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Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics最新文献

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Bo R. Meinertsen: Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradley’s Regress 博·r·迈纳特森:《事态的形而上学:造真、普遍性和告别布拉德利的倒退》
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2020-03-17 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-2019
W. Vallicella
{"title":"Bo R. Meinertsen: Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradley’s Regress","authors":"W. Vallicella","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-2019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-2019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-2019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43649774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Peirce and Leibniz on Continuity and the Continuum 皮尔斯和莱布尼茨论连续性和连续体
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2020-02-14 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0008
D. Anapolitanos, D. Christopoulou
{"title":"Peirce and Leibniz on Continuity and the Continuum","authors":"D. Anapolitanos, D. Christopoulou","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper discusses some of C. S. Peirce’s insights about continuity in his attempt to grasp the concept of the mathematical continuum. After a discussion of his earlier notions which he called ‘Kanticity’ and ‘Aristotelicity’ we arrive at his later belief that a continuum is rather a system of potential points. In his mature views, Peirce grasps a continuum as “a whole range of possibilities” without points at all. In the sequel, we turn to take into account some of Leibniz’s attempts to deal with continuity and the continuum and we compare Peirce and Leibniz’s approaches detecting certain impressive similarities and differences.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48061606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited 布莱克本对道德现实主义的监督性论证:重新审视
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2020-02-14 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-0004
H. Noonan
{"title":"Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited","authors":"H. Noonan","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Blackburn argues against naturalistic moral realism. He argues that there is no conceptual entailment from satisfying a naturalistic predicate to satisfying a moral predicate. But the moral is conceptually supervenient on the natural. However, this conjunction of conceptual supervenience with lack of conceptual entailment is something the non-realist can explain, but the realist cannot. I argue first that Blackburn’s best formulation of his challenge is his first one. Subsequently he reformulates it as a demand for a ‘ban on mixed worlds’. Critics have directed their arguments against this formulation but they are ineffective against Blackburn’s first formulation. My second thesis is, even so formulated the realist can meet the challenge. The bare conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural can be given a realist explanation by understanding names of moral properties as descriptive names of natural properties.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45643352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two Sides of the Same Coin? Neutral Monism as an Attempt to Reconcile Subjectivity and Objectivity in Personal Identity 同一枚硬币的两面？中性一元论：调和个人身份主客观的尝试
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2020-02-08 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0021
Nils-Frederic Wagner, I. Apostolova
{"title":"Two Sides of the Same Coin? Neutral Monism as an Attempt to Reconcile Subjectivity and Objectivity in Personal Identity","authors":"Nils-Frederic Wagner, I. Apostolova","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Standard views of personal identity over time often hover uneasily between the subjective, first-person dimension (e. g. psychological continuity), and the objective, third-person dimension (e. g. biological continuity) of a person’s life. Since both dimensions capture something integral to personal identity, we show that neither can successfully be discarded in favor of the other. The apparent need to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity, however, presents standard views with problems both in seeking an ontological footing of, as well as epistemic evidence for, personal identity. We contend that a fresh look at neutral monism offers a novel way to tackle these problems; counting on the most fundamental building blocks of reality to be ontologically neutral with regards to subjectivity and objectivity of personal identity. If the basic units of reality are, in fact, ontologically neutral – but can give rise to mental as well as physical events – these basic units of reality might account for both subjectivity and objectivity in personal identity. If this were true, it would turn out that subjectivity and objectivity are not conflictive dimensions of personal identity but rather two sides of the same coin.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42541608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism 像素主义的两个几何模型
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2020-01-24 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0002
Fabio Patrone
{"title":"Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism","authors":"Fabio Patrone","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pixelism is the combination of three metaphysical thesis, namely a radical form of exdurantism, mereological nihilism and counterpart theory. Pixelism is a theory that evaluates all the metaphysical phenomena of persistence, composition and modality in a homogeneous and consistent manner. In a pixel world, there is no identity over time and over possible worlds and nothing persists over more than an instant or a world. Entities can be univocally identified by a five-coordinates system (the three spatial dimensions, the temporal one and the possible worlds), and their relation is a counterpart relation both in different worlds and at different times or different regions of space. In this paper I will provide two models for pixelism: the first one takes pixels to be hypercubes, i. e. four-dimensional cubes, the acceptance of which is conditional on the acceptance of extended simples. The second one considers pixels as points in a four-dimensional space.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43927333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding 本质、独立性和接地
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2020-01-21 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-2018
Sophie R. Allen
{"title":"Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding","authors":"Sophie R. Allen","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-2018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-2018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper investigates the plausibility of Witmer, Butchard and Trogdon’s proposal to distinguish intrinsic properties from extrinsic ones in terms of independence from accompaniment and grounding. I argue that the proposed criterion is not adequate to determine intrinsicality, since according to it some intuitively extrinsic properties turn out to be intrinsic. I suggest and evaluate two responses: first, one could characterize a conception of independence which is specific to the individual instantiating the property; and second, one could justify two assumptions about properties which entail that counterexample properties of the kinds I present do not exist, most importantly that there are no fundamental properties which are instantiated in an intrinsic fashion by some individuals and an extrinsic fashion by others. Although the latter seems prima facie plausible, I present some potential counterexamples to it from current physical theory. I conclude that the grounding- and independence-based criterion of intrinsicality can be defended from my objections, although the cost of doing so might make it more attractive to characterize intrinsicality in terms of independence, or in terms of grounding, alone.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-2018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46483347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Necessitarianism and Dispositions 必需品主义与处置
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2020-01-15 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0022
S. Gozzano
{"title":"Necessitarianism and Dispositions","authors":"S. Gozzano","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I argue in favor of necessitarianism, the view that dispositions, when stimulated, necessitate their manifestations. After introducing and clarifying what necessitarianism does and does not amount to, I provide reasons to support the view that dispositions once stimulated necessitate their manifestations according to the stimulating conditions and the relevant properties at stake. In this framework, I will propose a principle of causal relevance and some conditions for the possibility of interference that allow us to avoid the use of ceteris paribus clauses. I then defend necessitarianism from recent attacks raised by, among others, Mumford and Anjum, noting that the antecedent strengthening test is a test for causal relevance that raises no difficulties for necessitarianism.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42543029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Five Sources of Contingency for Dispositionalism 处置主义的五个偶然性来源
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2020-01-07 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0004
Michele Paolini Paoletti
{"title":"Five Sources of Contingency for Dispositionalism","authors":"Michele Paolini Paoletti","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Law dispositionalism is the doctrine according to which laws of nature are grounded on powers/dispositions. In this article, I shall examine how certain laws of nature can turn out to be contingent on this view. First of all, I shall distinguish between two versions of law dispositionalism (i. e. a weak and a strong one) and I shall also single out two further theses that may be conjoined with it (i. e. strong and weak dispositional essentialism). I shall also single out four different sorts of laws of nature. Afterwards, I shall examine five sources of contingency for law dispositionalism: the contingent existence of the relevant entities involved in the laws; the contigent activation, background and possession conditions of the powers at stake; the presence of contingent constants in the laws; the presence of indeterministic powers; the presence of powers that are not essential to the entities involved in the laws.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44544478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Metaphysical Explanation Separated from Grounding 脱离接地的形而上学解释
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2019-12-24 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0009
Márta Ujvári
{"title":"Metaphysical Explanation Separated from Grounding","authors":"Márta Ujvári","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Grounding is typically associated to metaphysical explanation on the basis of the explanatory role’s being characteristic of grounding as well. Some even say that all what metaphysical explanation does is tracking the grounding relation. However, recently Maurin has argued that grounding does not “inherit” its properties from metaphysical explanation and, consequently, we should be “separatists”. In this paper separatism will be defended from the perspective of metaphysical explanation thus giving a turn to the separatist strategy. In particular, the structural difference between grounding and metaphysical explanation will be pointed out as affecting also the explanatory function. It will be shown how dispositions and essentialist claims play different roles in the two theories. Lastly, it will be claimed that the two theories diverge on accounting for law-like and accidental generalizations. Provided these arguments are sound, there will be good reason to tell metaphysical explanation apart from grounding.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47641487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Apriority and Essential Truth 先验性与本质真理
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2019-11-09 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0007
T. Haze
{"title":"Apriority and Essential Truth","authors":"T. Haze","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is a line of thought, neglected in recent philosophy, according to which a priori knowable truths such as those of logic and mathematics have their special epistemic status in virtue of a certain tight connection between their meaning and their truth. Historical associations notwithstanding, this view does not mandate any kind of problematic deflationism about meaning, modality or essence. On the contrary, we should be upfront about it being a highly debatable metaphysical idea, while nonetheless insisting that it be given due consideration. From this standpoint, I suggest that the Finean distinction between essence and modality allows us to refine the view. While liberal about meaning, modality and essence, the view is not without bite: it is reasonable to suppose that it is able to ward off philosophical confusions stemming from the undue assimilation of a priori to empirical knowledge.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45399590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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