Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献_第10页

Updatable Public Key Encryption from DCR: Efficient Constructions With Stronger Security 基于DCR的可更新公钥加密:具有更强安全性的高效结构

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3559376

Calvin Abou Haidar, Benoît Libert, Alain Passelègue

{"title":"Updatable Public Key Encryption from DCR: Efficient Constructions With Stronger Security","authors":"Calvin Abou Haidar, Benoît Libert, Alain Passelègue","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3559376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3559376","url":null,"abstract":"Forward-secure encryption (FS-PKE) is a key-evolving public-key paradigm that preserves the confidentiality of past encryptions in case of key exposure. Updatable public-key encryption (UPKE) is a natural relaxation of FS-PKE, introduced by Jost et al. (Eurocrypt'19), which is motivated by applications to secure messaging. In UPKE, key updates can be triggered by any sender -- via special update ciphertexts -- willing to enforce the forward secrecy of its encrypted messages. So far, the only truly efficient UPKE candidates (which rely on the random oracle idealization) only provide rather weak security guarantees against passive adversaries as they are malleable. Also, they offer no protection against malicious senders willing to hinder the decryption capability of honest users. A recent work of Dodis et al. (TCC'21) described UPKE systems in the standard model that also hedge against maliciously generated update messages in the chosen-ciphertext setting (where adversaries are equipped with a decryption oracle). While important feasibility results, their constructions lag behind random-oracle candidates in terms of efficiency. In this paper, we first provide a drastically more efficient UPKE realization in the standard model using Paillier's Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption. In the random oracle model, we then extend our initial scheme so as to achieve chosen-ciphertext security, even in a model that accounts for maliciously generated update ciphertexts. Under the DCR and Strong RSA assumptions, we thus obtain the first practical UPKE systems that satisfy the strongest security notions put forth by Dodis et al.","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116430984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Freely Given Consent?: Studying Consent Notice of Third-Party Tracking and Its Violations of GDPR in Android Apps 自愿同意?:研究Android应用中第三方跟踪同意声明及其违反GDPR行为

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3560564

Trung Tin Nguyen, M. Backes, Ben Stock

{"title":"Freely Given Consent?: Studying Consent Notice of Third-Party Tracking and Its Violations of GDPR in Android Apps","authors":"Trung Tin Nguyen, M. Backes, Ben Stock","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3560564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560564","url":null,"abstract":"Adopted in May 2018, the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requires the consent for processing users' personal data to be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous. While prior work has shown that this often is not given through automated network traffic analysis, no research has systematically studied how consent notices are currently implemented and whether they conform to GDPR in mobile apps. To close this research gap, we perform the first large-scale study into consent notices for third-party tracking in Android apps to understand the current practices and the current state of GDPR's consent violations. Specifically, we propose a mostly automated and scalable approach to identify the currently implemented consent notices and apply it to a set of 239,381 Android apps. As a result, we recognize four widely implemented mechanisms to interact with the consent user interfaces from 13,082 apps. We then develop a tool that automatically detects users' personal data sent out to the Internet with different consent conditions based on the identified mechanisms. Doing so, we find 30,160 apps do not even attempt to implement consent notices for sharing users' personal data with third-party data controllers, which mandate explicit consent under GDPR. In contrast, out of 13,082 apps implemented consent notices, we identify 2,688 (20.54%) apps violate at least one of the GDPR consent requirements, such as trying to deceive users into accepting all data sharing or even continuously transmitting data when users have explicitly opted out. To allow developers to address the problems, we send emails to notify affected developers and gather insights from their responses. Our study shows the urgent need for more transparent processing of personal data and supporting developers in this endeavor to comply with legislation, ensuring users can make free and informed choices regarding their data.","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133898420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Succinct Zero-Knowledge Batch Proofs for Set Accumulators 集合累加器的简洁零知识批证明

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3560677

Matteo Campanelli, D. Fiore, Semin Han, Jihye Kim, Dimitris Kolonelos, Hyunok Oh

{"title":"Succinct Zero-Knowledge Batch Proofs for Set Accumulators","authors":"Matteo Campanelli, D. Fiore, Semin Han, Jihye Kim, Dimitris Kolonelos, Hyunok Oh","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3560677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560677","url":null,"abstract":"Cryptographic accumulators are a common solution to proving information about a large set S. They allow one to compute a short digest of S and short certificates of some of its basic properties, notably membership of an element. Accumulators also allow one to track set updates: a new accumulator is obtained by inserting/deleting a given element. In this work we consider the problem of generating membership and update proofs for em batches of elements so that we can succinctly prove additional properties of the elements (i.e., proofs are of constant size regardless of the batch size), and we can preserve privacy. Solving this problem would allow obtaining blockchain systems with improved privacy and scalability. The state-of-the-art approach to achieve this goal is to combine accumulators (typically Merkle trees) with zkSNARKs. This solution is however expensive for provers and does not scale for large batches of elements. In particular, there is no scalable solution for proving batch membership proofs when we require zero-knowledge (a standard definition of privacy-preserving protocols). In this work we propose new techniques to efficiently use zkSNARKs with RSA accumulators. We design and implement two main schemes: 1) harisa, which proves batch membership in zero-knowledge; 2) insarisa, which proves batch updates. For batch membership, the prover in harisa is orders of magnitude faster than existing approaches based on Merkle trees (depending on the hash function). For batch updates we get similar cost savings compared to approaches based on Merkle trees; we also improve over the recent solution of Ozdemir et al. [USENIX'20].","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129434768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

Physical Hijacking Attacks against Object Trackers 针对对象跟踪器的物理劫持攻击

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3559390

Raymond Muller, Yanmao Man, Z. Berkay Celik, Ming Li, Ryan M. Gerdes

{"title":"Physical Hijacking Attacks against Object Trackers","authors":"Raymond Muller, Yanmao Man, Z. Berkay Celik, Ming Li, Ryan M. Gerdes","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3559390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3559390","url":null,"abstract":"Modern autonomous systems rely on both object detection and object tracking in their visual perception pipelines. Although many recent works have attacked the object detection component of autonomous vehicles, these attacks do not work on full pipelines that integrate object tracking to enhance the object detector's accuracy. Meanwhile, existing attacks against object tracking either lack real-world applicability or do not work against a powerful class of object trackers, Siamese trackers. In this paper, we present AttrackZone, a new physically-realizable tracker hijacking attack against Siamese trackers that systematically determines valid regions in an environment that can be used for physical perturbations. AttrackZone exploits the heatmap generation process of Siamese Region Proposal Networks in order to take control of an object's bounding box, resulting in physical consequences including vehicle collisions and masked intrusion of pedestrians into unauthorized areas. Evaluations in both the digital and physical domain show that AttrackZone achieves its attack goals 92% of the time, requiring only 0.3-3 seconds on average.","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129566359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Enforcing Fine-grained Constant-time Policies 执行细粒度的恒定时间策略

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3560689

B. Shivakumar, G. Barthe, B. Grégoire, Vincent Laporte, Swarn Priya

{"title":"Enforcing Fine-grained Constant-time Policies","authors":"B. Shivakumar, G. Barthe, B. Grégoire, Vincent Laporte, Swarn Priya","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3560689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560689","url":null,"abstract":"Cryptographic constant-time (CT) is a popular programming discipline used by cryptographic libraries to protect themselves against timing attacks. The CT discipline aims to enforce that program execution does not leak secrets, where leakage is defined by a formal leakage model. In practice, different leakage models coexist, sometimes even within a single library, both to reflect different architectures and to accommodate different security-efficiency trade-offs. Constant-timeness is popular and can be checked automatically by many tools. However, most sound tools are focused on a baseline (BL) leakage model. In contrast, (sound) verification methods for other leakage models are less developed, in part because these models require modular arithmetic reasoning. In this paper, we develop a systematic, sound, approach for enforcing fine-grained constant-time policies beyond the BL model. Our approach combines two main ingredients: a verification infrastructure, which proves that source programs are constant-time, and a compiler infrastructure, which provably preserves constant-timeness for these fine-grained policies. By making these infrastructures parametric in the leakage model, we achieve the first approach that supports fine-grained constant-time policies. We implement the approach in the Jasmin framework for high-assurance cryptography, and we evaluate our approach with examples from the literature: OpenSSL and wolfSSL. We found a bug in OpenSSL and provided a formally verified fix.","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"2002 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129581744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

WPES '22: 21st Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society WPES '22:第21届电子社会隐私研讨会

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3563220

Yuan Hong, Lingyu Wang

{"title":"WPES '22: 21st Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","authors":"Yuan Hong, Lingyu Wang","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3563220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3563220","url":null,"abstract":"These proceedings contain the papers selected for inclusion in the technical program for the 21st ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2022), held in conjunction with the 29th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security (CCS 2022). This year, WPES is held as a hybrid event (including both in-person and online presentations) on November 7, 2022. In response to the workshop's call for papers, 59 valid submissions were received. These 59 submissions include 43 submissions as full papers and 16 submissions as short papers. They were evaluated by a technical program committee consisting of 51 researchers whose backgrounds include a diverse set of topics related to privacy. Each paper was reviewed by at least 3 members of the program committee, and the average number of reviews for each paper is 3.75. Papers were evaluated based on their importance, novelty, and technical quality. After the rigorous review process, 12 submissions were accepted as full papers (acceptance rate: 20.3%) and additionally 8 submissions were accepted as short papers. The complete workshop proceedings are available at the following URL: https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.1145/3559613.","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133273308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

P-Verifier: Understanding and Mitigating Security Risks in Cloud-based IoT Access Policies p -验证者:理解和降低基于云的物联网访问策略中的安全风险

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3560680

Ze Jin, Luyi Xing, Yiwei Fang, Yan Jia, Bin Yuan, Qixu Liu

{"title":"P-Verifier: Understanding and Mitigating Security Risks in Cloud-based IoT Access Policies","authors":"Ze Jin, Luyi Xing, Yiwei Fang, Yan Jia, Bin Yuan, Qixu Liu","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3560680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560680","url":null,"abstract":"Modern IoT device manufacturers are taking advantage of the managed Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) IoT clouds (e.g., AWS IoT, Azure IoT) for secure and convenient IoT development/deployment. The IoT access control is achieved by manufacturer-specified, cloud-enforced IoT access policies (cloud-standard JSON documents, called IoT Policies) stating which users can access which IoT devices/resources under what constraints. In this paper, we performed a systematic study on the security of cloud-based IoT access policies on modern PaaS/IaaS IoT clouds. Our research shows that the complexity in the IoT semantics and enforcement logic of the policies leaves tremendous space for device manufacturers to program a flawed IoT access policy, introducing convoluted logic flaws which are non-trivial to reason about. In addition to challenges/mistakes in the design space, it is astonishing to find that mainstream device manufacturers also generally make critical mistakes in deploying IoT Policies thanks to the flexibility offered by PaaS/IaaS clouds and the lack of standard practices for doing so. Our assessment of 36 device manufacturers and 310 open-source IoT projects highlights the pervasiveness and seriousness of the problems, which once exploited, can have serious impacts on IoT users' security, safety, and privacy. To help manufacturers identify and easily fix IoT Policy flaws, we introduce P-Verifier, a formal verification tool that can automatically verify cloud-based IoT Policies. With evaluated high effectiveness and low performance overhead, P-Verifier will contribute to elevating security assurance in modern IoT deployments and access control. We responsibly reported all findings to affected vendors and fixes were deployed or on the way.","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"102 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113971441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Poster: MUSTARD - Adaptive Behavioral Analysis for Ransomware Detection 海报:MUSTARD -用于勒索软件检测的自适应行为分析

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3563529

D. Sanvito, G. Siracusano, Roberto González, R. Bifulco

引用次数: 0

Poster: Towards Complete Computation Graph Generation for Security Assessment of ROS Applications 海报:面向ROS应用安全评估的完整计算图生成

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3563540

Y. Luo, Ziwen Wan, Qi Alfred Chen

{"title":"Poster: Towards Complete Computation Graph Generation for Security Assessment of ROS Applications","authors":"Y. Luo, Ziwen Wan, Qi Alfred Chen","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3563540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3563540","url":null,"abstract":"Robot Operating System (ROS) is a popular middleware suite providing a set of libraries and tools to help with building robot applications. The ROS community makes it possible for developers to compose their own robot applications by simply integrating open-sourced software of different functionalities as standalone processes (ROS nodes) in their own application. These processes communicate with each other through the infrastructure provided by ROS, forming a graph of nodes called computation graph. However, adopting third-party software introduces the possibility of supply-chain attacks. By interacting with other nodes, the third-party ROS nodes seeming to be the most harmless can violate users' privacy, launch denial of service attacks, and even cause danger to human lives, due to the cyber-physical nature of robot applications. To allow effective security assessment of robot applications, we are the first to propose to explore a hybrid program analysis-based method to extract these interactions, i.e. the computation graph, from source code and identify the potentially malicious nodes within the graph.","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114192646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

DISTINCT: Identity Theft using In-Browser Communications in Dual-Window Single Sign-On DISTINCT:在双窗口单点登录中使用浏览器内通信进行身份盗窃

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3560692

Louis Jannett, Vladislav Mladenov, Christian Mainka, Jörg Schwenk

{"title":"DISTINCT: Identity Theft using In-Browser Communications in Dual-Window Single Sign-On","authors":"Louis Jannett, Vladislav Mladenov, Christian Mainka, Jörg Schwenk","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3560692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560692","url":null,"abstract":"Single Sign-On (SSO) protocols like OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect 1.0 are cornerstones of modern web security, and have received much academic attention. Users sign in at a trusted Identity Provider (IdP) that subsequently allows many Service Providers (SPs) to verify the users' identities. Previous research concentrated on the standardized - called textbook SSO in this paper - authentication flows, which rely on HTTP redirects to transfer identity tokens between the SP and IdP. However, modern web applications like single page apps may not be able to execute the textbook flow because they lose the local state in case of HTTP redirects. By using novel browser technologies, such as postMessage, developers designed and implemented SSO protocols that were neither documented nor analyzed thoroughly. We call them dual-window SSO flows. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive evaluation of dual-window SSO flows. In particular, we focus on the In-Browser Communication (InBC) used to exchange authentication tokens between SPs and IdPs in iframes and popups. We automate our analysis by developing Distinct - a tool that dynamically analyzes the JavaScript code executing as part of the SSO flow. Distinct translates the flow into a sequence diagram depicting all communicating entities and their exchanged messages, highlights insecure communication channels, and quantifies novel threats in dual-window SSO flows. We found that 56% of the SPs in the Tranco top 1k list support dual-window SSO. Surprisingly, 28% of the SPs implemented dual-window SSO without using official SDKs, leading to identity theft and XSS in 31% of these self-implemented SPs.","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114211288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2