执行细粒度的恒定时间策略

B. Shivakumar, G. Barthe, B. Grégoire, Vincent Laporte, Swarn Priya
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引用次数: 6

摘要

加密常数时间(CT)是一种流行的编程原则,被加密库用来保护自己免受定时攻击。CT规程旨在确保程序执行不会泄漏机密,其中的泄漏是由正式的泄漏模型定义的。在实践中,不同的泄漏模型共存,有时甚至在单个库中,以反映不同的体系结构并适应不同的安全性-效率权衡。恒时性很流行,并且可以被许多工具自动检查。然而,大多数声音工具都集中在基线(BL)泄漏模型上。相比之下,其他泄漏模型的(声音)验证方法开发较少,部分原因是这些模型需要模块化的算术推理。在本文中,我们开发了一种系统的、可靠的方法,用于在BL模型之外执行细粒度的恒定时间策略。我们的方法结合了两个主要成分:一个验证基础设施,它证明源程序是恒定时间的;一个编译基础设施,它可以证明为这些细粒度策略保留恒定时间。通过在泄漏模型中使这些基础设施参数化,我们实现了第一种支持细粒度恒定时间策略的方法。我们在Jasmin框架中实现了用于高保证加密的方法,并使用文献中的示例(OpenSSL和wolfSSL)来评估我们的方法。我们在OpenSSL中发现了一个bug,并提供了一个经过正式验证的修复。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Enforcing Fine-grained Constant-time Policies
Cryptographic constant-time (CT) is a popular programming discipline used by cryptographic libraries to protect themselves against timing attacks. The CT discipline aims to enforce that program execution does not leak secrets, where leakage is defined by a formal leakage model. In practice, different leakage models coexist, sometimes even within a single library, both to reflect different architectures and to accommodate different security-efficiency trade-offs. Constant-timeness is popular and can be checked automatically by many tools. However, most sound tools are focused on a baseline (BL) leakage model. In contrast, (sound) verification methods for other leakage models are less developed, in part because these models require modular arithmetic reasoning. In this paper, we develop a systematic, sound, approach for enforcing fine-grained constant-time policies beyond the BL model. Our approach combines two main ingredients: a verification infrastructure, which proves that source programs are constant-time, and a compiler infrastructure, which provably preserves constant-timeness for these fine-grained policies. By making these infrastructures parametric in the leakage model, we achieve the first approach that supports fine-grained constant-time policies. We implement the approach in the Jasmin framework for high-assurance cryptography, and we evaluate our approach with examples from the literature: OpenSSL and wolfSSL. We found a bug in OpenSSL and provided a formally verified fix.
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