{"title":"Sublating Rationality: The Eucharist as an Existential Trial","authors":"Liran Shia Gordon","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.2021.3212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.2021.3212","url":null,"abstract":"The Eucharist as a pillar of Christian life and faith stands at the center of the Mass. It carries multi-dimensional meanings and functions, each of which addresses different aspects of the Christian life and mindset. The main question that we will attend to is what happens to the rational framework of the believer or non-believer as s/he affirms or denies that the consecrated bread and wine are Christ’s body and blood. Following Edward Schillebeeckx’s phenomenological approach, it will be argued that such a reformulation of the rational framework accords with Heidegger’s reevaluation of the question of Being. The present reading limits itself to the encounter between the mind and the phenomenon and does not proceed to the meaning of the Eucharist as part of the Mass and the crucifixion of Christ. As such this study is not a historical study nor a sociological or anthropological one.","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114834043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The “Falling Elevator” and Resurrection from the Dead","authors":"I. Gasparov","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.2909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.2909","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper I argue that the \"falling elevator\" model once proposed by Dean Zimmerman to improve some drawbacks of Peter van Inwagen's account of how a belief in Christian resurrection could be made compatible with a materialist understanding of human persons is not satisfactory. Christian resurrection requires not only a survival, but also true death of a person, while the falling elevator can merely provide us with an account of how a material person is able miraculously to escape its own death.","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129457900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How To Hang A Door: Picking Hinges for Quasi-Fideism","authors":"Nicholas Smith","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.3059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.3059","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: In the epistemology of the late Wittgenstein, a central place is given to the notion of the hinge: an arational commitment that provides a foundation of some sort for the rest of our beliefs. Quasi-fideism is an approach to the epistemology of religion that argues that religious belief is on an epistemic par with other sorts of belief inasmuch as religious and non-religious beliefs all rely on hinges. I consider in this paper what it takes to find the appropriate hinge for a quasi-fideist approach to the epistemology of religion.","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133783102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Varieties of Theism and Explanations of Moral Realism","authors":"A. Jeffrey","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.2884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.2884","url":null,"abstract":"Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. “Theism” leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God’s existence would make to moral facts. Arguments like the explanans-driven argument for theistic moral realism and the explanationist argument for naturalist moral realism both require extra substantive assumptions about God in order to be valid and compelling. Specifically, the arguments must take a stand on whether God is personal or a-personal, and how this affects God’s relation to the natural world.","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131949839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hasker’s Tri-Personal God vs. New Testament Theology","authors":"Dale Tuggy","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.3670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.3670","url":null,"abstract":"Hasker’s “social” Trinity theory is subject to considerable philosophical problems (Section II). More importantly, the theory clashes with the clear New Testament teaching that the one God just is the Father alone (Section III). Further, in light of five undeniable facts about the New Testament texts, we can know that the authors of the New Testament thought that the only God was just the Father himself, not the Trinity (Section IV). Hasker can neither deny these facts nor defeat the strong evidence they provide that in affirming a triune God in the late 4th century, catholic tradition departed from apostolic teaching about the one God (Section V).","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"39 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125739604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Trinity and the New Testament – a Counter-Challenge to Dale Tuggy","authors":"W. Hasker","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.3671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V13I1.3671","url":null,"abstract":"Dale Tuggy argues that my trinitarian views are in conflict with the theology of the New Testament; the New Testament, rather, is unitarian. I show several flaws in this argument, and point out the New Testament evidence that eventually led to the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity.","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125724696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiction and the Agnostic","authors":"R. Le Poidevin","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V12I3.3415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V12I3.3415","url":null,"abstract":"Consider the agnostic who thinks that reason and evidence are neutral on the question of God’s existence, and as a result neither believes that God exists nor believes that God does not exist. Can such an agnostic live a genuinely religious life – even one in which God is the central animating idea? They might do so by accepting Pascal’s Wager: the expected rewards will always be greater if one bets on God’s existence than if one does not. Or they might accept William James’s argument that religious beliefs are properly activated by our passional nature. But both of these routes involve abandoning the initial agnosticism, and so are open to charges of irrationality. In this paper I explore a third route to the religious life, suggested by Pascal’s discussion, one which uses fiction and make-believe as the central prop. It might seem that this too entails abandoning agnosticism in favour of the view that religion just is fiction. I suggest, however, that there is a phenomenon which I term “serious make-believe” in which one can remain agnostic about whether the object of make-believe is real or a useful fiction. Applied to religion, the result is a religious life that is both genuinely engaged (and not merely experimental) and yet, by remaining agnostic, cannot be accused of irrationality.","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115697393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Metalinguistic Agnosticism, Religious Fictionalism and the Reasonable Believer","authors":"Jacob Hesse","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V12I3.3417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V12I3.3417","url":null,"abstract":"With the position, he labels as “new” or “metalinguistic agnosticism” Robin LePoidevin can avoid some problems with which fictionalists about religious language are confronted. Religious fictionalism is a position according to which all religious claims [1] are considered to be false when taken at face value. But because fictionalists about religious language think that certain religious worldviews have pragmatic benefits, they interpret several claims in such worldviews as true in fiction. This enables them to gain pragmatic benefits because they live as if a certain religious worldview were true. Nonetheless, they don’t believe that the respective worldview represents the non-fictional reality. [2] [1] In the following I understand a “religious claim“ either as the claim that God exists or as a claim that presupposes the existence of God. Since also Le Poidevin focuses on theistic religions I want to keep this focus in my response. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that religious fictionalism is not restricted to theistic religions. I also think that metalinguistic agnosticism and the argumentation in this paper could in principle be extended to non-theistic religions. [2] A defense of religious fictionalism can be found in for example Andrew S. Eshleman, “Can an Atheist Believe in God?”, Religious Studies 41, no. 2 (2005) and Andrew S. Eshleman, “Religious Fictionalism Defended: Reply to Cordry”, Religious Studies 46, no. 1 (2010).","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"4 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131589703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Relationship Between Biological and Intentional Altruism?","authors":"Roberto Di Ceglie","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V12I3.3406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V12I3.3406","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I first show that, from the view that God is the ultimate cause of the human ability to perform ethically laudable acts, does not follow that no continuity between biological and intentional altruism is possible. In line with recent theological research concerning the non-human world, I argue that there is a partial continuity between these two forms of altruism. I also show that, from a naturalistic viewpoint, no continuity at all seems demonstrable between the two forms of altruism at stake. I therefore contribute to strengthen a more general conviction, according to which evolution in itself is more persuasive than its combination with naturalism.","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115283695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Compatibility of Evolutionary Biology and Theism","authors":"J. Lemos","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V12I3.3399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V12I3.3399","url":null,"abstract":"Human beings are the products of many thousands of years of biological evolution, and this process occurs in accordance with the principles of natural selection originally articulated and defended by Charles Darwin and developed and defended further in the modern synthesis of the 20th century. In this paper, I consider how it may be thought that this fact threatens the rationality of belief in the Christian God. These threats are countenanced with respect to issues of design, randomness, suffering, and the objectivity of ethics. I argue that while some versions of Christian belief, such as those grounded in a literalist reading of the Genesis creation story or those committed to the image of God thesis, may be threatened by a Darwinian worldview, there are nonetheless plausible versions of Christian belief that are immune to Darwinian challenges.","PeriodicalId":428491,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134319140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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