双轨编码系统的故障攻击

J. Waddle, D. Wagner
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引用次数: 24

摘要

故障感应攻击是安全嵌入式系统设计者非常关注的问题。理想的解决方案是一种通用的电路转换,它将产生对故障感应攻击具有鲁棒性的电路。我们开发了一个框架来分析系统对单故障攻击的安全性,并将其应用于最近提出的一种方法(双轨编码),用于一般保护电路免受单故障攻击。最终,我们发现该方法在我们的威胁模型下并不成立:n位加密密钥可以通过大约n次试验从设备中提取。我们的结论是,安全设计应该包含明确的对策,以直接解决或试图使我们的威胁模型失效
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fault attacks on dual-rail encoded systems
Fault induction attacks are a serious concern for designers of secure embedded systems. An ideal solution would be a generic circuit transformation that would produce circuits that are robust against fault induction attacks. We develop a framework for analyzing the security of systems against single fault attacks and apply it to a recent proposed method (dual-rail encoding) for generically securing circuits against single fault attacks. Ultimately, we find that the method does not hold up under our threat models: n-bit cryptographic keys can be extracted from the device with roughly n trials. We conclude that secure designs should incorporate explicit countermeasures to either directly address or attempt to invalidate our threat models
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