Journal of Transcendental Philosophy最新文献

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The Conceptual Origin of Worldview in Kant and Fichte 康德与费希世界观的概念起源
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-06-27 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2022-0007
Alexander T. Englert
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引用次数: 1
Peter Antich, Motivation and the Primacy of Perception: Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Knowledge, Athens OH: Ohio UP, 2021, pp. 264, ISBN 978-0-8214-2432-2 (hbk) $95.00. Peter Antich,动机与知觉的首要性:梅洛-庞蒂的知识现象学,Athens: Ohio UP, 2021, pp. 264, ISBN 978-0-8214-2432-2 (hbk) $95.00。
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-06-17 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2022-0017
Erica Harris
{"title":"Peter Antich, Motivation and the Primacy of Perception: Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Knowledge, Athens OH: Ohio UP, 2021, pp. 264, ISBN 978-0-8214-2432-2 (hbk) $95.00.","authors":"Erica Harris","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2022-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2022-0017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130363840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Matthew Rukgaber, Space, Time, and the Origins of Transcendental Idealism: Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy from 1747 to 1770 《空间、时间与先验唯心主义的起源:1747 - 1770年伊曼努尔·康德哲学》
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-06-13 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2022-0019
Bryan Hall
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引用次数: 0
Brandon C. Look.: Leibniz and Kant Brandon C.看。莱布尼茨和康德
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-06-06 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2022-0025
Pierpaolo Betti
{"title":"Brandon C. Look.: Leibniz and Kant","authors":"Pierpaolo Betti","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2022-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2022-0025","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128201582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mapping the Critical System: Kant and the Highest Good 描绘批判体系:康德与最高善
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-04-11 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0026
K. Sweet
{"title":"Mapping the Critical System: Kant and the Highest Good","authors":"K. Sweet","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay considers Kant’s concept of the highest good from a systematic point of view. The two spheres of freedom and nature—of the practical and theoretical—need to be brought into a causal relation for the highest good to be achieved. Kant seems to offer numerous possibilities for how human beings are able to think that it is possible for the highest good to be attainable. I argue that it is only in the third Critique, however, that Kant articulates an answer that also establishes freedom and nature within a larger system. The third Critique does this by positing a third, independent and mediating sphere of human experience that allows a transition between freedom and nature to be effected. This answer to the problem of the highest good is distinctive because the causal efficacy of reason in attaining its own demands is preserved. I examine Kant’s view by way of an analysis of his discussion of ‘territory’ and ‘domain’ in the Introduction to the text.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122026883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Brandom 罗伯特·布兰顿的哲学主题
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2022-0008
Corinne L. Bloch-Mullins, Yoon Choi, S. Luft
{"title":"Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Brandom","authors":"Corinne L. Bloch-Mullins, Yoon Choi, S. Luft","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2022-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2022-0008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"34 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132790910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Substitutional Accounting for Singular Terms: Some Problems and a Slightly More Kantian Solution for Brandom 奇异项的代换会计:一些问题和略为康德式的随机解法
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2022-0004
Micah Lewin
{"title":"Substitutional Accounting for Singular Terms: Some Problems and a Slightly More Kantian Solution for Brandom","authors":"Micah Lewin","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2022-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2022-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article grapples with Robert Brandom’s account of singular terms. I argue that neither Brandom’s answer to the question “What are singular terms?” nor his answer to the question “Why are there any singular terms?” works as they currently stand. Brandom’s substitution-inferential semantic account of what singular terms are fails to distinguish between the semantic role of singular terms and indefinite descriptions, and Brandom’s “expressive transcendental deduction” for why there are any singular terms fails to deciseively show that singular terms are expressively necessary for the use of logical vocabulary. Still, I then characterize how Brandom does have resources within his substitution-inferential semantics to give a better, revised answer to the question “What are singular terms?” that both fits programmatically within his framework and has a curious Kantian parallel. I leave the matter offering a Brandom-friendly replacement account for why there are any singular terms thus conceived for another occasion.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128356409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Debunkings de dicto and de re : Brandom on Genealogical Explanation 揭秘口述与口述:家谱解释中的随机现象
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-03-25 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0046
W. Wolf
{"title":"Debunkings de dicto and de re : Brandom on Genealogical Explanation","authors":"W. Wolf","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0046","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One of the most surprisingly prominent themes in Robert Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust is the role of genealogical explanations. Brandom sees genealogies or ‘debunking arguments’ as significant because of their ability to deprive our discursive acts (claims and actions) of the normative status they require to be genuinely discursive or conceptual. His solution to the problem of genealogy is to offer rationalizing reconstructions of others’ discursive acts, which credit them with normative status. He calls this “forgiveness” (a notion similar to Davidson’s “charity”). In this paper, I provide some additional conceptual resources to explicate Brandom’s notions of genealogy and forgiveness. These resources allow me to discriminate between two alternate and seemingly incompatible ways of responding to genealogies. One way depends on rationalizing explanations that still attempt to attribute commitments to their subjects, the other avoids making such attributions in favor of explaining commitments only in terms of norms accepted by the rationalizer. I argue that Brandom’s work sometimes promotes the latter response to genealogy but that this tendency should be eliminated from the account.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129981717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Problems with the Highest Good 最高善的问题
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-03-07 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0022
C. Fugate
{"title":"Problems with the Highest Good","authors":"C. Fugate","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I want to focus not on the problems that I believe may threaten Kant’s account of the highest good, but instead on those that I believe threaten the majority of the interpretive reconstructions attempted by commentators and thus prevent the emergence of a consensus in the near future. My goal is to set forth exactly four problems to which I believe any successful interpretation or reconstruction of Kant’s account of the highest good will have to provide substantive solutions and, in doing so, either break new theoretical ground or at least provide a more comprehensive methodology for sorting through the texts.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128232389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Natural and Transcendental Illusions in a Kantian-Pragmatist Philosophical Anthropology 论康德-实用主义哲学人类学中的自然幻觉与先验幻觉
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2021-0044
S. Pihlström
{"title":"On Natural and Transcendental Illusions in a Kantian-Pragmatist Philosophical Anthropology","authors":"S. Pihlström","doi":"10.1515/jtph-2021-0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0044","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The covid-19 pandemic and the increasingly polarized political situation in many countries today have highlighted the significance of various humanly natural intellectual mistakes, cognitive biases, and widespread inferential errors. This essay examines, at a philosophical meta-level, the relation between our natural epistemic errors and the kind of humanly unavoidable transcendental illusion analyzed by Immanuel Kant in the Transcendental Dialectic of the First Critique. While both kinds of illusion are usually primarily discussed in an epistemological context, my approach is not exclusively epistemic. Rather, my main argument extends the broadly Kantian critique of reason – as a critical via negativa focusing on what is epistemically “wrong” about us, as the kind of cognitive agents we human beings naturally are – into a pragmatically enriched investigation of “the negative” as constitutive of the human condition, that is, our lack of sufficiently critical epistemic and ethical capacities, including our propensity to both cognitive error and moral evil. Our being inescapably inclined to manifest such negativities in our epistemic and ethical lives, and our insufficient awareness of doing so, are, arguably, “transcendental facts” about us, to be critically examined in terms of a Kantian-cum-pragmatist philosophical anthropology. This significantly enriches our picture of transcendental philosophy.","PeriodicalId":425825,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transcendental Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129267603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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