21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)最新文献

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The Pump: a decade of covert fun 泵:十年的隐蔽乐趣
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.56
Myong H. Kang, I. S. Moskowitz, Stanley Chincheck
{"title":"The Pump: a decade of covert fun","authors":"Myong H. Kang, I. S. Moskowitz, Stanley Chincheck","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.56","url":null,"abstract":"This paper traces the ten plus year history of the Naval Research Laboratory's Pump idea. The Pump was theorized, designed, and built at the Naval Research Laboratory's Center for High Assurance Computer Systems. The reason for the Pump is the need to send messages from a \"low\" enclave to a \"high\" enclave, in a secure and reliable manner. In particular, the Pump was designed to minimize the covert channel threat from the necessary message acknowledgements, without penalizing system performance and reliability. We review the need for the Pump, the design of the Pump, the variants of the Pump, and the current status of the Pump, along with manufacturing and certification difficulties","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126046875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 73
An integrity verification scheme for DNS zone file based on security impact analysis 基于安全影响分析的DNS区域文件完整性验证方案
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.9
R. Chandramouli, S. Rose
{"title":"An integrity verification scheme for DNS zone file based on security impact analysis","authors":"R. Chandramouli, S. Rose","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.9","url":null,"abstract":"The domain name system (DNS) is the world's largest distributed computing system that performs the key function of translating user-friendly domain names to IP addresses through a process called name resolution. After looking at the protection measures for securing the DNS transactions, we discover that the trust in the name resolution process ultimately depends upon the integrity of the data repository that authoritative name servers of DNS use. This data repository is called a zone file. Hence we analyze in detail the data content relationships in a zone file that have security impacts. We then develop a taxonomy and associated population of constraints. We also have developed a platform-independent framework using XML, XML schema and XSLT for encoding those constraints and verifying them against the XML encoded zone file data to detect integrity violations","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"44 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126126892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Verify results of network intrusion alerts using lightweight protocol analysis 使用轻量级协议分析验证网络入侵警报的结果
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.62
J. Zhou, Adam Carlson, M. Bishop
{"title":"Verify results of network intrusion alerts using lightweight protocol analysis","authors":"J. Zhou, Adam Carlson, M. Bishop","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.62","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.62","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a method to verify the result of attacks detected by signature-based network intrusion detection systems using lightweight protocol analysis. The observation is that network protocols often have short meaningful status codes saved at the beginning of server responses upon client requests. A successful intrusion that alters the behavior of a network application server often results in an unexpected server response, which does not contain the valid protocol status code. This can be used to verify the result of the intrusion attempt. We then extend this method to verify the result of attacks that still generate valid protocol status code in the server responses. We evaluate this approach by augmenting Snort signatures and testing on real world data. We show that some simple changes to Snort signatures can effectively verify the result of attacks against the application servers, thus significantly improve the quality of alerts","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115617233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 41
Fault attacks on dual-rail encoded systems 双轨编码系统的故障攻击
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.25
J. Waddle, D. Wagner
{"title":"Fault attacks on dual-rail encoded systems","authors":"J. Waddle, D. Wagner","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.25","url":null,"abstract":"Fault induction attacks are a serious concern for designers of secure embedded systems. An ideal solution would be a generic circuit transformation that would produce circuits that are robust against fault induction attacks. We develop a framework for analyzing the security of systems against single fault attacks and apply it to a recent proposed method (dual-rail encoding) for generically securing circuits against single fault attacks. Ultimately, we find that the method does not hold up under our threat models: n-bit cryptographic keys can be extracted from the device with roughly n trials. We conclude that secure designs should incorporate explicit countermeasures to either directly address or attempt to invalidate our threat models","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"17 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122591659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24
Building evidence graphs for network forensics analysis 为网络取证分析构建证据图
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.14
Wei Wang, Thomas E. Daniels
{"title":"Building evidence graphs for network forensics analysis","authors":"Wei Wang, Thomas E. Daniels","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.14","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present techniques for a network forensics analysis mechanism that includes effective evidence presentation, manipulation and automated reasoning. We propose the evidence graph as a novel graph model to facilitate the presentation and manipulation of intrusion evidence. For automated evidence analysis, we develop a hierarchical reasoning framework that includes local reasoning and global reasoning. Local reasoning aims to infer the roles of suspicious hosts from local observations. Global reasoning aims to identify group of strongly correlated hosts in the attack and derive their relationships. By using the evidence graph model, we effectively integrate analyst feedback into the automated reasoning process. Experimental results demonstrate the potential and effectiveness of our proposed approaches","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125493614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 46
Looking back at the Bell-La Padula model 回顾Bell-La Padula模型
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.37
D. E. Bell
{"title":"Looking back at the Bell-La Padula model","authors":"D. E. Bell","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.37","url":null,"abstract":"The Bell-La Padula security model produced conceptual tools for the analysis and design of secure computer systems. Together with its sibling engineering initiatives, it identified and elucidated security principles that endure today. This paper reviews those security principles, first in their own time, and then in the context of today's computer and network environment","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133645750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 160
User-centered security: stepping up to the grand challenge 以用户为中心的安全:迎接重大挑战
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.60
M. Zurko
{"title":"User-centered security: stepping up to the grand challenge","authors":"M. Zurko","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.60","url":null,"abstract":"User-centered security has been identified as a grand challenge in information security and assurance. It is on the brink of becoming an established subdomain of both security and human/computer interface (HCI) research, and an influence on the product development lifecycle. Both security and HCI rely on the reality of interactions with users to prove the utility and validity of their work. As practitioners and researchers in those areas, we still face major issues when applying even the most foundational tools used in either of these fields across both of them. This essay discusses the systemic roadblocks at the social, technical, and pragmatic levels that user-centered security must overcome to make substantial breakthroughs. Expert evaluation and user testing are producing effective usable security today. Principles such as safe staging, enumerating usability failure risks, integrated security, transparent security and reliance on trustworthy authorities can also form the basis of improved systems","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114463584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 82
Exploiting independent state for network intrusion detection 利用独立状态进行网络入侵检测
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.24
Robin Sommer, V. Paxson
{"title":"Exploiting independent state for network intrusion detection","authors":"Robin Sommer, V. Paxson","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.24","url":null,"abstract":"Network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) critically rely on processing a great deal of state. Often much of this state resides solely in the volatile processor memory accessible to a single user-level process on a single machine. In this work, we highlight the power of independent state, i.e., internal fine-grained state that can be propagated from one instance of a NIDS to others running either concurrently or subsequently. Independent state provides us with a wealth of possible applications that hold promise for enhancing the capabilities of NIDSs. We discuss an implementation of independent state for the Bro NIDS and examine how we can then leverage independent state for distributed processing, load parallelization, selective preservation of state across restarts and crashes, dynamic reconfiguration, high level policy maintenance, and support for profiling and debugging. We have experimented with each of these applications in several large environments and are now working to integrate them into the sites' operational monitoring. A performance evaluation shows that our implementation is suitable for use even in large scale environments","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133914033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 46
Understanding complex network attack graphs through clustered adjacency matrices 通过聚类邻接矩阵理解复杂网络攻击图
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.58
S. Noel, S. Jajodia
{"title":"Understanding complex network attack graphs through clustered adjacency matrices","authors":"S. Noel, S. Jajodia","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.58","url":null,"abstract":"We apply adjacency matrix clustering to network attack graphs for attack correlation, prediction, and hypothesizing. We self-multiply the clustered adjacency matrices to show attacker reachability across the network for a given number of attack steps, culminating in transitive closure for attack prediction over all possible number of steps. This reachability analysis provides a concise summary of the impact of network configuration changes on the attack graph. Using our framework, we also place intrusion alarms in the context of vulnerability-based attack graphs, so that false alarms become apparent and missed detections can be inferred. We introduce a graphical technique that shows multiple-step attacks by matching rows and columns of the clustered adjacency matrix. This allows attack impact/responses to be identified and prioritized according to the number of attack steps to victim machines, and allows attack origins to be determined. Our techniques have quadratic complexity in the size of the attack graph","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127601374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 128
Replay attack in TCG specification and solution TCG中的重放攻击规范及解决方案
21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSAC.2005.47
D. Bruschi, L. Cavallaro, A. Lanzi, Mattia Monga
{"title":"Replay attack in TCG specification and solution","authors":"D. Bruschi, L. Cavallaro, A. Lanzi, Mattia Monga","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2005.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.47","url":null,"abstract":"We prove the existence of a flaw which we individuated in the design of the object-independent authorization protocol (OIAP), which represents one of the building blocks of the trusted platform module (TPM), the core of the trusted computing platforms (TPs) as devised by the trusted computing group (TCG) standards. In particular, we prove, also with the support of a model checker, that the protocol is exposed to replay attacks, which could be used for compromising the correct behavior of a TP We also propose a countermeasure to undertake in order to avoid such an attack as well as any replay attacks to the aforementioned protocol","PeriodicalId":422994,"journal":{"name":"21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'05)","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115345001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 42
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