Journal of the Philosophy of History最新文献_第9页

What Should We Require from an Account of Explanation in Historiography? 我们对史学解释的要求是什么?

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-09-28 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341446

Veli Virmajoki

{"title":"What Should We Require from an Account of Explanation in Historiography?","authors":"Veli Virmajoki","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341446","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I explicate desiderata for accounts of explanation in historiography. I argue that a fully developed account of explanation in historiography must explicate many explanation-related notions in order to be satisfactory. In particular, it is not enough that an account defines the basic structure of explanation. In addition, the account of explanation must be able to explicate notions such as minimal explanation, complete explanation, historiographical explanation, explanatory depth, explanatory competition, and explanatory goal. Moreover, the account should also tell how explananda can be chosen in a motivated way. Furthermore, the account should be able to clarify notions that are closely connected with explanation such as historical contingency. Finally, it is important that the account is able to recognize when explanation-related notions and issues are so closely intertwined that we are in danger of not seeing the differences between them. In other words, I argue that a satisfactory account of explanation in historiography must have the power to explicate central explanation-related notions and to clarify discussions where the differences between the notions are obscure. In order to explicate these desiderata, I formulate a (version of the) counterfactual account of explanation and show how that account is able to explicate explanation-related notions and clarify issues that are connected with historiographical explanations. The success of the counterfactual account suggests that historiographical explanations do not differ fundamentally from explanations in many other fields. Explanation in historiography; historical counterfactuals; historical contingency; explanatory depth; explanatory goal; the choice of explanandum","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18722636-12341446","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42812727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Editorial: The Philosophy of Intellectual History and Conceptual Change 社论:思想史哲学与观念变迁

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-07-13 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341443

Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen

{"title":"Editorial: The Philosophy of Intellectual History and Conceptual Change","authors":"Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341443","url":null,"abstract":"Intellectual history, understood as the study of thinkers, ideas and thinking patterns in history, is probably the most interdisciplinary form of history writing that there is. An intellectual historian must be able to comprehend and study a great number of disciplines and contexts, even if one is not necessarily committed to the existence of unit ideas that traverse from context to context. However, because of its broad scope, intellectual history can sometimes seem shapeless and borderless. Interdisciplinarity and elusive boundaries would not be a problem if the basic intellectual unit(s) of intellectual history were explicit and the method by which to study them precise. Clarity regarding the basic unit of analysis and method of study would bring rigour and coherence to its practice. The intellectual historian would be able to stick to her disciplinary commitments and delineate the existence and the functions of these units in other disciplines and contexts from this specific methodological vantage point. It is thus unsurprising that there has been a productive debate about what these basic intellectual units should be and how intellectual history should be studied at large. It has been asked whether these units to be studied are concepts, ideas, some other larger thought complexes, sentences, other linguistic entities or something else entirely. And if they are, say, concepts, should they be conceived of as Platonic, linguistic, mental or some other kinds of entities? Further questions include the following: What defines when a concept is the same and when it is different? How much change is allowed for two conceptual instantiations of the ‘same’ intellectual unit in a historical trajectory? And so on. Naturally, there have also been powerful and insightful expressions of what the study of intellectual history consists in. Arguably one of the most famous is Arthur Lovejoy’s project of unit ideas.1 According to it, unit ideas can be identified in their basic form and in combinations in innumerable frameworks.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18722636-12341443","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44733762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Radical, Sceptical and Liberal Enlightenment 激进、怀疑和自由启蒙

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-07-13 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341444

J. Alexander

{"title":"Radical, Sceptical and Liberal Enlightenment","authors":"J. Alexander","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341444","url":null,"abstract":"We still ask the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Every generation seems to offer new and contradictory answers to the question. In the last thirty or so years, the most interesting characterisations of Enlightenment have been by historians. They have told us that there is one Enlightenment, that there are two Enlightenments, that there are many Enlightenments. This has thrown up a second question, ‘How Many Enlightenments?’ In the spirit of collaboration and criticism, I answer both questions by arguing in this article that there are in fact three Enlightenments: Radical, Sceptical and Liberal. These are abstracted from the rival theories of Enlightenment found in the writings of the historians Jonathan Israel, John Robertson and J.G.A. Pocock. Each form of Enlightenment is political; each involves an attitude to history; each takes a view of religion. They are arranged in a sequence of increasing sensitivity to history, as it is this which makes it possible to relate them to each other and indeed propose a composite definition of Enlightenment. The argument should be of interest to anyone concerned with ‘the Enlightenment’ as a historical phenomenon or with ‘Enlightenment’ as a philosophical abstraction.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"14 1","pages":"257-283"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18722636-12341444","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46266736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Confrontation and Its Problems: Can the History of Science Provide Evidence for the Philosophy of Science? 对抗及其问题:科学史能否为科学哲学提供证据?

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-06-26 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341445

Thodoris Dimitrakos

{"title":"Confrontation and Its Problems: Can the History of Science Provide Evidence for the Philosophy of Science?","authors":"Thodoris Dimitrakos","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341445","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this paper I am concerned with the relation between the history of science and the philosophy of science from the perspective of philosophy. In particular, I examine two philosophical objections against the idea that the history of science can provide evidences to the philosophy of science. The first objection is metaphysical and suggests that given Hume’s law, i.e. that norms cannot be derived from facts and given that the history of science is a descriptive enterprise while the philosophy of science is a normative endeavor, the former cannot be informative for the latter. The second is epistemological and is often called the ‘case studies dilemma’. According to this dilemma, we can neither deduce general philosophical theories from particular historical cases nor test the former through the latter. I argue that although those objections fail to be fatal for the idea that the historical data can provide evidence for the philosophical theories of science, they can help us draw a proper image of the relation between the history and the philosophy of science. I conclude that this picture presupposes the constant epistemic iteration between the two disciplines.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":"1-32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18722636-12341445","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48625715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Meanings and Understandings in the History of Ideas 思想史上的意义与理解

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-06-03 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341441

A. Blau

引用次数: 4

History on the Move: Reimagining Historical Change and the (Im)possibility of Utopia in the 21st Century 移动中的历史:重新想象21世纪的历史变迁和乌托邦的可能性

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-05-20 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341442

Juhan Hellerma

引用次数: 2

The End of Histories? Review Essay of Alexander Rosenberg’s How History Gets Things Wrong: the Neuroscience of Our Addiction to Stories 历史的终结？亚历山大·罗森伯格《历史如何出错：我们对故事上瘾的神经科学》评论文章

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-04-22 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341440

Mariana Imaz-Sheinbaum, P. Roth

引用次数: 1

Editorial: Too many books to read? Then read this. 社论:书太多了?那就读读这个。

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-04-20 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341439

Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen

引用次数: 0

Scientific Concepts as Forward-Looking: How Taxonomic Structure Facilitates Conceptual Development 前瞻性的科学概念:分类结构如何促进概念发展

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-02-18 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341438

Corinne L. Bloch-Mullins

引用次数: 4

R. G. Collingwood’s Overlapping Ideas of History 科林伍德的重叠历史观

IF 0.5 3区历史学

Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2020-01-16 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341437

C. Fear

{"title":"R. G. Collingwood’s Overlapping Ideas of History","authors":"C. Fear","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341437","url":null,"abstract":"Does R. G. Collingwood’s meta-philosophical theory that concepts in philosophy are organized as “scales of forms” apply to his own work on the nature of history? Or is there some inconsistency between Collingwood’s work as a philosopher of history and as a theorist of philosophical method? This article surveys existing views among Collingwood specialists on the applicability of Collingwood’s “scale of forms” thesis to his own philosophy of history, especially the accounts of Leon Goldstein and Lionel Rubinoff, and outlines the obvious objections to such an application. These objections however are found to be answerable. It is shown that Collingwood did indeed think the scale of forms thesis should apply to the philosophy of history, and even that he identified the “highest” form in history as a kind of scientific research or inquiry. But it is not demonstrated that Collingwood identified the “lower” forms explicitly. An account is then provided of the three distinct forms that can be identified in Collingwood’s philosophy of history, and of the “critical points” by which (according to Collingwood’s philosophical method) lower forms are negated and incorporated by higher forms. But it is also explained that these forms are not neatly coterminous with the stages in Western philosophical thinking about history as Collingwood narrates them in The Idea of History.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"-1 1","pages":"1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18722636-12341437","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42343313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0