Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献

Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms 移动平台上的确定性Rowhammer攻击

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978406

V. V. D. Veen, Y. Fratantonio, Martina Lindorfer, D. Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, G. Vigna, H. Bos, Kaveh Razavi, Cristiano Giuffrida

{"title":"Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms","authors":"V. V. D. Veen, Y. Fratantonio, Martina Lindorfer, D. Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, G. Vigna, H. Bos, Kaveh Razavi, Cristiano Giuffrida","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978406","url":null,"abstract":"Recent work shows that the Rowhammer hardware bug can be used to craft powerful attacks and completely subvert a system. However, existing efforts either describe probabilistic (and thus unreliable) attacks or rely on special (and often unavailable) memory management features to place victim objects in vulnerable physical memory locations. Moreover, prior work only targets x86 and researchers have openly wondered whether Rowhammer attacks on other architectures, such as ARM, are even possible. We show that deterministic Rowhammer attacks are feasible on commodity mobile platforms and that they cannot be mitigated by current defenses. Rather than assuming special memory management features, our attack, DRAMMER, solely relies on the predictable memory reuse patterns of standard physical memory allocators. We implement DRAMMER on Android/ARM, demonstrating the practicability of our attack, but also discuss a generalization of our approach to other Linux-based platforms. Furthermore, we show that traditional x86-based Rowhammer exploitation techniques no longer work on mobile platforms and address the resulting challenges towards practical mobile Rowhammer attacks. To support our claims, we present the first Rowhammer-based Android root exploit relying on no software vulnerability, and requiring no user permissions. In addition, we present an analysis of several popular smartphones and find that many of them are susceptible to our DRAMMER attack. We conclude by discussing potential mitigation strategies and urging our community to address the concrete threat of faulty DRAM chips in widespread commodity platforms.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123132408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 281

Targeted Online Password Guessing: An Underestimated Threat 目标在线密码猜测:一个被低估的威胁

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978339

Ding Wang, Zijian Zhang, Ping Wang, Jeff Yan, Xinyi Huang

{"title":"Targeted Online Password Guessing: An Underestimated Threat","authors":"Ding Wang, Zijian Zhang, Ping Wang, Jeff Yan, Xinyi Huang","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978339","url":null,"abstract":"While trawling online/offline password guessing has been intensively studied, only a few studies have examined targeted online guessing, where an attacker guesses a specific victim's password for a service, by exploiting the victim's personal information such as one sister password leaked from her another account and some personally identifiable information (PII). A key challenge for targeted online guessing is to choose the most effective password candidates, while the number of guess attempts allowed by a server's lockout or throttling mechanisms is typically very small. We propose TarGuess, a framework that systematically characterizes typical targeted guessing scenarios with seven sound mathematical models, each of which is based on varied kinds of data available to an attacker. These models allow us to design novel and efficient guessing algorithms. Extensive experiments on 10 large real-world password datasets show the effectiveness of TarGuess. Particularly, TarGuess I~IV capture the four most representative scenarios and within 100 guesses: (1) TarGuess-I outperforms its foremost counterpart by 142% against security-savvy users and by 46% against normal users; (2) TarGuess-II outperforms its foremost counterpart by 169% on security-savvy users and by 72% against normal users; and (3) Both TarGuess-III and IV gain success rates over 73% against normal users and over 32% against security-savvy users. TarGuess-III and IV, for the first time, address the issue of cross-site online guessing when given the victim's one sister password and some PII.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"199 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120865241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 291

The Honey Badger of BFT Protocols BFT协议中的蜜獾

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978399

Andrew K. Miller, Yuchong Xia, Kyle Croman, E. Shi, D. Song

{"title":"The Honey Badger of BFT Protocols","authors":"Andrew K. Miller, Yuchong Xia, Kyle Croman, E. Shi, D. Song","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978399","url":null,"abstract":"The surprising success of cryptocurrencies has led to a surge of interest in deploying large scale, highly robust, Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols for mission-critical applications, such as financial transactions. Although the conventional wisdom is to build atop a (weakly) synchronous protocol such as PBFT (or a variation thereof), such protocols rely critically on network timing assumptions, and only guarantee liveness when the network behaves as expected. We argue these protocols are ill-suited for this deployment scenario. We present an alternative, HoneyBadgerBFT, the first practical asynchronous BFT protocol, which guarantees liveness without making any timing assumptions. We base our solution on a novel atomic broadcast protocol that achieves optimal asymptotic efficiency. We present an implementation and experimental results to show our system can achieve throughput of tens of thousands of transactions per second, and scales to over a hundred nodes on a wide area network. We even conduct BFT experiments over Tor, without needing to tune any parameters. Unlike the alternatives, HoneyBadgerBFT simply does not care about the underlying network.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127335474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 673

Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable 车载网络的错误处理使其易受攻击

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978302

Kyong-Tak Cho, K. Shin

{"title":"Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable","authors":"Kyong-Tak Cho, K. Shin","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978302","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary vehicles are getting equipped with an increasing number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and wireless connectivities. Although these have enhanced vehicle safety and efficiency, they are accompanied with new vulnerabilities. In this paper, we unveil a new important vulnerability applicable to several in-vehicle networks including Control Area Network (CAN), the de facto standard in-vehicle network protocol. Specifically, we propose a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS), called the bus-off attack, which exploits the error-handling scheme of in-vehicle networks to disconnect or shut down good/uncompromised ECUs. This is an important attack that must be thwarted, since the attack, once an ECU is compromised, is easy to be mounted on safety-critical ECUs while its prevention is very difficult. In addition to the discovery of this new vulnerability, we analyze its feasibility using actual in-vehicle network traffic, and demonstrate the attack on a CAN bus prototype as well as on two real vehicles. Based on our analysis and experimental results, we also propose and evaluate a mechanism to detect and prevent the bus-off attack.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123784115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 185

Attacking OpenSSL Implementation of ECDSA with a Few Signatures 几个签名的ECDSA的OpenSSL实现

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978400

Shuqin Fan, Wenbo Wang, Qingfeng Cheng

{"title":"Attacking OpenSSL Implementation of ECDSA with a Few Signatures","authors":"Shuqin Fan, Wenbo Wang, Qingfeng Cheng","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978400","url":null,"abstract":"In this work, we give a lattice attack on the ECDSA implementation in the latest version of OpenSSL, which implement the scalar multiplication by windowed Non-Adjacent Form method. We propose a totally different but more efficient method of extracting and utilizing information from the side-channel results, remarkably improving the previous attacks. First, we develop a new efficient method, which can extract almost all information from the side-channel results, obtaining 105.8 bits of information per signature on average for 256-bit ECDSA. Then in order to make the utmost of our extracted information, we translate the problem of recovering secret key to the Extended Hidden Number Problem, which can be solved by lattice reduction algorithms. Finally, we introduce the methods of elimination, merging, most significant digit recovering and enumeration to improve the attack. Our attack is mounted to the {series secp256k1} curve, and the result shows that only 4 signatures would be enough to recover the secret key if the Flush+Reload attack is implemented perfectly without any error,which is much better than the best known result needing at least 13 signatures.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126747847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 40

How I Learned to be Secure: a Census-Representative Survey of Security Advice Sources and Behavior 我是如何学会安全的:一项关于安全建议来源和行为的普查代表调查

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978307

Elissa M. Redmiles, Sean Kross, Michelle L. Mazurek

{"title":"How I Learned to be Secure: a Census-Representative Survey of Security Advice Sources and Behavior","authors":"Elissa M. Redmiles, Sean Kross, Michelle L. Mazurek","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978307","url":null,"abstract":"Few users have a single, authoritative, source from whom they can request digital-security advice. Rather, digital-security skills are often learned haphazardly, as users filter through an overwhelming quantity of security advice. By understanding the factors that contribute to users' advice sources, beliefs, and security behaviors, we can help to pare down the quantity and improve the quality of advice provided to users, streamlining the process of learning key behaviors. This paper rigorously investigates how users' security beliefs, knowledge, and demographics correlate with their sources of security advice, and how all these factors influence security behaviors. Using a carefully pre-tested, U.S.-census-representative survey of 526 users, we present an overview of the prevalence of respondents' advice sources, reasons for accepting and rejecting advice from those sources, and the impact of these sources and demographic factors on security behavior. We find evidence of a \"digital divide\" in security: the advice sources of users with higher skill levels and socioeconomic status differ from those with fewer resources. This digital security divide may add to the vulnerability of already disadvantaged users. Additionally, we confirm and extend results from prior small-sample studies about why users accept certain digital-security advice (e.g., because they trust the source rather than the content) and reject other advice (e.g., because it is inconvenient and because it contains too much marketing material). We conclude with recommendations for combating the digital divide and improving the efficacy of digital-security advice.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115993404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 138

CCSW'16: 8th ACM Cloud Computing Security Workshop CCSW'16:第八届ACM云计算安全研讨会

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2990480

Elli Androulaki, M. Reiter

引用次数: 0

Introduction to Credit Networks: Security, Privacy, and Applications 信用网络导论:安全、隐私和应用

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2976755

Aniket Kate

{"title":"Introduction to Credit Networks: Security, Privacy, and Applications","authors":"Aniket Kate","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2976755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2976755","url":null,"abstract":"Credit networks model transitive IOweYou (IOU) credit between their users. With their flexible-yet-scalable design and robustness against intrusion, we are observing a rapid increase in their popularity as a backbone of real-world permission-less payment settlement networks (e.g., Ripple and Stellar) as well as several other weak-identity systems requiring Sybil-tolerant communication. In payment scenarios, due to their unique capability to unite emerging crypto-currencies and user-defined currencies with the traditional fiat currency and banking systems, several existing and new payment enterprises are entering in this space. Nevertheless, this enthusiasm in the market significantly exceeds our understanding of security, privacy, and reliability of these inherently distributed systems. Currently employed ad hoc strategies to fix apparent flaws have made those systems vulnerable to bigger problems once they become lucrative targets for malicious players. In this tutorial, we first define the concept of IOU credit networks, and describe some of the important credit network applications. We then describe and analyze recent and ongoing projects to improve the credit-network security, privacy and reliability. We end our discussion with interesting open problems and systems challenges in the field. This introductory tutorial is accessible to the standard CCS audience with graduate-level security knowledge.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128703675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Systematic Fuzzing and Testing of TLS Libraries TLS库的系统模糊测试

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978411

Juraj Somorovsky

引用次数: 101

On the Security and Usability of Segment-based Visual Cryptographic Authentication Protocols 基于段的可视化密码认证协议的安全性和可用性研究

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-10-24 DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978417

Tianhao Wang, Huangyi Ge, Omar Chowdhury, H. K. Maji, Ninghui Li

引用次数: 3