2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS)最新文献

An Active Detection Scheme for Cyber Attacks on Grid-tied PV Systems 并网光伏系统网络攻击的主动检测方案

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311539

Jorge A. Ramos-Ruiz, Jaewon Kim, Woo-Hyun Ko, Tong Huang, P. Enjeti, P. Kumar, Le Xie

引用次数: 7

Intrusion Detection Systems-Enabled Power Electronics for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 支持入侵检测系统的无人机电力电子设备

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311545

M. Rahman, Md. Tauhidur Rahman, M. Kisacikoglu, K. Akkaya

引用次数: 6

Demonstration of Man in the Middle Attack on a Commercial Photovoltaic Inverter Providing Ancillary Services 提供辅助服务的商用光伏逆变器的中间攻击演示

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311531

Georgios Tertytchny, Hazem Karbouj, L. Hadjidemetriou, C. Charalambous, M. Michael, Marios Sazos, M. Maniatakos

引用次数: 6

Implementation of a Grid-Tied Secure Reconfigurable Power Converter 并网安全可重构功率变换器的实现

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311537

A. Siddiqui, Prithwiraj Roy Chowdhury, Prashant Sawant, S. M. Shinde, Yutian Gui, M. Manjrekar, S. Essakiappan, F. Saqib

{"title":"Implementation of a Grid-Tied Secure Reconfigurable Power Converter","authors":"A. Siddiqui, Prithwiraj Roy Chowdhury, Prashant Sawant, S. M. Shinde, Yutian Gui, M. Manjrekar, S. Essakiappan, F. Saqib","doi":"10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311537","url":null,"abstract":"In power converter designs embedding security is essential to protect the device from physical and network attacks, and to provide secure communication between Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and power system operators. The communication-based cyber-attacks such as physical access to a network and remote networked attacks compromise the signals, reverse engineer and inject faults. The resource-constrained terminal devices such as smart meters, power converters as well as third party appliances open additional opportunities for malicious actors. In this work, we present a low overhead secure communication framework that incorporates processors, Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for communication in a grid-tied system. We propose a novel reconfigurable design of a power converter controller to establish secure communication for a grid-tied converter. An open-source Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) platform is used to develop the library functions necessary to perform power electronic controls. The FPGA works in conjunction with the integrated TPM to exchange command and feedback signals. Preliminary results of the operation of the controller with a 3-phase inverter feeding power to a resistive load are also presented.","PeriodicalId":434320,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127164223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Anomaly Detection in Distribution Power System based on a Condition Monitoring Vector and Ultra- Short Demand Forecasting 基于状态监测向量和超短需求预测的配电系统异常检测

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311534

Mohsen Hosseinzadehtaher, Ahmad Khan, M. Shadmand, H. Abu-Rub

{"title":"Anomaly Detection in Distribution Power System based on a Condition Monitoring Vector and Ultra- Short Demand Forecasting","authors":"Mohsen Hosseinzadehtaher, Ahmad Khan, M. Shadmand, H. Abu-Rub","doi":"10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311534","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a proactive intrusion detection system (IDS) for smart distribution power systems. The considered attack scenario is manipulation of the advanced measuring infrastructures (AMIs) readings and/or smart inverters data. These manipulated data from the grid edge devices mislead the grid operator for making proper operational planning decisions. In a stealthy attack model, where the attacker compromises significant number of these smart devices, serious demand-supply unbalance can occur that may result in major blackouts. The proposed IDS is based on a condition monitoring vector (CMV) equipped with a learned ultra-short-term demand forecasting (USTDF) mechanism. This cybersecurity approach is able to verify smart devices readings. In the proposed method, the instantaneous difference of collected AMIs and other smart devices data with the ultra-short term forecasted demand is defined as the CMV. This vector probes a pre-defined error band for identifying the compromised smart devices. The learned USTDF mechanism is based on the distribution grid historical load profile and the temperature data for the goal area. An accurate multi-dimensional regression model is developed and learned for forecasting the load behavior in this area. Finally, the suspicious areas are flagged or become separated from the main grid by the network operator based on the proposed CMV outcomes and the output of decision-making module. The proposed IDS aims to enhance the cybersecurity of the smart devices at the grid-edge that plays major role in ensuring the resiliency of the grid. The theoretical analyses are verified by several case studies.","PeriodicalId":434320,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS)","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115735535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Adaptive Resilient Operation of Cooperative Grid-Forming Converters Under Cyber Attacks 网络攻击下合作并网变流器的自适应弹性运行

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311543

Subham S. Sahoo, T. Dragičević, Yongheng Yang, F. Blaabjerg

引用次数: 9

Deep Learning-Based False Sensor Data Detection for Battery Energy Storage Systems 基于深度学习的电池储能系统假传感器数据检测

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311542

Hyunjun Lee, Gomanth Bere, Kyung-soo Kim, Justin Ochoa, Joung-Hu Park, Taesic Kim

引用次数: 3

Cyber-physical security framework for Photovoltaic Farms 光伏电站网络物理安全框架

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311533

Jinan Zhang, Qi Li, Jin Ye, Lulu Guo

引用次数: 8

Smart Contract-Defined Secondary Control and Co-Simulation for Smart Solar Inverters using Blockchain Technology 基于区块链技术的智能太阳能逆变器智能合约二次控制与联合仿真

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9326268

A. Hadi, Gomanth Bere, Bohyun Ahn, Taesic Kim

引用次数: 1

Intrusion Detection for Cybersecurity of Power Electronics Dominated Grids: Inverters PQ Set-Points Manipulation 电力电子主导电网的网络安全入侵检测:逆变器PQ设定点操纵

2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) Pub Date : 2020-10-13 DOI: 10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311538

Ahmad Khan, Mohsen Hosseinzadehtaher, M. Shadmand, Danish Saleem, H. Abu-Rub

{"title":"Intrusion Detection for Cybersecurity of Power Electronics Dominated Grids: Inverters PQ Set-Points Manipulation","authors":"Ahmad Khan, Mohsen Hosseinzadehtaher, M. Shadmand, Danish Saleem, H. Abu-Rub","doi":"10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberPELS49534.2020.9311538","url":null,"abstract":"This work provides cybersecurity analytics for a high photovoltaic (PV) penetrated distribution network, representing future power electronics dominated grid (PEDG). Firstly, the impact of active and reactive power (PQ) set-points manipulation on the network is studied. Then, an intrusion detection system (IDS) is developed for identifying the potentially compromised PV inverters in the network. The proposed IDS is based on defining the normal, safe, and abnormal operation regions of the PV inverters from point of view of the steady state voltage stability of the network. These three-operation regions are identified by utilizing active power, reactive power, and voltage (PQV) limits of each specific grid-following inverter in the network. Each grid-following inverter’s PQV contour includes the information of network topology, inverter ratings, and inverter controller. The developed PQ limits are integrated into the centralized secondary control layer for realization of the proposed IDS. Furthermore, the proposed secondary control layer is capable of providing remedial actions during an anomaly event to enhance the grid resiliency. The theoretical analyses are verified by several attack scenarios for a network of grid-following inverters.","PeriodicalId":434320,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116803266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11