{"title":"Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?","authors":"J. Raz","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192847003.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192847003.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"If promises are binding there must be a reason to do as one promised. There is a difficulty in explaining what that reason is. It arises because the reasons that promising creates are content independent. Similar difficulties arise regarding other content-independent reasons, though their solution need not be the same. Section 1 introduces an approach to promises, and outlines an account of them. The problems discussed in the chapter arise, albeit in slightly modified ways, for various other accounts as well. It is, however, helpful to use a specific account as a springboard leading to one explanation of promissory reasons, namely of the reasons that valid promises constitute for performing the promised act (Section 2). We can call it the bare reasons account. Sections 3 and 4 will raise difficulties with that account, leading to its abandonment in favour of an alternative in Sections 5 and 6.","PeriodicalId":430740,"journal":{"name":"The Roots of Normativity","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128533964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can Basic Moral Principles Change?","authors":"J. Raz","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192847003.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192847003.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can change, and finds them wanting. The principal argument discussed derives from the claim that normative considerations are intelligible, and therefore that they can be explained, and their explanations presuppose the prior existence of basic normative principles. The intelligibility thesis is affirmed but the implication that basic change is impossible is denied. Subsumptive explanations are contrasted with explanations by analogy. Later in the chapter, other objections are considered more briefly: that normative properties are queer, that they are unconnected to the rest of reality, and therefore cannot play an explanatory role, etc.","PeriodicalId":430740,"journal":{"name":"The Roots of Normativity","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125360049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Identity and Social Bonds","authors":"J. Raz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3270853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3270853","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter first argues that there is no problem about how to justify partialities (though there is a difficulty in justifying impartialities). Then it considers the role of consent in justifying rights and duties, using voluntary associations as a case in which consent has an important but limited role in doing so, a role determined and circumscribed by evaluative considerations. The values explain why consent can bind, and bind one to act as one does not wish to do and even as one judges to be ill-advised. That opens the way to an explanation of how value considerations relate to non-voluntary membership in socially constituted groups, generating rights and duties that to a considerable extent are independent of the individual’s aims and preferences.","PeriodicalId":430740,"journal":{"name":"The Roots of Normativity","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134220797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intention and Motivation","authors":"J. Raz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2996260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2996260","url":null,"abstract":"What is the role of intentions in the actions intended? What do they contribute, and how do they contribute to the occurrence of the intended actions? The chapter will offer an account of acting with an intention and of having an intention to act. It will not offer an account of intentional action, merely suggesting that when intentional actions are not actions done with an intention, their explanation as intentional relates to that of actions with intentions, showing how like them and unlike them they are. Motivation will be discussed mainly to distinguish its role in leading to action from the role played by intentions.","PeriodicalId":430740,"journal":{"name":"The Roots of Normativity","volume":"37 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124968498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Guise of the Bad","authors":"J. Raz","doi":"10.26556/JESP.V10I3.102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26556/JESP.V10I3.102","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter considers the possibility of acting in the belief that the action is bad and for the reason that it is, as the agent believes, bad. Besides, can agents, without having any relevant false beliefs, perform actions motivated by their badness? The worry is the compatibility of action for the sake of the bad with the thesis of the Guise of the Good (intended actions are undertaken because agents see them as good in some respects). How can reason explanations and the more widely understood normative explanations explain actions, in light of the conditions for the rationality of actions and the bearing of masking beliefs on the explanation of their actions? Various conceptual mistakes are possible. Given the variety of human motivations, the chapter focuses on the interpretation of one case: the Luciferian motive, understood, roughly, as the drive to defy the limits of thought or of rational thought.","PeriodicalId":430740,"journal":{"name":"The Roots of Normativity","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124927482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Value and the Weight of Practical Reasons","authors":"J. Raz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2520425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2520425","url":null,"abstract":"Assuming that the value of options constitutes the proximate reason for pursuing them, some considerations encourage doubts whether we have reason to promote or to maximize value. A proper argument would require establishing a negative. Raising doubts is less demanding: it consists in explaining some aspects of the relation between values and reasons that enable us to dispense with the doubtful thesis, by illustrating alternative relations between values and reasons. Theses such as that value should be promoted show how to determine the strength of reasons. Abandoning the thesis reopens the question of how to do this. The doubt about promotion of value is not merely terminological. Even though the value of things and of activities is a reason to engage with them there are cases in which there is not always a reason to choose the best. The conclusion touches on the limits of the argument, and its importance.","PeriodicalId":430740,"journal":{"name":"The Roots of Normativity","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128184405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Attachments and Associated Reasons","authors":"Joseph Raz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1956026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1956026","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter unfolds in five sections dealing with five questions: first, does the partiality of attachments present an obstacle to their being or giving practical reasons? Second, given a value-based approach to practical reasons, can universal values generate reasons that are specific to their subjects, reasons—say—towards my friends that only I have? Third, do attachments affect what we do independently of any reasons that they provide? Fourth, in what ways do attachments constitute or provide normative reasons, and briefly, how do attachment-related reasons relate to other practical reasons? Finally, the chapter turns to the question of the nature of and justification for partiality to oneself.","PeriodicalId":430740,"journal":{"name":"The Roots of Normativity","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134225508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Role of Well-Being","authors":"J. Raz","doi":"10.1111/J.1520-8583.2004.00029.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1520-8583.2004.00029.X","url":null,"abstract":"‘Well-being’ signifies the good life, the life which is good for the person whose life it is. I defend and slightly modify my view of well-being, as a wholehearted and successful pursuit of valuable relationships and goals, The chapter considers the role of well-being in practical thought: in particular, a suggestion that when we care about people, and when we ought to care about people, what we do, or ought to, care about is their well-being, regardless of who cares and who is cared for. People may care, perhaps ought to care, about themselves, and about people with whom they have, or ought to have special bonds, and about other people generally. The chapter argues that the suggestion is misleading: the role of well-being in both personal and ethical life is much more nuanced and more modest.","PeriodicalId":430740,"journal":{"name":"The Roots of Normativity","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128545505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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