International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security最新文献

{"title":"An Ontology of Cyberspace as a Basis for Decision-making in Cyberoperations","authors":"Alexander Grandin","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.2023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.2023","url":null,"abstract":"In the cyberoperations community there is a commonly accepted starting point for describing cyberspace as comprising of multiple planes through which information flows. However, the model is not a tool that facilitates planning and executing cyberoperations. Tools do exist in the form of technical cybersecurity ontologies. At the moment the link between technical ontologies, that are the tools of experts, and the operational planning process is limited. These technical ontologies provide automated information that would support operational planning. At the moment cybersecurity experts translate the information that military professionals need, which may cause insufficiencies or distortions in communication or cause inconsistencies in the planning process.  This paper presents the ongoing work of developing a model of cyberspace in the form of a core ontology. The ontology describes the flow of digital information between persons and the enabling technology as well as geographical data. It is intended as a tool that supports operational planning and decision-making in and through cyberspace, by enabling automation and reasoning. The model is created using the well-established Constructive Research Approach (CRA) methodology, and is developed on earlier research. CRA consists of six phases in which (1) the problem is defined, (2) an understanding of the topic is generated, (3) a solution (model) is constructed which then is (4) demonstrated. Then the models (5) theoretical connections are presented and the (6) scope of applicability is assessed. The challenges of developing an ontology of cyberspace as part of the third phase of the methodology are in focus. The ontology serves as an operational core ontology, aiming to link cybersecurity domain ontologies to the DOLCE+DnS Ultralite (DUL) foundational ontology. The ontology is based on research in Cyberspace Geography and Cyber Terrain. No earlier attempts at creating a core ontology of cyberspace grounded in a foundational ontology, based on these concepts, were found. Overall, the use of reference ontologies in cyberspace research is scarce and few are grounded in a foundational ontology. The starting point for the ontology is a model of cyberspace comprising of six layers, which are the 1) geographic layer, 2) physical network layer, 3) logical network layer, 4) socio-organizational layer, 5) virtual persona layer and finally the 6) persona layer. The model was complemented with levels describing action and information and partially excluded the outer levels 1 and 6, which were directly linked to the DUL foundational ontology.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":"127 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140223722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On The Zero-Trust Intranet Certification Problem","authors":"Danielle Botha-Badenhorst, André Martin McDonald, Graham David Barbour, Ethan Buckinjohn, Wian Gertenbach","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.2054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.2054","url":null,"abstract":"Securing corporate networks and ensuring the trustworthiness of network resources are critical security concerns for organisations in today's interconnected digital landscape. The zero-trust security model is an approach to designing and implementing ICT systems which prescribes that clients and servers cannot be trusted automatically, even when connected to networks traditionally considered trusted. The implementation of the zero-trust model within the corporate intranet requires a secure method to verify the identity of local servers. On the Internet, trust in the identity of public servers is established by well-known public Certificate Authorities (CAs), which issue digital certificates to securely identify servers. However, local intranet servers exist within the internal address space of the network. Consequently, it is impossible to naturally obtain digital certificates for these servers, validly signed by a public CA, without publicly disclosing sensitive information such as intranet server Domain Name System (DNS) records. This leaves organisations with the option of relying on endpoint management systems to install custom CA root certificates on all corporate browsers or, in some cases, ignoring the problem altogether.\u0000In this paper, we draw on practical experience in the deployment of cybersecurity devices in corporate intranets to formally define the intranet certification problem. We specify five requirements that a solution to this problem must satisfy. We then conduct a comprehensive review of existing candidate solutions and academic research relevant to the intranet certification problem. Specifically, existing ICT systems for public key infrastructure and endpoint management are identified and evaluated with respect to their ability to meet the stated requirements for solving the intranet certification problem, as well as their cost. Our study reveals that solutions that meet the technical and security requirements of the intranet certification problem are beyond the reach of smaller private sector companies and public sector organisations in underdeveloped and emerging economies. The high cost and technical expertise required for their implementation and management render these solutions impractical. Consequently, by relying on servers with self-signed certificates, these entities inadvertently leave their servers susceptible to impersonation, information theft, and unauthorised resource access, thus violating the fundamental principles of the zero-trust model. We conclude that a gap exists for a simple, cost-effective, and easily managed solution to the intranet certification problem.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":" 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140221390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Covert Subversive Agents and Consensus Disruption on Large Projects","authors":"J. Vorster, Louise Leenen","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.2174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.2174","url":null,"abstract":"Is it possible to dramatically affect and influence military and other projects through social engineering of the consensus processes? In this paper we explore the impact that subversive agents can have on the ability of projects to move forward by disrupting the social cohesion and decision-making abilities of the processes designed to reach consensus. A consensus simulator is used to model group social cohesion behaviour in the context of project deliverables and show what the effect can be on the effort to reach consensus (number of meetings) as well as the time to reach consensus (calendar time) when subversive agents attempt to influence the groups making up the project team in such a way that it delays the ability of the team to reach consensus on key decisions. Many military options are available to delay enemy projects, including the assassination of enemy scientists, sanctions aimed at denying key project components, or even direct military action such as bombing the enemy facilities. However, this paper focusses on aspects of soft-force projection through covert disruption of project timelines. A social simulator was constructed that models individual agent’s beliefs about various key topics within the context of a project. The effect that a small number of subversive agents can have on the time- and effort of a project is shown. In their covert actions, these subversive agents need to stay hidden, and thus their covert actions are limited, yet they can exert significant damage to the project in terms of delays. In this paper we present results showing the effects that such a small group can have, as well as pointing out that there seem to be a critical group size over which the subversive agents can not only have significant impact on project-delays but can also steer and direct certain key decisions.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":" 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140222217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Proposed High-Level Methodology on How OSINT is applied in Blockchain Investigations","authors":"Wian Gertenbach, Johnny Botha, Louise Leenen","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.2172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.2172","url":null,"abstract":"The characteristics of blockchain established a desirable platform for entities to innovate and operate in a secure, transparent, and decentralised manner. However, cybercriminals have increasingly found refuge in the decentralised environment of blockchain technology. Cryptocurrencies are increasingly misused in malicious activities that encompass the trade of illicit goods, money laundering, various types of scams and ransomware attacks. The total cryptocurrency value received by illicit addresses reached an all-time high of $20.6 billion in 2022 according to Chainalysis. The inherent privacy and anonymity features of many blockchain networks make it challenging for law enforcement and regulatory agencies to track and apprehend wrongdoers. Consequently, a pressing need arises not only to initiate investigations on the blockchain to identify unlawful activities, but also to discover connections between these activities and the identities of the responsible individuals. Due to blockchain data being publicly available, the application of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) techniques is proposed to facilitate these types of investigations. In the context of blockchain, OSINT, together with investigation tools hold the promise of unearthing valuable information that could aid in attributing malicious activities to the individuals responsible for those actions. By analysing and synthesizing data from publicly accessible sources, such as data from blockchain explorers and link analysis tools such Chainalysis, Maltego or Spiderfoot, investigators could potentially unveil valuable clues that assist in building a comprehensive picture of blockchain-related criminal activities. Ultimately, with sufficient information and actionable intelligence collected, the main goal is to link it to Know Your Customer (KYC) data, that could be obtained from cryptocurrency exchanges via a subpoena from law enforcement agencies. This paper delves into the mechanisms of various OSINT tools and techniques, to determine their adaptability to the specific demands of blockchain investigations. This study provides a methodology and recommendations with insights into how these tools can be wielded to bridge the gap between blockchain's pseudonymity and real-world identities.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":" 47","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140222331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Deepfakes: The Legal Implications","authors":"Trishana Ramluckan","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.2099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.2099","url":null,"abstract":"The development of deepfakes began in 2017, when a software developer on the Reddit online platform began posting his creations in which he swapped the faces of Hollywood celebrities onto the faces of adult film artists, while in 2018, the comedic actor Jordan Peele posted a deepfake video of former U.S. President Obama insulting former U.S. President Trump and warning of the dangers of deepfake media. With the viral use of deepfakes by 2019, the U.S. House Intelligence Committee began hearings on the potential threats to U.S. security posed by deepfakes. Unfortunately, deepfakes have become even more sophisticated and difficult to detect. With easy accessibility to the applications of deepfakes, its usage has increased drastically over the last five years. Deepfakes are now designed to harass, intimidate, degrade, and threaten people and often leads to the creation and dissemination of misinformation as well as creating confusion about important state and non-state issues. A deepfake may also breach IP rights e.g., by unlawfully exploiting a specific line, trademark or label. Furthermore, deepfakes may cause more severe problems such as violation of the human rights, right of privacy, personal data protection rights apart from the copyright infringements. While just a few governments have approved AI regulations, the majority have not due to concerns around the freedom of speech. And while most online platforms such as YouTube have implemented a number of legal mechanisms to control the content posted on their platforms, it remains a time consuming and costly affair. A major challenge is that deep fakes often remain indetectable by the unaided human eye, which lead to the development by governments and private platform to develop deep-fake detecting technologies and regulations around their usage. This paper seeks to discuss the legal and ethical implications and responsibilities of the use of  deepfake technologies as well as to highlight the various social and legal challenges which both regulators and the society face while considering the potential role of online content dissemination platforms and governments in addressing deep fakes.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":" 29","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140221114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cross-disciplinary AI supply chain risk assessment","authors":"Gareth Davies, Angela Mison, Richard Ward","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.2179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.2179","url":null,"abstract":"While AI remains chip based and part of both commercial and national strategic superiority goals, it is useful to examine the security and risks associated with achieving those goals.  The future strategy rests perilously on an unstable inverted triangle of financial and economic reality. This paper presents the AI chip supply chain as an inverted triangle which base/apex is dependent on a global single supplier with the capability of producing equipment essential for their manufacture.  It highlights the dependence on a single company for the fabrication of those chips, and the security risks associated with that supplier being Taiwanese in limited foreign ownership.  It is suggested that the increasing tensions between China and the USA have resulted, in part, from this dependence, which was demonstrated by the supply chain crisis resulting from Covid-19.  The attempt to reduce this dependence led to the CHIPS and Science Act 2022, signed into law by President Biden.  In part of the inverted triangle are found Big Tech and the major Cloud Service Providers.  They vary between 60% - 80% of their market capital being in financial institutional ownership, most of which is held by a very limited number of institutions, not all of whom are publicly quoted.  To doubt the influence wielded by those financial institutions, just a single institution with major Big Tech and Cloud holdings has, at 31 December 2022, USD 8.59 trillion of assets under management.  This represents economic power and places it between the equivalent Gross Domestic Product of China (USD 19.37 trillion) and Japan (USD 4.41 trillion) the second and third entries behind the USA in the GDP rankings.  Financial institutions are market driven to achieve growth, contribute to economic stability, and are to an extent regulated by unelected vested interests and organisations. The battlefield for national supremacy of AI may concern chips, until the arrival of quantum AI.   Current Chinese economic woes are providing the momentum for pre-emptive strikes at the semiconductor industry, and an inverted triangle is neither a secure nor stable structure for a supply chain.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":" 59","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140221143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection through Cybersecurity: A National Government Perspective","authors":"Thulisile Dephney Mkhwanazi, Lynn Futcher","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.1987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.1987","url":null,"abstract":"The South African national government is forging ahead with digitalisation plans to enhance socioeconomic growth in the country. However, digitalisation is accompanied by detrimental cybersecurity risks that may potentially exacerbate the vulnerability of the National Critical Information Infrastructure (NCII) of South Africa to cyber-attacks. Therefore, the envisaged digitalisation benefits in South Africa may be offset by the increased cybersecurity risk on the NCII of the country. Through a theoretical literature review, this study aims to investigate digitalisation and identify the cybersecurity risks it poses to the National Critical Information Infrastructure of South Africa, from a national government policy perspective. A gap has been identified in Information and Communications Technology for Development (ICT4D) research studies that researchers tend to focus on the implementation of ICTs while neglecting the policy aspect that is meant to direct and control the implementation of ICTs. Therefore, this study bridges this gap by approaching digitalisation and cybersecurity from a national government policy perspective. The output of this study is a National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (through Cybersecurity) Conceptual Framework (NCIIP-CF) that is applicable to all spheres of government (local, provincial or national) as policy makers. The NCIIP-CF demonstrates an approach that embeds cybersecurity in the digitalisation process for the national government of South Africa, thus enabling an NCII that is resilient to cybersecurity risks.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":" 59","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140221747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploring South Africa’s Cybersecurity Legal Framework regulating Information Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability","authors":"M. Watney","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.1999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.1999","url":null,"abstract":"The discussion critically evaluates the effectiveness of laws dealing with cyber threats within the context of the South African cybersecurity landscape. It deals with the legal response to non-state cyber operations to national security and law enforcement by means of the domestic law and not with state or state-sponsored cyber operations which falls within the remit of the international law. Globally the digital ecosystems of all countries face a common denominator, namely the threat of cyber operations and how to deal with it effectively. There are various cyber operations, but the discussion mainly deals with cyber operations that target the confidentiality, availability and integrity of information and the effectiveness of the South African cybersecurity legislation in protecting information. The effectiveness of the following legislation will be deliberated: • The Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) 4 of 2013. POPIA does not define a data breach, nor does it indicate the time in which the breach must be reported to the Information Regulator (IR). In 2021 the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (Department) suffered a ransomware attack. The breach was reported to the IR. In July 2023 the Department became the first institution to be fined for failure to comply with an enforcement notice. • The Cybercrimes Act 119 of 2021. The ransomware attack suffered by the Department in 2021 constitutes a cybercrime, but how effective is the Cybercrimes Act to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of the threat actor(s) who orchestrated the attack? Should there not be guidelines in respect of a ransomware attack prescribing a compulsory reporting obligation or discouraging payment of ransom. The first line of defense to offensive non-state cyber operations is a robust and resilient cybersecurity legal framework. Although a government cannot eliminate all possible threats, it can mitigate the risks, and this can be achieved by means of a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy. A country should have a cybersecurity strategy and it will be determined if for example the 2023 United States of America cybersecurity strategy could serve as guidance to South Africa. Why is your paper of interest to the conference participants? Use this space to persuade the reviewers why they should select this abstract for the conference : In today’s digital world, one cannot ignore the importance of cybersecurity. One single security breach may result in the exposure of the personal information of millions of people. Cybersecurity legislation is therefore essential to ensure the protection of government departments, institutions, businesses and individuals against malicious cyber operations.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":"89 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140223196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Defining the \"Cyber-Pearl Harbor\" - Validation of the DSLP-framework in \"Offensive Cyberspace Operations Targeting Ukraine: A Cyber Pearl-Harbor\"","authors":"Jonathan Lilja, Eleshwa Eishayea, Gazmend Huskaj","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.2035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.2035","url":null,"abstract":"The use of cyberattacks against organizations, health care and individuals have increased along with the constant digitalisation. Nations have also fallen victim to cyberattacks, often combined with other means of war. A Cyber-Pearl Harbor (further shortened as CPH) is a term mentioned by the former United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Leon Panetta, who described it as “combined attacks that result in human death and physical destruction and that paralyzes an entire nation”. Gazmend Huskaj used Panetta's definition in order to create a framework (herein the “DSLP-framework”) for classifying an event as a CPH. This study strives to see if the DSLP-framework can be validated since the term has been widely used for the last 25 years. However, a universal definition of the term seems to be missing, therefore it is not certain that the criteria presented in the framework is accurate. A qualitative case study was conducted through a literature review regarding the term CPH and semi structured interviews with three experts were done, which were later analysed through a thematic analysis. The framework was applied to three real life cases: a public health sector in Costa Rica, a TV-tower in Kyiv, Ukraine and the grocery company Coop in Sweden. The result from applying the DSLP-framework to each case was that only the case of TV-tower in Kiev, Ukraine, could be classified as a CPH. The following conclusions were drawn in this study: 1) The framework could not be validated due to lack of data, and 2) The interviewees views differed from the framework making it hard to find common ground.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":"91 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140223417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An AI Model for Digital Forensic Readiness in the Cloud using Secure Access Service Edge","authors":"T. Hungwe, Hein Venter","doi":"10.34190/iccws.19.1.2132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.19.1.2132","url":null,"abstract":"Computing infrastructure has evolved and has brought about changes to the ways that work and business are carried out. Cloud computing has redefined these workspaces by providing connectivity and tools to enable productivity, collaboration, and flexibility.   As work moves outside the centralised office and goes remote, users are accessing the cloud directly, leaving the protection of the corporate network and leaving the users’ computing platforms open to threats. In the pre-cloud era, the data centre for organisations was the single location where digital assets would be housed and non-complicated security parameters implemented. The firewall would be the main security perimeter implemented to secure the network in this pre-cloud era. The advent of cloud computing has brought potential areas and gaps in securing the organisational data, information and communication connectivity to the cloud-based resources. As such, there is need to rethink and redesign the models which can be implemented to secure the cloud computing services. The cloud should be in a state of digital forensics readiness in order to facilitate digital forensics investigation. The study focuses on the development of an artificial intelligence model for digital forensic readiness for the cloud using secure access service edge. This integrated approach might assist in the provisioning of cloud security.","PeriodicalId":429427,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security","volume":" 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140221912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}