{"title":"Transcendental Arguments and the Sources of Value: Constitutivism as Critical Realism","authors":"Linda Lovelli","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I present different ways in which transcendental argumentation has been used in contemporary debates in moral philosophy to justify the normative authority of morality. My aim is to defend strong “retorsive” transcendental argumentation as a way to ground a sort of critical realism in metaethics, comparing transcendental arguments proposed by Karl-Otto Apel, Christine Korsgaard and Alan Gewirth – which are sometimes referred to as “constitutivist” arguments. In particular, I endorse an argumentative strategy that considers the merits of the respective positions while overcoming the limits of each. Such a strategy aims at grounding transcendentally the metaphysical fact of human value, making explicit the ontological implications of transcendental argumentation, and showing that a justification of fundamental values alone can ultimately make it possible to ground basic moral principles.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130106230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kantian vs. Platonic: The Ambiguity of Schopenhauer’s Notion of Ideas Explained via Its Origins","authors":"A. Sattar","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The ‘Platonic Ideas’ in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics are (merely) appearances. On the other hand, as the immediate objecthood of the will, they are the essences of species and the only object of true aesthetic cognition, which leads beyond mere appearance. To explain this apparent incongruence, I offer an analysis of Schopenhauer’s early metaphysics (1809–1814), and its transformation into the metaphysics of will, fleshing out the several and divergent concepts of (Platonic) ‘idea’. Specifically, first, as part of his religious and neo-Platonic early philosophy; second, in the context of his ‘true criticism’ in the spirit of Kantian transcendental philosophy; third, as identical to the thing in itself as part of the metaphysics of will, heavily influenced by Kant’s notion(s) of ideas from CR and CJ. Explaining Schopenhauer’s mature notion of Platonic Ideas genetically as a set of homonymic notions helps us better explain its divergent meanings in WWR.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134334297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Indicative Conditionals and the Expressive Conception of Logic","authors":"Spencer Paulson","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is often thought that the test for whether an indicative conditional is assertible is to first suppose the antecedent and then check to see if the consequent is probable on that supposition. Call this procedure the “Ramsey Test”. Some influential accounts of indicative conditionals (e.g. Adams 1975, Edgington 1995) hold that the Ramsey Test works because indicative conditionals are used to express a high credence in the consequent conditional on the antecedent. In this paper I will argue that a different expressivist account, one inspired by Brandom (1994) can handle a wider range of phenomena. In particular, it does a better job explaining how conditionals function in modus tollens arguments. I will end by discussing how the account proposed here goes beyond Brandom’s own work on logic and hermeneutics. Of particular importance is the role played by a conversational common ground, distinct from the commitments of the interpreter and interpreted (6992 words).","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131681469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards the Highest Good: Endless Progress and Its Totality in Kant’s Moral Argument for the Postulate of Immortality","authors":"Nataliya Palatnik","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Kant’s moral proof of the postulate of immortality in the Critique of Practical Reason is often dismissed as a failed argument that trades on illicit conceptual shifts. I argue that Kant’s argument is more interesting and less problematic than is usually thought. I first examine its role in the second Critique’s Dialectic. I then point out that the standard interpretation, according to which the argument presupposes God’s intuitive grasp of the moral equivalence between the disposition to pursue holiness and its attainment, faces a number of philosophical and textual problems. I offer an alternative reading that avoids these problems. In particular, I stress the importance of Kant’s mathematized conception of the relationship between infinite progress towards an ideal goal and its attainment and argue that appealing to this conception allows Kant to meet a well-known criticism that his proof illegitimately substitutes the endless progress towards holiness for holiness itself.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123775535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Unity of the Highest Good: Kant on Systemic Justice","authors":"Shterna Friedman","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Kant’s concept of the highest good proportionately unites virtue and happiness—the supreme goods of, respectively, the systems of freedom and of nature. A middle path between theological and secular interpretations of Kant’s highest good is possible if we disentangle two distinct roles played by God: a causal role in promoting the real unity of the highest good, i.e., its actualization; and a conceptual role in modeling its conceptual unity. The highest good is theological in the first case, but neutral—neither directly theological nor secular—in the second. Reconstructing how Kant envisioned the conceptual unity of the highest good requires taking seriously his repeated reference to God as the highest original good, and to the best (i.e., moral) world as the highest derived good. If, as Kant thought, a moral God forms a triadic unity comprised of holiness, goodness, and divine justice, perhaps he assumed that the conceptual unity of the derived good is likewise triadic, comprised of virtue, happiness, and a form of justice that is not directly divine but “systemic,” designating the unity of the systems of nature and of freedom. Divine justice, in contrast, constitutes the real unity of the highest good.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132104523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Forgiveness as an Approach to the History of Philosophy","authors":"Y. Gazit","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0041","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the past, Robert Brandom’s philosophy has provided fruitful grounds for the development of an approach to the history of philosophy. In A Spirit of Trust (2019), however, this approach takes a new form; one that corresponds to a shift of focus in Brandom’s philosophy, from his earlier inferentialism to its later developments in the thesis of rational recollection. This article aims to elucidate and explicate this new approach, which Brandom refers to as forgiveness. By looking into the thesis of rational recollection, the article examines the back-looking attitude that Brandom argues for and how it can be applied to past philosophy. To better understand the novelty of this approach as forgiveness, the article considers other names that Brandom ascribes to this process, which interestingly correspond to different genres in the historiography of philosophy. Lastly, the article discusses whether such a forgiving approach leaves room for criticism and mistakes.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131866052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Highest Good and Its Crisis in Kant’s Thought","authors":"Luca Fonnesu","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article has the aim to show that Kant’s “standard” conception of the highest good does not represent his last word about the problem. Kant moves from a conception of the highest good close connected with the metaphysical tradition and with the aim of a new, moral justification of traditional metahysical concepts such as God and immortality of the soul. This view does find many difficulties and oscillations in the Critiques, looking for different formulations of a moral “proof” for the metaphysical concepts, grounded upon the need of justice and of a rational solution to the question of theodicy. The failure of this project is apparent with the essay on theodicy (1791). In the last decade of Kant’s intellectual activity, the expression “highest good” occurs few times and the concept looses its systematic relevance, as shown by the last works up to the Opus postumum.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126484642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Psychophysiological Transcendentalism in Friedrich Albert Lange’s Social and Political Philosophy","authors":"E. Widmer","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent literature, it has been suggested that Lange’s social and political philosophy is separate from his neo-Kantian program. Prima facie, this interpretation makes sense given that Lange argues for an account of social norms that builds on Darwin and Smith rather than on Kant. Still, this paper argues that elements of psychophysiological transcendentalism can be found in Lange’s social and political philosophy. A detailed examination of the second edition of the History of Materialism, Schiller’s Poems, and the second edition of The Worker’s Question reveals that Lange sought to develop a systematic foundation of psychophysiological transcendentalism that is presupposed in his social and political philosophy. This allows for a more detailed understanding of Lange’s practical philosophy and assures him a position in the tradition of neo-Kantian socialism.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115811511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Nature and Status of Concepts in Phenomenology","authors":"Evan Clarke","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay examines the debate that arose immediately following the publication of the first volume of Edmund Husserl's Ideas regarding the model of concept formation that Husserl sketches in that work. After a brief overview of the relevant passages from the Ideas, I take up essay-length responses to Husserl by August Messer, Theodor Elsenhans, and Heinrich Gustav Steinmann. Reflecting a variety of empiricist commitments, all three authors are skeptical that concepts can be expected to embody the essence of a corresponding phenomenon. Subsequently, I review the responses to these critiques offered by Husserl, his then-assistant Edith Stein, and Paul Linke. For Linke, it is at least highly probable that certain concepts derive their content from an apprehension of essence. The empiricist alternative, he argues, is fatally unstable. Husserl and Stein, meanwhile, offer a more forceful defense of this position. Unless we allow that certain kinds of concepts can originate from a grasp of essence, they argue, we will be unable to explain how certain manifest cognitive accomplishments are possible.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123762727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}