Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献_第4页

POSTER: An Educational Network Protocol for Covert Channel Analysis Using Patterns 使用模式进行隐蔽信道分析的教育网络协议

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2989037

S. Wendzel, W. Mazurczyk

引用次数: 5

SandScout: Automatic Detection of Flaws in iOS Sandbox Profiles SandScout:自动检测iOS沙盒配置文件中的缺陷

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978336

Luke Deshotels, Răzvan Deaconescu, Mihai Chiroiu, Lucas Davi, W. Enck, A. Sadeghi

引用次数: 16

The Shadow Nemesis: Inference Attacks on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently Searchable Encryption 影子复仇者:对有效部署，有效搜索加密的推理攻击

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978401

D. Pouliot, C. V. Wright

{"title":"The Shadow Nemesis: Inference Attacks on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently Searchable Encryption","authors":"D. Pouliot, C. V. Wright","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978401","url":null,"abstract":"Encrypting Internet communications has been the subject of renewed focus in recent years. In order to add end-to-end encryption to legacy applications without losing the convenience of full-text search, ShadowCrypt and Mimesis Aegis use a new cryptographic technique called \"efficiently deployable efficiently searchable encryption\" (EDESE) that allows a standard full-text search system to perform searches on encrypted data. Compared to other recent techniques for searching on encrypted data, EDESE schemes leak a great deal of statistical information about the encrypted messages and the keywords they contain. Until now, the practical impact of this leakage has been difficult to quantify. In this paper, we show that the adversary's task of matching plaintext keywords to the opaque cryptographic identifiers used in EDESE can be reduced to the well-known combinatorial optimization problem of weighted graph matching (WGM). Using real email and chat data, we show how off-the-shelf WGM solvers can be used to accurately and efficiently recover hundreds of the most common plaintext keywords from a set of EDESE-encrypted messages. We show how to recover the tags from Bloom filters so that the WGM solver can be used with the set of encrypted messages that utilizes a Bloom filter to encode its search tags. We also show that the attack can be mitigated by carefully configuring Bloom filter parameters.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132600334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 92

TaintART: A Practical Multi-level Information-Flow Tracking System for Android RunTime 一个实用的Android运行时多层次信息流跟踪系统

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978343

Mingshen Sun, Tao Wei, John C.S. Lui

{"title":"TaintART: A Practical Multi-level Information-Flow Tracking System for Android RunTime","authors":"Mingshen Sun, Tao Wei, John C.S. Lui","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978343","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile operating systems like Android failed to provide sufficient protection on personal data, and privacy leakage becomes a major concern. To understand the security risks and privacy leakage, analysts have to carry out data-flow analysis. In 2014, Android upgraded with a fundamentally new design known as Android RunTime (ART) environment in Android 5.0. ART adopts ahead-of-time compilation strategy and replaces previous virtual-machine-based Dalvik. Unfortunately, many data-flow analysis systems like TaintDroid were designed for the legacy Dalvik environment. This makes data-flow analysis of new apps and malware infeasible. We design a multi-level information-flow tracking system for the new Android system called TaintART. TaintART employs a multi-level taint analysis technique to minimize the taint tag storage. Therefore, taint tags can be stored in processor registers to provide efficient taint propagation operations. We also customize the ART compiler to maximize performance gains of the ahead-of-time compilation optimizations. Based on the general design of TaintART, we also implement a multi-level privacy enforcement to prevent sensitive data leakage. We demonstrate that TaintART only incurs less than 15% overheads on a CPU-bound microbenchmark and negligible overhead on built-in or third-party applications. Compared to legacy Dalvik environment in Android 4.4, TaintART achieves about 99.7% faster performance for Java runtime benchmark.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"4 22","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132938855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 164

POSTER: DataLair: A Storage Block Device with Plausible Deniability 海报:DataLair:一个可否认的存储块设备

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2989061

Anrin Chakraborti, Cheng Chen, R. Sion

{"title":"POSTER: DataLair: A Storage Block Device with Plausible Deniability","authors":"Anrin Chakraborti, Cheng Chen, R. Sion","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2989061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2989061","url":null,"abstract":"Sensitive information is present on our phones, disks, watches and computers. Its protection is essential. Plausible deniability of stored data allows individuals to deny that their device contains a piece of sensitive information. This constitutes a key tool in the fight against oppressive governments and censorship. Unfortunately, existing solutions, such as the now defunct TrueCrypt [2], can defend only against an adversary that can access a user's device at most once (\"single-snapshot adversary\"). Recent solutions have traded significant performance overheads for the ability to handle more powerful adversaries able to access the device at multiple points in time (\"multi-snapshot adversary\"). In this paper we show that this sacrifice is not necessary. We introduce and build DataLair, a practical plausible deniability mechanism. When compared with existing approaches, DataLair is two orders of magnitude faster (and as efficient as the underlying raw storage) for public data accesses, and 3-5 times faster for hidden data accesses. An important component in DataLair is a new, efficient write-only ORAM construction, which provides an improved access complexity when compared to the state-of-the-art.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116219329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Covert Channels through Random Number Generator: Mechanisms, Capacity Estimation and Mitigations 通过随机数生成器的隐蔽信道:机制、容量估计和缓解

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978374

Dmitry Evtyushkin, D. Ponomarev

引用次数: 66

Mix&Slice: Efficient Access Revocation in the Cloud Mix&Slice:云中的高效访问撤销

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978377

Enrico Bacis, S. Vimercati, S. Foresti, S. Paraboschi, Marco Rosa, P. Samarati

引用次数: 46

POSTER: RIA: an Audition-based Method to Protect the Runtime Integrity of MapReduce Applications 海报:RIA:一个基于审核的方法来保护MapReduce应用程序的运行时完整性

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2989042

Yongzhi Wang, Yulong Shen

引用次数: 2

Content Security Problems?: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Content Security Policy in the Wild 内容安全问题?:评估野外内容安全策略的有效性

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978338

Stefano Calzavara, Alvise Rabitti, M. Bugliesi

引用次数: 56

Strong Non-Interference and Type-Directed Higher-Order Masking 强无干扰和有型高阶掩模

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978427

G. Barthe, Sonia Belaïd, François Dupressoir, Pierre-Alain Fouque, B. Grégoire, Pierre-Yves Strub, Rébecca Zucchini

{"title":"Strong Non-Interference and Type-Directed Higher-Order Masking","authors":"G. Barthe, Sonia Belaïd, François Dupressoir, Pierre-Alain Fouque, B. Grégoire, Pierre-Yves Strub, Rébecca Zucchini","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978427","url":null,"abstract":"Differential power analysis (DPA) is a side-channel attack in which an adversary retrieves cryptographic material by measuring and analyzing the power consumption of the device on which the cryptographic algorithm under attack executes. An effective countermeasure against DPA is to mask secrets by probabilistically encoding them over a set of shares, and to run masked algorithms that compute on these encodings. Masked algorithms are often expected to provide, at least, a certain level of probing security. Leveraging the deep connections between probabilistic information flow and probing security, we develop a precise, scalable, and fully automated methodology to verify the probing security of masked algorithms, and generate them from unprotected descriptions of the algorithm. Our methodology relies on several contributions of independent interest, including a stronger notion of probing security that supports compositional reasoning, and a type system for enforcing an expressive class of probing policies. Finally, we validate our methodology on examples that go significantly beyond the state-of-the-art.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123089225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 211