to prioritizing the needs of patient over their own interests.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142156259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kasper P Kepp, Kevin Bardosh, Tijl De Bie, Louise Emilsson, Justin Greaves, Tea Lallukka, Taulant Muka, J Christian Rangel, Niclas Sandström, Michaéla C Schippers, Jonas Schmidt-Chanasit, Tracy Vaillancourt
{"title":"Zero-covid advocacy during the COVID-19 pandemic: a case study of views on Twitter/X.","authors":"Kasper P Kepp, Kevin Bardosh, Tijl De Bie, Louise Emilsson, Justin Greaves, Tea Lallukka, Taulant Muka, J Christian Rangel, Niclas Sandström, Michaéla C Schippers, Jonas Schmidt-Chanasit, Tracy Vaillancourt","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00205-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00205-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>During the COVID-19 pandemic, many advocacy groups and individuals criticized governments on social media for doing either too much or too little to mitigate the pandemic. In this article, we review advocacy for COVID-19 elimination or \"zero-covid\" on the social media platform X (Twitter). We present a thematic analysis of tweets by 20 influential co-signatories of the World Health Network letter on ten themes, covering six topics of science and mitigation (zero-covid, epidemiological data on variants, long-term post-acute sequelae (Long COVID), vaccines, schools and children, views on monkeypox/Mpox) and four advocacy methods (personal advice and promoting remedies, use of anecdotes, criticism of other scientists, and of authorities). The advocacy, although timely and informative, often appealed to emotions and values using anecdotes and strong criticism of authorities and other scientists. Many tweets received hundreds or thousands of likes. Risks were emphasized about children's vulnerability, Long COVID, variant severity, and Mpox, and via comparisons with human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV). Far-reaching policies and promotion of remedies were advocated without systematic evidence review, or sometimes, core field expertise. We identified potential conflicts of interest connected to private companies. Our study documents a need for public health debates to be less polarizing and judgmental, and more factual. In order to protect public trust in science during a crisis, we suggest the development of mechanisms to ensure ethical guidelines for engagement in \"science-based\" advocacy, and consideration of cost-benefit analysis of recommendations for public health decision-making.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142120808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}