HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science最新文献_第10页

Telling Stories in Science: Feyerabend and Thought Experiments 在科学中讲故事:费耶阿本德和思想实验

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-12-16 DOI: 10.1086/712946

M. Stuart

{"title":"Telling Stories in Science: Feyerabend and Thought Experiments","authors":"M. Stuart","doi":"10.1086/712946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/712946","url":null,"abstract":"The history of the philosophy of thought experiments (TEs) has touched on the work of Kuhn, Popper, Duhem, Mach, Lakatos, and other big names of the twentieth-century. But so far, almost nothing has been written about Paul Feyerabend. His most influential work was Against Method, eight chapters of which concern Galileo, with a significant focus on Galileo’s TEs. The later Feyerabend was interested in what might be called the epistemology of drama, including stories and myths. This article brings these aspects of Feyerabend’s work together in an attempt to present what might have been his considered views on scientific TEs. According to Feyerabend, TEs are a special kind of story that can help to demolish a dominant myth and instigate a new one through the use of propaganda to change our habits, by appealing to our sense of what is interesting, appealing, revealing, comprehensible, coherent, and surprising. I conclude by contrasting Feyerabend’s ideas with two currents in the modern debate on TEs: (1) the claim that the epistemology of TEs is just the epistemology of deductive or inductive arguments and (2) the claim that a complete epistemology of TEs must take into account the fact that TEs are a kind of narrative.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"3 1","pages":"262 - 281"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86662957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Historical Counterfactuals, Transition Periods, and the Constraints on Imagination 历史的反事实、过渡时期和想象力的限制

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-12-16 DOI: 10.1086/712937

Catherine Greene

{"title":"Historical Counterfactuals, Transition Periods, and the Constraints on Imagination","authors":"Catherine Greene","doi":"10.1086/712937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/712937","url":null,"abstract":"The history of how philosophers have dealt with thought experiments in science is the main focus of this special issue. Counterfactual analysis is an interesting feature of thought experiments, because it requires the imagination of alternative states of the world (see also publications by Fearon, Lebow and Stein, Reiss, and Tetlock and Belkin, who suggest the same). In historical analysis, the use of imagination is often the focus of criticisms of such counterfactual analysis. In this article, I consider three strategies for constraining imagination: making limited counterfactual changes, limiting counterfactual changes to decisions of important figures, and using evidence to restrict the scope for imagination. Given the focus of this special issue, I will relate this discussion to Lewis’s and Woodward’s analyses of counterfactuals in the philosophy of science. I show that counterfactual analysis in historical cases has some resemblance to Lewis’s and Woodward’s analyses, but that what Lewis calls “transition periods” cannot be left entirely vague, as Lewis suggests, nor can counterfactual changes be seen simply as interventions, as Woodward suggests. I propose that efforts to limit imagination in historical counterfactuals are ultimately problematic, but that imagination can nevertheless play a useful role in counterfactual analysis.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"27 1","pages":"305 - 323"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80855030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cristina Chimisso. Hélène Metzger, Historian and Historiographer of the Sciences. New York: Routledge, 2019. Pp. 217+index. $160.00 (cloth). ISBN 978-1-138-21039-4. 克里斯蒂娜Chimisso。科学的历史学家和历史学家。纽约:劳特利奇出版社，2019。217 +索引页。160.00美元(布)。ISBN 978-1-138-21039-4。

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-12-16 DOI: 10.1086/713016

Óscar Moro Abadia

引用次数: 0

The Role of Imagination in Ernst Mach’s Philosophy of Science: A Biologico-economical View 想象在恩斯特·马赫科学哲学中的作用:一个生物经济学的视角

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-12-16 DOI: 10.1086/712974

Char Brecevic

引用次数: 2

The Materialism of Roy Wood Sellars 罗伊·伍德·塞拉斯的唯物主义

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-12-16 DOI: 10.1086/712933

B. Gimes

引用次数: 0

Why Did Weyl Think That Emmy Noether Made Algebra the Eldorado of Axiomatics? 为什么Weyl认为Emmy Noether让代数成为公理化的宝库?

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-12-16 DOI: 10.1086/712942

Iulian D. Toader

引用次数: 0

To the Icy Slopes in the Melting Pot: Forging Logical Empiricisms in the Context of American Pragmatisms 到大熔炉里的冰坡:在美国实用主义背景下锻造逻辑经验主义

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-12-16 DOI: 10.1086/712936

A. Tuboly

引用次数: 5

Michael J. Sauter. The Spatial Reformation: Euclid between Man, Cosmos, and God. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019. Pp. 327. $89.95 (cloth). ISBN 978-0-812-25066-4. 迈克尔·j·索特。空间改革:欧几里得在人、宇宙和上帝之间。费城:宾夕法尼亚大学出版社，2019。327页。89.95美元(布)。ISBN 978-0-812-25066-4。

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1086/710187

D. M. Miller

引用次数: 0

Hermann Cohen’s Principle of the Infinitesimal Method: A Defense 赫尔曼·科恩的无限小方法原理:辩护

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1086/710180

Scott Edgar

引用次数: 1

Cassirer and Goldstein on Abstraction and the Autonomy of Biology 卡西尔和戈尔茨坦论生物学的抽象和自主性

IF 0.4

HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1086/710181

M. Chirimuuta

{"title":"Cassirer and Goldstein on Abstraction and the Autonomy of Biology","authors":"M. Chirimuuta","doi":"10.1086/710181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/710181","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the mutual influence between Ernst Cassirer and his cousin, the neurologist Kurt Goldstein. For both Cassirer and Goldstein, views on the nature of human cognition were fundamental to their understanding of scientific knowledge, and these were informed by both philosophical theorizing and empirical research on pathologies of the nervous system. Following Cassirer, and in agreement with the physicalism of the Vienna Circle, Goldstein held that the physical sciences had progressed by arriving at abstract, mathematical representations to take the place of qualitative characterizations of observable reality. In tension with physicalism, Goldstein was not sanguine about the fruitfulness of the abstractive approach in biology. He proposed that biology must adhere to its own sui generis methods of observation and experimentation in order to obtain knowledge of the “natures” of living organisms. I argue that there is a parallel with Cassirer’s assertion of the differences between physical and cultural sciences, underwritten by the deployment of varying symbolic functions. I also propose that the neurological writings of Goldstein are an important backdrop to Cassirer’s positive evaluation of abstract thought, in contrast to the pessimism regarding a worldview dominated by scientific abstractions expressed by philosophers such as Bergson, Whitehead, and Husserl.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"3 1","pages":"471 - 503"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88707414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1