HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science最新文献_第3页

Relativity Theory as a Theory of Principles: A Reading of Cassirer’s Zur Einstein’schen Relativitätstheorie 作为原理理论的相对论:解读卡西尔的《爱因斯坦的理论》Relativitätstheorie

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HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.1086/726076

Marco Giovanelli

{"title":"Relativity Theory as a Theory of Principles: A Reading of Cassirer’s Zur Einstein’schen Relativitätstheorie","authors":"Marco Giovanelli","doi":"10.1086/726076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726076","url":null,"abstract":"In his Zur Einstein’schen Relativitätstheorie, Ernst Cassirer presents relativity theory as the last manifestation of the tradition of the “physics of principles” that, starting from the nineteenth century, has progressively prevailed over that of the “physics of models.” In particular, according to Cassirer, the relativity principle plays a role similar to the energy principle in previous physics. In this article, I argue that this comparison represents the core of Cassirer’s neo-Kantian interpretation of relativity. Cassirer pointed out that before and after Kant, the history of physics presents significant instances in which the search for formal conditions that the laws of nature must satisfy preceded and made possible the direct search for such laws. In his earlier years, Cassirer seems to have regarded principles like the energy principle, the relativity principle, and the principle of least action as a constitutive but provisional form of a priori, imposing specific limitations on the form of the allowable laws of nature. Only in his later years, by attributing an autonomous status to these statements of principle, did Cassirer attribute a definitive but merely regulative meaning to the a priori. This does not impose specific requirements on natural laws but only a motivation to search for them.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"261 - 296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75692557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Cogito, Ergo Sumus? The Pregnancy Problem in Descartes’s Philosophy 我思，Ergo Sumus?笛卡尔哲学中的怀孕问题

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HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-04-24 DOI: 10.1086/725593

Maja Sidzinska

{"title":"Cogito, Ergo Sumus? The Pregnancy Problem in Descartes’s Philosophy","authors":"Maja Sidzinska","doi":"10.1086/725593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725593","url":null,"abstract":"Given Descartes’s metaphysical and natural-philosophic commitments, it is difficult to theorize the pregnant human being as a human being under his system. Specifically, given (1) Descartes’s account of generation; (2) his commitment to mechanistic explanations where bodies are concerned; (3) his reliance on a subtle individuating principle for human (and animal) bodies; and (4) his metaphysics of human beings, which include minds, bodies, and mind-body unions, there is no available human substance or entity that may clearly be the subject of pregnancy. The incompatibility of any of the three options found in commitment 4 with commitment 1, 2, or 3, together with other undesirable consequences should any be selected, results in what I call the pregnancy problem. The pregnancy problem is a previously unconsidered problem for the Cartesian philosophy. Given the pregnancy problem, commitment 1, 2, 3, or 4, or a combination of these would have to be revised for Descartes’s system to avoid a variety of tensions; alternatively, counterintuitive consequences may have to be accepted. Ironically, given Descartes’s interest in generation and medicine more generally, the Cartesian framework struggles to accommodate pregnancy in human beings. This may have implications for the systematicity and sex neutrality of dualist metaphysics in general.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"37 1","pages":"209 - 240"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77741959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Front Matter 前页

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1086/725535

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:The Science of Proof: Forensic Medicine in Modern France 《证据科学:现代法国的法医学》

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HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1086/724052

Brandon Long

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:Dem wissenschaftlichen Determinismus auf der Spur: Von der klassischen Mechanik zur Entstehung der Quantenphysik 科学的决定论一路从古典力学到量子物理的起源

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HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1086/724051

Massimo Ferrari

引用次数: 2

We Have Never Been “New Experimentalists”: On the Rise and Fall of the Turn to Experimentation in the 1980s 我们从来都不是“新实验主义者”:20世纪80年代转向实验的兴衰

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HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1086/724045

J. Potters, M. Simons

{"title":"We Have Never Been “New Experimentalists”: On the Rise and Fall of the Turn to Experimentation in the 1980s","authors":"J. Potters, M. Simons","doi":"10.1086/724045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724045","url":null,"abstract":"The 1980s, it is often claimed, was the decade when experimentation finally became a philosophical topic. This was the responsibility, the claim continues, of one particular movement within philosophy of science, called “new experimentalism.” The aim of this article is to complicate this historical narrative. We argue that in the 1980s, the study of experimentation was carried out not by one movement with one particular aim but rather in a diverse and open-ended way by people with different aims and backgrounds. We then argue that from the late 1990s onward, this diversity disappeared and made room for disciplinary divisions—questions concerning experimentation became philosophical, others sociological, and so on. The reason for this, we claim, was that science and technology studies, philosophy of technology, and philosophy of science took over aspects of the 1980s study of experimentation. In this way, we argue, these elements became institutionalized, whereas others were forgotten. The importance of this process of institutionalization is illustrated by means of a discussion of other, similar approaches to the philosophy of experimentation that have not been able to ensure continuity because they did not find an institutional home.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"8 1","pages":"91 - 119"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76307745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Philosophical Method of Dioscorides’s De Materia Medica 迪奥斯科里德《本草论》的哲学方法

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HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1086/724061

M. Marren, Kevin Marren

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Poincaré’s Radical Ontology 庞加莱的激进本体论

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HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1086/724050

J. Holder

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John Dewey: Was the Inventor of Instrumentalism Himself an Instrumentalist? 约翰·杜威:工具主义的发明者自己是工具主义者吗?

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HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1086/724043

C. Henne

{"title":"John Dewey: Was the Inventor of Instrumentalism Himself an Instrumentalist?","authors":"C. Henne","doi":"10.1086/724043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724043","url":null,"abstract":"In discussing instrumentalism in philosophy of science, John Dewey is rarely studied but rather mentioned in passing to credit him for coining the label. His instrumentalism is often interpreted as the view that science is an instrument designed to control the environment and satisfy our practical ends or likened to the Duhemian view that scientific objects are useful fictions for organizing observable phenomena. Dewey was careful to qualify the first view and denied holding the second. Furthermore, the observable-unobservable distinction does not play any significant role in Dewey’s instrumentalism. The question then arises: Was the inventor of instrumentalism himself an instrumentalist? I present the key aspects of Dewey’s instrumentalism and contrast his views with the instrumentalism of Mach, Duhem, and Poincaré. Dewey’s epistemological instrumentalism is global and not local; nevertheless, it is fallibilist and optimistic rather than skeptical and pessimistic. Dewey’s ontological instrumentalism concerns the nature of scientific objects, regardless of whether they are observable or unobservable, and is fully compatible with realism about atoms or electrons. Dewey’s practical instrumentalism holds that because science provides understanding of the workings of nature rather than an exhaustive picture of reality, it is the best instrument we have for the enrichment of experience.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"46 1","pages":"120 - 150"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88574754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Popper: Critical Rationalist, Conventionalist, and Virtue Epistemologist 波普尔:批判理性主义者、约定主义者和美德认识论家

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HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1086/724046

Patrick M. Duerr

{"title":"Popper: Critical Rationalist, Conventionalist, and Virtue Epistemologist","authors":"Patrick M. Duerr","doi":"10.1086/724046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724046","url":null,"abstract":"This article revisits Karl Popper’s falsificationist methodology with respect to three tasks. The first is to illuminate and systematize Popper’s methodological views in light of his core epistemological commitments. A second and related objective is to gauge which aspects of falsificationism should be identified as “conventionalist”—a label that Popper himself uses (albeit with qualifications) but that is compromised by and, thus, stands in need of elucidation because of Popper’s idiosyncratic understanding of conventionalism. Third, by elaborating Popper’s virtue-epistemological, dialogical model of rationality, I show how Popper’s conventionalism, fallibilism, and critical rationalism form a coherent system. This system allows Popper to accord science the status of a privileged source of knowledge—without naïve appeal to authority. My systematization of Popper’s views yields an intrinsically and exegetically more satisfactory reading of Popper’s falsificationism than usual presentations. Thanks to its marked flexibility and methodological liberalism, it bypasses many standard objections but still offers sound and relevant methodological advice. With its “virtue-methodological” thrust, Popper sketches an original and promising approach to methodology, the fertility of which deserves further exploration for contemporary debates.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"68 1","pages":"54 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72963643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0