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Factualism and Anti-Descriptivism: A Challenge to the Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality 事实主义与反描述主义:对唯物主义基本准则的挑战
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2022-02-28 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29105
Víctor Fernández Castro
{"title":"Factualism and Anti-Descriptivism: A Challenge to the Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality","authors":"Víctor Fernández Castro","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29105","url":null,"abstract":": Inspired by the work of Sellars, Cumpa (2014, 2018) and Buonomo (2021) have argued that we can evaluate our metaphysical pro-posals on fundamental categories in terms of their capacity for reconciling the scientific and the manifest image of the world. This criterion of fundamentality would allow us to settle the question of which categories among those proposed in the debate—e.g., substance, structure or facts—have a better explanatory value. The aim of this essay is to argue against a central assumption of the criterion: semantic descriptivism. Specifically, I aim at showing that the criterion rests on the idea that the manifest picture is mostly a description of the world, and thus, it commits us with certain realism. Instead, I argue that at least some of the vocabulary we use to construct our manifest picture of the world, mental vocabulary, is evaluative rather than descriptive and thus creates problems in reconcile the manifest picture with scientific psychology and neurosciences. I conclude with some remarks on alternatives that could provide a way out of the fundamentality criterion.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44466738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partial Compatibilism: Free Will in the Light of Moral Experience 部分相容主义：道德经验视野中的自由意志
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2022-02-28 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29101
David Peroutka
{"title":"Partial Compatibilism: Free Will in the Light of Moral Experience","authors":"David Peroutka","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29101","url":null,"abstract":"Partial compatibilism says that there are basically two kinds of freedom of the will: some free volitions cannot be determined, while others can. My methodological choice is to examine what assumptions will appear necessary if we want to take seriously—and make understandable—our ordinary moral life. Sometimes, typically when we feel guilty about a choice of ours, we are sure enough that we, at the considered moment, actually could have taken a different option. At other times, however, typically when we are aware of some unquestionable moral reasons for a certain choice, we may perceive our choice as voluntary and free in spite of the fact that it is, in the given situation, unthinkable for us to choose otherwise than we actually do (there are situations when responsible agents, because of their strong moral reasons/motives, cannot choose differently). The assumption that experiences of the first kind are not always mistaken excludes our world being deterministic. Yet free will and determinism go together in some of those possible worlds which contain only the second kind of free volitions. Partial compatibilism represents a ‘third way’ between standard compatibilism and incompatibilism, a way to solve that old dilemma. Partial Compatibilism: Free Will in the Light of Moral Experience 3 Organon F 29 (1) 2022: 2–25","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42265429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is There an Alternative to Moderate Scientism? 除了温和的科学主义，还有别的选择吗?
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2022-02-28 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29106
Szymon Makuła
{"title":"Is There an Alternative to Moderate Scientism?","authors":"Szymon Makuła","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29106","url":null,"abstract":"This paper’s primary purpose is to show that there is a peculiar alternative to scientism whose central thesis is not about sources of knowledge or the existence of various objects, but it aims at setting out a strategy to help decide which of the two mutually exclusive beliefs is the better one to adopt. Scientophilia, to coin a term, recommends preferring, without any discussion, a position consistent with the consensus of credible and reliable experts in a given domain. In case there is no such agreement, mainly because peers disagree with each other, or experts are difficult to identify, it is recommended for a scientophile to suspend judgment. Scientophilia is not a position on science or human knowledge boundaries, but it deals with the practical side of belief change. Verdicts made by this approach are partially similar to those offered by mild scientism, as scientophilia puts scientific knowledge as one of the most reliable sources. However, it is also consistent with mild antiscientism, as in some particular cases (for example, Moorean truths), it assigns reliable expertise to non-scientific experts. Therefore it is a third way.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43557454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robert Kirk’s Attempted Intellectual Filicide: Are Phenomenal Zombies Hurt? 罗伯特·柯克的智力谋杀:非凡的僵尸受伤了吗?
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2022-02-28 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29104
D. Sepetyi
{"title":"Robert Kirk’s Attempted Intellectual Filicide: Are Phenomenal Zombies Hurt?","authors":"D. Sepetyi","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29104","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper, I discuss Robert Kirk’s attempt to refute the zombie argument against materialism by demonstrating, “in a way that is intuitively appealing as well as cogent”, that the idea of phenomenal zombies involves incoherence. Kirk’s argues that if one admits that a world of zombies z is conceivable, one should also admit the conceivability of a certain transformation from such a world to a world z* that satisfies a description D, and it is arguable that D is incoherent. From which, Kirk suggests, it follows that the idea of zombies is incoherent. I argue that Kirk’s argument has several minor deficiencies and two major flaws. First, he takes for granted that cognitive mental states are physical (cognitive physicalism), although a zombist is free to—and would better—reject this view. Second, he confuses elements of different scenarios of transformation, none of which results in the incoherent description D.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42965982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action 你到底为什么要这么做?人类的推理和行动的理由
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2021-11-29 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28405
J. Gascón
{"title":"Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action","authors":"J. Gascón","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28405","url":null,"abstract":"During the last decades several studies in cognitive psychology have shown that many of our actions do not depend on the reasons that we adduce afterwards, when we have to account for them. Our decisions seem to be often influenced by normatively or explanatorily irrelevant features of the environment of which we are not aware, and the reasons we offer for those decisions are a posteriori rationalisations. But exactly what reasons has the psychological research uncovered? In philosophy, a distinction has been commonly made between normative and motivating reasons: normative reasons make an action right, whereas motivating reasons explain our behaviour. Recently, Maria Alvarez has argued that, apart from normative (or justifying) reasons, we should further distinguish between motivating and explanatory reasons. We have, then, three kinds of reasons, and it is not clear which of them have been revealed as the real reasons for our actions by the psychological research. The answer we give to this question will have important implications both for the validity of our classifications of reasons and for our understanding of human action.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48605788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition 如何不争论预测加工和4E认知的兼容性
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2021-11-29 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28402
Yavuz Recep Başoğlu
{"title":"How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition","authors":"Yavuz Recep Başoğlu","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28402","url":null,"abstract":"In theories of cognition, 4E approaches to cognition are seen to refrain from employing robust representations in contrast to Predictive Process, where such posits are utilized extensively. Despite this notable dissimilarity with regard to posits they employ in explaining certain cognitive phenomena, it has been repeatedly argued that they are in fact compatible. As one may expect, these arguments mostly end up contending either that Predictive Process is actually nonrepresentational or that 4E approaches are representational. In this paper, I will argue that such arguments are inadequate for the indicated purpose for several reasons: the variety of representational posits in Predictive Process, the diverse attitudes of practitioners of 4E approaches toward representations and the unconstrained use of the term “representation” in cognitive science. Hence, here I will try to demonstrate that any single argument, if it depends on representational 4E approaches or nonrepresentational Predictive Process, falls short of encompassing this heterogeneity in pertinent debates. Then, I will analyze similar arguments provided by Jacob Hohwy and Michael Kirchhoff to illustrate how destructive this seemingly ordinary criticism is. 778 Yavuz Recep Başoğlu Organon F 28 (4) 2021: 777–801","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44486082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Degrees of Understanding and the Inferential Component of Understanding 理解的程度与理解的推理成分
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2021-11-29 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28401
S. Petkov
{"title":"The Degrees of Understanding and the Inferential Component of Understanding","authors":"S. Petkov","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28401","url":null,"abstract":"Current debates on the nature of explanatory understanding have converged on the idea that at least one of the core components of understanding is inferential. Philosophers have characterized the inferential dimension of understanding as consisting of several related cognitive abilities to grasp a given explanation and the nexus of complementing explanations to which it belongs. Whilst analyses of both the subjective epistemic abilities related to grasping and objective features of the inferential links within explanations have received much attention, both within theories of explanation and in the literature on understanding, the criteria for evaluating the specific structure and organization of explanatory clusters or nexuses has received much less attention. Nevertheless, two notable exceptions stand out—Khalifa’s characterization of an explanatory nexus, and theories of explanatory unification. I take Khalifa’s ideas, together with the basic criteria of successful explanatory unification, as my starting point. To both I make some corrections and additions, in order to arrive at a more robust notion of an explanatory nexus and ultimately show that its structural properties and the inter-explanatory relations it contains are relevant to the resulting understanding. The Degrees of Understanding and the Inferential Component of Understanding 747 Organon F 28 (4) 2021: 746–776 I propose to represent such nexuses as directed graph trees and show that some of their properties can be related to the degree of understanding that such nested explanatory structures can offer. I will further illustrate these ideas by a case study on an ecological theory of predation.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46608965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemic Foundations of Salience-Based Coordination 基于显著性的协调的认识论基础
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2021-11-29 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28404
Vojtěch Zachník
{"title":"Epistemic Foundations of Salience-Based Coordination","authors":"Vojtěch Zachník","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28404","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to assess current theoretical findings on the origin of coordination by salience and suggests a way to clarify the existing framework. The main concern is to reveal how different coordination mechanisms rely on specific epistemic aspects of reasoning. The paper highlights the fact that basic epistemic assumptions of theories diverge in a way that makes them essentially distinctive. Consequently, recommendations and predictions of the traditional views of coordination by salience are, in principle, based on the processes related to the agent’s presumptions regarding the cognitive abilities of a co-player. This finding implies that we should consider these theories as complementary, and not competitive, explanations of the same phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48891926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Novel Reading of Thomas Nagel’s “Challenge” to Physicalism 托马斯·纳格尔对身体主义“挑战”的小说解读
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2021-11-29 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28403
Serdal Tümkaya
{"title":"A Novel Reading of Thomas Nagel’s “Challenge” to Physicalism","authors":"Serdal Tümkaya","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28403","url":null,"abstract":"In passing remarks, some commentators have noted that for Nagel, physicalism is true. It has even been argued that Nagel seeks to find the best path to follow to achieve future physicalism. I advance these observations by adding that for Nagel, we should discuss the consciousness problem not in terms of physical and mental issues but in terms of our desire to include consciousness in an objective/scientific account, and we can achieve this only by revising our self-conception, i.e., folk psychology, to develop a more detached view of experience. Through the project of objective phenomenology, Nagel aims to achieve some sort of objective, detached, and scientific explanation of the subjective nature of experience. This project seeks to make the truth of physicalism intelligible and consciousness more amenable to scientific study, potentially raising an even broader concept than the one physicalism originally proposes.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41400736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Dilemma about the Mental 心理困境
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
Organon F Pub Date : 2021-11-29 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28406
Andreas Elpidorou, Guy Dove
{"title":"A Dilemma about the Mental","authors":"Andreas Elpidorou, Guy Dove","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28406","url":null,"abstract":"Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing one—viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a scientifically derived physical theory—is met with serious trouble. Proponents of physicalism can either appeal to current physical theory or to some future physical theory (preferably an ideal and complete one). Neither option is promising: currentism almost assuredly renders physicalism false and futurism appears to render it indeterminate or trivial. The purpose of this essay is to argue that attempts to characterize the mental encounter a similar dilemma: currentism with respect to the mental is likely to be inadequate or contain falsehoods and futurism leaves too many significant questions about the nature of mentality unanswered. This new dilemma, we show, threatens both sides of the current debate surrounding the metaphysical","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45385155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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