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Journal of Transcendental Philosophy最新文献

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Dominique Pradelle: Intuition et idéalités. Phénoménologie des objets mathématiques 多米尼克·普拉黛尔:直觉和理想。数学对象现象学
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0035
J. Fournier
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引用次数: 0
Samantha Matherne: Cassirer 萨曼莎·马瑟恩:卡西尔
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0039
Jacinto Páez Bonifaci
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引用次数: 0
The Transcendental Parameters of “Nature as Universal Organism” in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie 谢林自然哲学中“作为普遍有机体的自然”的先验参数
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0028
Jason Barton
{"title":"The Transcendental Parameters of “Nature as Universal Organism” in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie","authors":"Jason Barton","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The minutiae of F.W.J. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie have been perennially dismissed due to its allegedly infeasible and indefensible assertions about Nature, such as his designation of Nature as “universal organism.” In the realm of post-Kantian German Idealism, such a dismissive attitude toward Schelling’s so-called objective idealism, more often than not, develops itself along the lines of Hegel’s critique of Schelling’s conception of the Absolute (i.e., as static, fixed, undifferentiated, dull, and so on). In turn, I aim to accomplish two tasks in the following investigation. First, I intend to clarify Schelling’s characterization of Nature as universal organism through a practical or teleological, instead of a theoretical or metaphysical, approach. Second, I seek to undermine the Hegelian-influenced criticisms of Schelling’s “Absolute” by demonstrating the ways in which the practico-teleological characterization of Schelling’s formulation of Nature extends into his later philosophical works (i.e., his Identitätsphilosophie and his Freiheitsschrift). Through these clarifications, I hope to emphasize the uniqueness and richness of Schelling’s configuration of Nature.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"143 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115214358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Giorgi Lebanidze: Hegel’s Transcendental Ontology 《黑格尔的先验本体论》
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0031
Florian Ganzinger
{"title":"Giorgi Lebanidze: Hegel’s Transcendental Ontology","authors":"Florian Ganzinger","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0031","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121547288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge 感性知识的随机性
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-08-10 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0018
Daniel E. Kalpokas
{"title":"Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge","authors":"Daniel E. Kalpokas","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlements and commitments of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128509543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action 随机与奎因的视角混合De Re态度归因:行动解释中的一个问题的解决
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-08-09 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2020-0004
S. Crawford
{"title":"Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action","authors":"S. Crawford","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2020-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2020-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Making it Explicit Robert Brandom claims that perspectivally hybrid de re attitude ascriptions explain what an agent actually did, from the point of view of the ascriber, whether or not that was what the agent intended to do. There is a well-known problem, however, first brought to attention by Quine, but curiously ignored by Brandom, that threatens to undermine the role of de re ascriptions in the explanation of action, a problem that stems directly from the fact that, unlike de dicto ascriptions, they permit the attribution of inconsistent attitudes to agents. I propose a solution to the problem which I believe is consistent with Brandom’s approach to the nature of intentionality and the explanation of action.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129376471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Relational Account of Moral Normativity: The Neo-Kantian Notion of We-Subject 道德规范的关系解释:新康德主义的自我主体概念
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-08-09 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0014
R. Redaelli
{"title":"A Relational Account of Moral Normativity: The Neo-Kantian Notion of We-Subject","authors":"R. Redaelli","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of the paper is to provide a relational explanation of the sources of moral normativity, within a Neo-Kantian framework. To this purpose, the key notions employed are those of we-society and stance-taking, developed by Neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert. Specifically, by resorting to such notions, the paper attempts to overcome two limits ascribed to the theory of moral normativity of Ch. Korsgaard: namely W. Smith’s objection of solipsism and S. Crowell’s problem of non-deliberate action, whereby Ch. Korsgaard’s identification of the source of normativity in reflection would lead her theory to a form of solipsism and to failing to explain actions based on so-called ‘mindless coping’. In tackling these objections, the paper outlines a Rickertian inspired theory, according to which the sources of moral normativity can be explained on the basis of the heterological I-You relationship, which is the foundation of the we-society intended as a set of values, patterns of expectations, tacit consents, and procedural knowledge.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126825554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Frontmatter
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-frontmatter2
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引用次数: 0
The Scientific Weltanschauung: (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy 科学世界观:狄尔泰、雅斯贝尔斯与分析哲学的(反)自然主义
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-06-23 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0016
Thomas J. Spiegel
{"title":"The Scientific Weltanschauung: (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy","authors":"Thomas J. Spiegel","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124180445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Schelling’s Narrative Philosophy and Ankersmit’s Narrative Logic – Is There Any Philosophy to Narrative? 谢林的叙事哲学与安克斯米特的叙事逻辑——叙事有哲学吗?
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-06-04 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0013
K. Filutowska
{"title":"Schelling’s Narrative Philosophy and Ankersmit’s Narrative Logic – Is There Any Philosophy to Narrative?","authors":"K. Filutowska","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper considers the problem of a narrative philosophy according to F. W. J. Schelling and narrative logic according to Franklin Ankersmit. Referring to these examples, I ask whether there is any philosophy to narrative at all. First, I discuss Schelling’s views from his unfinished work “The Ages of the World,” as well as his later dialectics of mythology of revelation from the system of the ages of the world. I focus on a dialectics of figurative and speculative order, which is at the core of Schelling’s project to tell philosophy in the form of poetry and demonstrate the origins of Schelling’s narrative philosophy in his early, transcendental thought. Next, I juxtapose my findings with Ankersmit’s analysis of historians’ language. I also consider whether, and how, some of these ideas can be applied in contemporary narrative research.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133896267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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