社论:思想史哲学与观念变迁

IF 0.4 3区 历史学 Q1 HISTORY
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen
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引用次数: 1

摘要

知识史,被理解为对历史中思想家、思想和思维模式的研究,可能是历史写作中最跨学科的形式。一个知识历史学家必须能够理解和研究大量的学科和背景,即使一个人不一定致力于存在从一个背景到另一个背景的单元思想。然而,由于其广泛的范围,知识史有时看起来不成形,没有边界。如果知识史的基本知识单元是明确的,并且研究它们的方法是精确的,那么跨学科和难以捉摸的边界就不会成为问题。分析的基本单位和研究方法的明确性将使其实践具有严谨性和连贯性。知识历史学家将能够坚持她的学科承诺,并从这个特定的方法论角度描述这些单元在其他学科和背景中的存在和功能。因此,关于这些基本的知识单元应该是什么以及如何全面研究知识史,人们进行了富有成效的辩论,这并不奇怪。有人问,这些要研究的单元是概念、思想、其他一些更大的思维复合体、句子、其他语言实体还是完全其他的东西。如果它们是概念,那么它们应该被认为是柏拉图式的、语言学的、心理的还是其他类型的实体?进一步的问题包括:什么定义了一个概念何时相同,何时不同?在历史轨迹中,“同一”智力单元的两个概念实例化允许有多大变化?等等。自然,对知识史研究的内容也有有力而深刻的表达。可以说,其中最著名的是Arthur Lovejoy的单位思想项目。1根据该项目,单位思想可以以其基本形式和无数框架中的组合来识别。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Editorial: The Philosophy of Intellectual History and Conceptual Change
Intellectual history, understood as the study of thinkers, ideas and thinking patterns in history, is probably the most interdisciplinary form of history writing that there is. An intellectual historian must be able to comprehend and study a great number of disciplines and contexts, even if one is not necessarily committed to the existence of unit ideas that traverse from context to context. However, because of its broad scope, intellectual history can sometimes seem shapeless and borderless. Interdisciplinarity and elusive boundaries would not be a problem if the basic intellectual unit(s) of intellectual history were explicit and the method by which to study them precise. Clarity regarding the basic unit of analysis and method of study would bring rigour and coherence to its practice. The intellectual historian would be able to stick to her disciplinary commitments and delineate the existence and the functions of these units in other disciplines and contexts from this specific methodological vantage point. It is thus unsurprising that there has been a productive debate about what these basic intellectual units should be and how intellectual history should be studied at large. It has been asked whether these units to be studied are concepts, ideas, some other larger thought complexes, sentences, other linguistic entities or something else entirely. And if they are, say, concepts, should they be conceived of as Platonic, linguistic, mental or some other kinds of entities? Further questions include the following: What defines when a concept is the same and when it is different? How much change is allowed for two conceptual instantiations of the ‘same’ intellectual unit in a historical trajectory? And so on. Naturally, there have also been powerful and insightful expressions of what the study of intellectual history consists in. Arguably one of the most famous is Arthur Lovejoy’s project of unit ideas.1 According to it, unit ideas can be identified in their basic form and in combinations in innumerable frameworks.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
期刊介绍: Philosophy of history is a rapidly expanding area. There is growing interest today in: what constitutes knowledge of the past, the ontology of past events, the relationship of language to the past, and the nature of representations of the past. These interests are distinct from – although connected with – contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics. Hence we need a distinct venue in which philosophers can explore these issues. Journal of the Philosophy of History provides such a venue. Ever since neo-Kantianism, philosophy of history has been central to all of philosophy, whether or not particular philosophers recognized its potential significance.
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